



**This electronic thesis or dissertation has been
downloaded from Explore Bristol Research,
<http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk>**

Author:
Shepherd, Laura

Title:
**The impact of armed conflict on women and girls : a feminist reconceptualisation of
(international) security and (gender) violence**

General rights

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written consent of the author.


Take down policy

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

- Your contact details
- Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
- An outline of the nature of the complaint

On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.

The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Girls: A Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence



Laura Shepherd
University of Bristol

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in
accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law
(Department of Politics)

Submitted in August 2006

Word Count: 70568

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 1325 in October 2000 to address gender issues arising in conflict and post-conflict situations. As Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings argued, “1325 is highly significant because it is the *first* time the Security Council has devoted an entire session to debating women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations” (2004: 130, emphasis in original). This research uses UNSCR 1325 as a vehicle for the analysis of discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence, with the intention of demonstrating that dominant understandings of these concepts contribute to continuing violence and insecurity that in turn play a part in constructing both gender and the international. Through reflection on the theorisation of these concepts I demonstrate their interaction, using critiques of the conventional conceptualisations to justify the alternatives that I offer in a review of the relevant literature.

I demonstrate that, even given the persuasiveness and relevance of one or more of the explanatory factors advanced by the relevant Reports of the Secretary-General, the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325 has an enormous influence over the practicalities of its implementation. That is, the liberal concepts around which it is organised, the meanings (re)produced within the document and the tensions and inconsistencies within it have contributed to, indeed mandated, its failure. I offer an analysis of the competing narratives concerning the production of UNSCR 1325 constructed by the two central actors: the United Nations and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. In doing so, I argue that the Resolution’s concerns with gender mainstreaming and peace(state)building are premised on liberal conceptualisations of (international) security and (gender) violence, and that the UNSCR 1325 would need to look radically different in order to produce the reforms it claims to seek.

Dedications and Acknowledgements

This research was completed with support from the Economic and Social Research Council, for which I am extremely grateful. I also offer thanks to the staff and research students, in particular Penny Griffin and Christina Rowley, in the Department of Politics at the University of Bristol for their encouragement, interest and inspirations. Sincerest thanks are also due to my supervisors, Jutta Weldes and Judith Squires, who supported this project (and its author) for the past three years.

LJS


AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original except where indicated by special reference in the text and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.

SIGNED:



DATE: 25 August 2006

The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Girls:

A Feminist Reconceptualisation of

(International) Security and (Gender) Violence

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	3
LIST OF TABLES AND LIST OF FIGURES.....	4
INTRODUCTION	5
INTRODUCTION	5
<i>Contributions of a Feminist Poststructuralist</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Introducing 1325.....</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Aims</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Chapter Outline</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Endings and Beginnings</i>	<i>20</i>
CHAPTER ONE: ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES	22
<i>Reflections on Method</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>On Discourse</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>On Power</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>On Representation</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Analytical Strategies.....</i>	<i>34</i>
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	43
<i>(Gender) Violence.....</i>	<i>44</i>
‘Violence Against Women’	46
‘Gender Violence’	51
‘The Violent Reproduction of Gender’	59
<i>(International) Security.....</i>	<i>64</i>
‘National security’	67
‘International Security’	76
‘The Violent Reproduction of the International’	84
<i>The Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence.....</i>	<i>90</i>
CHAPTER THREE: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S REPORTS.....	97
<i>About the Report: Reporting on UNSCR 1325</i>	<i>98</i>
<i>Analysing the Report: Problematising the Secretary-General’s Reports..</i>	<i>104</i>
Gender.....	105
Violence.....	111
International.....	115
Security	121
<i>Challenging the Reports: The Implementation of UNSCR 1325</i>	<i>124</i>
CHAPTER FOUR: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325.....	127
<i>About UNSCR 1325</i>	<i>127</i>
<i>Understanding UNSCR 1325: A Descriptive Reading</i>	<i>131</i>

<i>ProblematISING UNSCR 1325: A Discourse-Theoretical Reading.....</i>	<i>134</i>
Gender.....	135
Violence.....	142
International.....	145
Security.....	148
<i>Challenging UNSCR 1325: Conclusions.....</i>	<i>151</i>
CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLORING THE NARRATIVES OF PRODUCTION OF UNSCR 1325.....	155
<i>Contextualising the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security.....</i>	<i>157</i>
<i>Analysing the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security.....</i>	<i>161</i>
<i>Contextualising the United Nations Security Council.....</i>	<i>168</i>
<i>Analysing the United Nations Security Council.....</i>	<i>172</i>
<i>Challenging the Narratives of Production: Conclusions.....</i>	<i>177</i>
CONCLUSIONS.....	184
<i>'How Does a Policy Mean?'</i>	<i>185</i>
<i>The Violent Reproduction of the International.....</i>	<i>188</i>
<i>The Violent Reproduction of Gender.....</i>	<i>192</i>
<i>Towards a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence.....</i>	<i>196</i>
APPENDIX ONE: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325.....	199
APPENDIX TWO: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY (2002).....	203
APPENDIX THREE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY (2004).....	219
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES.....	245
JODA.....	<i>Journal of Gender Studies</i>
UK.....	United Kingdom
UN.....	United Nations
UNDAW.....	United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women
UNDP.....	United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO.....	United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
UNFEM.....	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNWOMEN.....	United Nations Women's Empowerment Fund
UNSC.....	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR.....	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSO.....	United Nations Security Council
USA.....	United States of America
USSR.....	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCRWC.....	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WHO.....	World Health Organization
WIPF.....	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

List of Abbreviations

AI	Amnesty International
BPFA	Beijing Platform for Action
BRIDGE	Briefings on Development and Gender
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CoGG	Commission on Global Governance
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEVAW	Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
DTA	Discourse Theoretical Analysis
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
GA	General Assembly
HAP	Hague Appeal for Peace
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationary Office
IA	International Alert
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
INSTRAW	United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
IR	International Relations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGO WG	Non-Governmental Organisation Working Group
P5	Permanent members of the UNSC
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
TODA	Text-Oriented Discourse Analysis
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAW	United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNFWCW	United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCRWC	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WHO	World Health Organisation
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

List of Tables and List of Figures

TABLE 1: ILLUSTRATING THE DYNAMICS OF CRITIQUE..... 17

TABLE 2: CRITICAL REVIEW OF GENDER VIOLENCE LITERATURE 64

TABLE 3: CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LITERATURE 90

TABLE 4: TOWARDS A FEMINIST RECONCEPTUALISATION OF (INTERNATIONAL)
SECURITY AND (GENDER) VIOLENCE..... 96

FIGURE 1: SIX CRITIQUES OF ‘VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN’ LITERATURE..... 51

FIGURE 2: SIX CRITIQUES OF ‘GENDER VIOLENCE’ LITERATURE..... 58

FIGURE 3: SIX CRITIQUES OF ‘NATIONAL SECURITY’ LITERATURE..... 75

FIGURE 4: SIX CRITIQUES OF ‘INTERNATIONAL SECURITY’ LITERATURE..... 83

¹ All of these ‘international’ articles have been from the ‘Security’ Department of the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) and are available on the IISS website (http://www.iiiss.org). For a more detailed discussion of the politics of international security, see the book by the author, *International Security and the Politics of the International* (2006). For a more detailed discussion of the politics of international security, see the book by the author, *International Security and the Politics of the International* (2006).

² These are the main themes of the book by the author, *International Security and the Politics of the International* (2006).

Introduction

Women's bodies have actually become battle grounds ... the violence is all about destroying ... the inbuilt strength of a woman to build a community.

Ruth Ojiambo Ochieng, Uganda, 2006

We have documented ... systematic sexual violence, committed by the Burmese military as a weapon of war in the ongoing conflict ... where women are raped ... in order to terrorise the women, and the local community, morally, psychologically, and also physically.

Nang Charm Tong, Burma, 2006

We've had reports from women ... about some very difficult situations that lesbians have been going through. There is more violence towards them because they've broken away from the gender role expected of them. This is why there is more repression. ... they suffer direct repression on their bodies and their lives.

Elisabeth Castillo, Colombia, 2006¹

These personal narratives, provided by women reflecting on the difficulties of coordinating research on and activism against gendered violence, are disturbing to say the least. Taken from the website of Amnesty International's 'Stop Violence Against Women' campaign, the above testimonies draw attention not only to the crucial need to better the experiences of women who live under threat of violence, but also to the conceptual and practical impediments to combating violence against women in contemporary academic and policy environments. In the academic environment of International Relations (IR) as a discipline, one of the most salient obstacles is the ways in which gendered violence has been conventionally and conceptually precluded as an object of study (Peterson and Runyan 1999: 115-117).

Feminist challenges to the well-defined and equally well-defended boundaries of IR² have drawn attention to the potential not only of transgressing

¹ All of these testimonials are taken from the 'Stories' page on Amnesty International's web portal devoted to stopping violence against women, at <http://web.amnesty.org/actforwomen/stories-index-eng> [accessed 25 August 2006]. For a personal reflection on the politics of presenting such testimonials as the introduction to research, see my (2006) 'Loud Voices Behind the Wall: Gender Violence and the Violent Reproduction of the International'.

² There is an enormous amount of literature on this subject. See, *inter alia*, Keohane 1989 and Weber's 1994 response; Zalewski 1995; Jones 1996 and Carver, Cochran and Squires' 1998

those boundaries but also to the importance of understanding (gendered) violence in relation to security.³ Turning the analytical focus of this research to *gendered* violence is motivated by two related concerns. “[V]iolence establishes social relationships ... it marks and makes bodies ... it constitutes subjects even as it renders them incomplete” (D’Cruze and Rao 2004: 503). This latter understanding of violence, as constitutive of subjectivity, has historically been absented from academic theorising of security, where violence is conventionally conceived of as a functional mechanism within an anarchic international system.⁴ Second, given that violence ‘marks and makes bodies’, I seek to understand the types of body that are marked and made through violence that is specifically gendered – that is, violence that “emerges from a profound desire to keep the binary order of gender natural or necessary” (Butler 2004: 35). Stemming from a desire to formulate a theorisation of security in relation to violence, I argue that studying the subjects produced through gendered violence in the context of debates over the meaning and content of security provides more coherent accounts of both violence and security.

The notion that identity is central to theorising security has been well explicated by scholars critical of conventional, state-centric approaches to security.⁵ “Recognising gender as a significant dimension of identity and security opens the door to non-state-based views of security and aptly illustrates how identity shapes individual and collective security needs” (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004: 156). However, most of these critical voices seek to interject into academic debates on security by broadening the accepted agenda of security – to include the recognition of multiple phenomena, from earthquakes to economic deprivation, as threatening to security – and proliferating the referent objects of security discourse, such that security is no longer solely the concern of states but also of communities, societies and individuals. While scholars of security have contested the parameters of debates about security, and feminist scholars of

response; Sylvester 1996; Tickner 1997; Sylvester 2002; Carver (ed.) 2003; Steans 2003a; Agathangelou and Ling 2004.

³ Literature addressing feminist conceptualisations of security includes Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992; Broadhead 2000; Hansen 2000; Blanchard 2003; Youngs 2003; Hoogensen and Rottem 2004.

⁴ See, *inter alia*, Waltz 1979; Herz 1950; Mearsheimer 1995, 1990.

⁵ For example, Campbell 1998; McSweeney 1999; Bilgin 2003.

security have drawn attention to the importance of gender as a category of analysis, there is little work being done on the ways in which the organisational logics of security and violence are discursively constituted (see Shepherd and Weldes *forthcoming* 2006).

Contributions of a Feminist Poststructuralist⁶

I identify myself as a feminist researcher, and recognise that this entails a curiosity about “the concept, nature and practice of gender” (Zalewski 1995: 341). This curiosity questions the ways in which gender is made meaningful in social/political interactions and the practices – or performances – through which gender configures boundaries of subjectivity. I espouse a feminism that seeks to challenge conventional constructions of gendered subjectivity and political community, while acknowledging the intellectual heritage of feminisms that seek to claim rights on behalf of a stable subject and maintain fidelity to a regime of truth that constitutes the universal category of ‘women’ (Butler 2004: 8-11). While a feminist project that does not assume a stable ontology of gender may seem problematic, I argue, along with Judith Butler, that “[t]he deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated” (1999: 189).

A focus on articulation entails a further commitment to the analytical centrality of language – or, as I see it, discourse.⁷ Elizabeth Grosz argues that an integral part of feminist theory is the willingness to “tackle the question of the language available for theoretical purposes and the constraints it places on what can be said” (1987: 479). To me, this aspect of feminist theory is definitive of my feminist politics. If “men and women are the stories that have been told about ‘men’ and ‘women’” (Sylvester 1994: 4), and the way that ‘men’ and ‘women’ both act and are acted upon, then the language used to tell those stories and describe those actions is not just worthy of analytical attention but can form the basis of an engaged critique. Furthermore, an approach that recognises that there

⁶ I use the representation of ‘poststructural’ rather than ‘post-structural’ to indicate that I consider myself to be still ‘structural’, building on it, rather than hyphenetically separable.

⁷ I discuss the concept of discourse, and the ways in which I see it as different from language, in Chapter One.

is more to the discursive constitution of gender – the stories that are told about ‘men’ and ‘women’ – than linguistic practices can enable thinking gender differently.

Alison Stone, reading Butler’s work on feminism and political theory, argues that this type of approach constitutes a “genealogical feminism”, in which the organisational logics of feminism – historically assumed to be ‘women’ and/or ‘gender’ – are “continually re-enacted through corporeal activities” (2005: 12). This approach allows for research that investigates the ways in which ‘women’ as subjects and objects act, speak, write and represent themselves, are represented, written about, spoken about and acted on. There is no singular feminine subject or feminist approach, just as, in my understanding, the notion of a singular feminist project is unsustainable. My project, therefore, seeks to contribute to contemporary debates in its desire to think differently the concepts of gender, violence, security and the international by investigating how these concepts are (re)presented and (re)produced in a particular discursive context.⁸ Such a concern, at least with regard to gender, is indicative of not only a feminist project but also a poststructural politics (Flax 1990). I argue, along with Butler, that poststructural political research centralises power, and takes the investigation of practices of power to be “the very precondition of a politically engaged critique” (1994: 157).

Espousing a poststructural politics is not always acknowledged to be compatible with a commitment to a feminist politics.⁹ Traversing this terrain entails constructing a politics that speaks of “undecidability” (Elam 1994: 32). With reference to the difficulties of formulating a feminist politics without a definitive subject, Diane Elam argues that “undecidability forms part of a situation of representation, political action, or ethical judgement ... We may not yet know what women can do or be, but feminism has an obligation at the very

⁸ I employ the bracketed (re) to indicate that these practices do not conjure fully formed objects, subjects and the relationships between them within a given discursive terrain but draw on the existing knowledges about these subjects and objects in order to construct or (re)legitimise an intelligible ‘reality’. It also signifies that these processes are always ongoing and never complete. I discuss representation, discourse and power in detail in Chapter One.

⁹ See Nicholson (ed.) 1990 for a collection of insightful and thought-provoking essays on this theme, and Zalewski 2000 for reflections on the possibilities of ‘feminism after postmodernism’.

least to think about what this might mean” (ibid.). Thus, the theory/practice¹⁰ of feminist poststructuralisms in whatever guise does not represent “simply another oxymoron, a new quagmire of contradiction for feminist to sink in” (Moi 1990: 368) but rather a dynamic and thorough exploration of what feminism itself ‘might mean’.

This in no way suggests that others feminisms have not enabled the articulation of critiques of gender and other relations of power that are valid, vigorous and vital. My political consciousness developed through the tracing of feminist work in the discipline of anthropology (see, *inter alia*, Rosaldo and Lamphere (eds) 1974; Moore 1988) that drew attention to the ‘margins, silences and bottom rungs’ of the discipline.¹¹ It was from this perspective that I learned what I meant when I called myself a feminist, and what it meant politically to pay close attention to the development of gendered subjectivities. This background gave me a strong appreciation for the particular rather than the abstract, the specific rather than the general, and most of all for the practices of power that are product/productive of ways of being in the world. The value in telling a different story is in the telling, in illustrating the ways in which these stories are constructed and could be constructed differently. The transience is best encapsulated in this quote from de Lauretis:

This shift implies, in my opinion, a displacement and a self-displacement: leaving or giving up a place that is safe, that is ‘home’ ... for another place that is unknown and risky, ... a place of discourse from which speaking and thinking are at best tentative, uncertain and unguaranteed. But the leaving is not a choice: one could not live there in the first place (cited in Brooks 1997, p.211).

Introducing 1325

In this research, I explore the discursive constitution of concepts of (gender) violence and (international) security in particular texts.¹² In using the

¹⁰ I have deliberately run these terms together as I perceive their rigid separation as problematic, a point to which I return in Chapter Two. I see theory as a form of practice and vice versa.

¹¹ See Enloe 1996 for an exploration of this construction.

¹² Throughout this text, I use the bracketed form <(international) security and (gender) violence> to indicate the mutability of these discourses – that is, to draw attention to the ways in which security and violence can be differently inter/nationalised and gendered. When I use the unbracketed form <international security and gender violence>, I refer specifically to the

texts that I do as vehicles for analysis I emphatically do not want to suggest that the documents as they stand are too problematic to serve as the foundation for academic and activist work that seeks to combat gender violence and frame such violence as an international security concern. The texts themselves are treated as vehicles for the theoretical investigation I undertake here: an exploration of the potential for reconceptualising the concepts of (gender) violence and (international) security. However, the project undertaken here is explicitly not ‘merely’ theoretical, or ‘academic’ in the pejorative sense of the term.¹³ My interest in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence is indeed motivated by a desire to see whether these concepts could be reconceived, in keeping with a commitment to thinking these concepts differently. However, I also consider the implications of such a reconceptualisation on policy as well as academic work. I wish to provide for those undertaking such work the possibility of alternative concepts with which to proceed. Therefore, this project, despite its theoretical leaning and heritage, does indeed have an avowedly practical application.

In undertaking this research, I wish to contribute to both policy and academic debates. I offer a reconceptualisation of (international) security and (gender) violence through my analysis, drawing on bodies of academic literature to establish the limits of the relevant discourses. Furthermore, I illustrate the ways in which these concepts, as they currently inform policy and academic debates, are both a product of and productive of the difficulties described above. This project uses United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, and related documentation from the United Nations and the NGO Working Group for Women, Peace and Security, as a vehicle for the analysis of the research question: ‘How are the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence discursively constituted, and with what effects?’. These two institutions both claim a degree of author-ity over the Resolution,¹⁴ the United Nations through

discourses that (re)produce the meaning of security and violence through particular organisational logics of the international and gender. These discourses are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

¹³ In keeping with much commonsense usage of the term, The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘academic’ as not only “relating to education and scholarship” but also “scholarly rather than technical or practical” and “of only theoretical interest”.

¹⁴ I use the hyphenated ‘author-ity’ to draw attention to the connotations of both ownership (author) and control (authority) that the word signifies to me.

the Security Council and the NGO Working Group through the advocacy of its members that, as they claim, successfully resulted in the adoption of the Resolution (NGO WG 2005).

UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000 with the aim of ensuring that all efforts towards peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the conduct of armed conflict itself, would entail sensitivity towards gendered violence and gendered inequalities. The Resolution is an appropriate vehicle for this analysis, providing as it does an articulation of the concepts of gender, violence, security and the international with which I am concerned. The Resolution refers to “the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) and, further, to the need for the international community to “protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse” (ibid: Article 10) in the provision of security.

Thus, I treat UNSCR 1325 as a site at which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence are in contact, a site at which it is possible to identify different articulations of the concepts of gender, violence, security and the international that constitute different discourses of (gender) violence and (international) security. Through discourse-theoretical analysis, I explore the tensions and inconsistencies that are product/productive of the contact of these discourses. That is, specific conceptualisations of security (as ‘international’) and violence (as ‘gender’) inform the Resolution. Through my analysis I unpick the discursive construction of these concepts and investigate the implications of the Resolution, and therefore the concepts that are product/productive of it, for policy and research in this area. I conclude that the organisation of the Resolution around liberal concepts of international security and gender violence suggests that transformation of social/political community can only be achieved through processes of peace(state)building and gender mainstreaming.¹⁵ In developing a critique of these processes, I argue that they cannot deliver the radical reforms that UNSCR 1325 purports to seek.

¹⁵ In the concluding chapter of this research, I argue that development and peacekeeping institutions are implicated in the production of ‘appropriate’ statehood, according to the dominant discourse of ‘international security’. Therefore, I represent the process of peacebuilding thus.

Academic and advocacy research that exists on UNSCR 1325 affirms the significance of the Resolution, arguing for instance that

Resolution 1325 is a watershed political framework that makes women – and a gender perspective – relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations and reconstructing war-torn societies. It makes the pursuit of gender equality relevant to every single Council action, ranging from mine clearance to elections to security sector reform. (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 3).

UNSCR 1325 has been lauded as “unique” (Cohn 2004: 8-9), and has provided governments and non-government actors alike with a comprehensive set of tools with which to approach the issue of conflict resolution through a gendered lens. In a recent survey of civil society activity “[o]ut of a total of 44 respondents, 38 indicated that they use 1325 in their work on women, peace and security issues” (NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security 2004: 5).

However, it has also been recognised that “peace agreements, electoral and judicial reform and government restructuring are only as good as their implementation” (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 84). The capacities of UNSCR 1325, such as they are, while potentially enabling the redress of gendered inequalities in conflict and post-conflict situations, have largely been lost in translation in the Resolution’s journey from adoption to advocacy tool. It has been argued that the implementation of policy aimed at ameliorating the situations of women can function to misrepresent the involvement of women in processes of reconstruction by sustaining the women-as-peacemaker stereotype (Pankhurst 2004: 38; see also Whitbread 2005; Wilson 2005). Also, such ‘gender-sensitive’ policy is easily sidelined, as a result of the widely evidenced belief that “issues regarding women, gender and human rights are ‘soft’ or marginal issues” (Mazurana 2005: 40) that can safely be put on a back burner while the ‘hard’ issues of political organisation and reconstruction are dealt with.

Therefore, while UNSCR 1325 is both a remarkable document in its own right, and an opportunity for the construction of more inclusive reconstruction programmes in a variety of contexts, gaps and weaknesses remain. This project proceeds on the understanding that the concepts around which the Resolution is organised are instrumental in constructing the ways in which specific policy can be implemented; without critical engagement with these concepts, efforts to

understand the limited successes of the Resolution will be partial. While there has been extensive involvement with UNSCR 1325 in the research and construction of advocacy tools and evaluations in specific conflict situations, there has been little consideration of the “productive force [of UNSCR 1325] in shaping conceptions of women and gender” (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004: 136). In identifying the Resolution as a fitting vehicle for analysis, I recognise this ‘productive force’, not only in the context of ‘women and gender’ but also in the discursive construction of violence, security and the international. The discourses that I seek to analyse in this research are both produced by and productive of the documents that I use to conduct the analysis, and UNSCR 1325, mandating as it does subsequent reports by the United Nations Secretary-General that allow for the investigation of the ways in which the articulations of these concepts change over time, is a suitable focus for this investigation.

I offer a feminist reconceptualisation of international security and gender violence because the current conceptualisations are not adequate for the task of thinking gender differently in the context of violence and security. They do not allow for the development of theory or practice that is capable of addressing the complexities inherent in these issues. As Wendy Brown argues, “What suspicion about the naturalness of gender subordination persists when feminism addresses only the wrongs done to women and not the socially produced capacity for women to be wronged, to be victims?” (2003: 11). In the context of security, investigating this capacity manifests in a curiosity about “what Foucault would have called the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all” (Dillon 1996: 14) and the ways in which performances of security discourse function to (re)produce particular configurations of social/political reality. The theoretical inadequacies, relating to the ways in which current conceptualisations of international security and gender violence inform policy and practice, have grievous consequences. These consequences impact not only on future policy addressing gender in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, but also on the grass-roots organisations that use UNSCR 1325 to lobby for reconstruction and thus the individuals who live the impact of these policy decisions.

Aims

The first of four related aims of this project is to illustrate the ways in which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence are in contact in UNSCR 1325. This involves not only identifying the moments at which UNSCR 1325 explicitly mentions these two concepts, but also tracing the ways in which these concepts are situated in relation to each other. Mapping the concepts through the Resolution in this way enables me to make an argument about the ‘before’ of the Resolution, that is, how it came to be written in the way that it did. Furthermore, this technique allows me to identify the ways in which the conceptualisations of gender violence and international security evidenced in the Resolution are taken forward into policy discussions about the ‘after’ of UNSCR 1325 – or, indeed, the way that they are left unproblematised in such discussions.

The second aim of this research is to demonstrate that the discursive construction of the concepts in question determined the failure of UNSCR 1325. Although I explore the explanations given by the United Nations and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security for the failures – and successes – of the Resolution, neither the institutions nor academic research on the subject problematises the discursive construction of the organising concepts. Therefore, my third aim is to establish the ways in which UNSCR 1325 was constructed through, and represents, particular conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security and, furthermore, to highlight that these discourses, on which the Resolution relies for textual coherence, could have been constructed differently.

Ultimately, I argue that (international) security can be reconceptualised in conjunction with (gender) violence, and to separate these concepts is to construct an analytical framework that is both partial and highly problematic.¹⁶ This project is of relevance not only to academics working on security and violence, but also to the institutions in question, the UN Security Council and the NGO

¹⁶ I recognise that focussing on gender in an effort to understand the particular articulations of violence and security in the documents with which I am concerned also functions to produce a partial reading, as I marginalize concerns of race, class, ethnicity and other (post)structural hierarchies of exclusion. I refer to these hierarchies as (post)structural as I see them as mutable through contextual performance, rather than as sedimented structural conditions.

Working Group. Moreover, this research evidences the ways in which academic and policy discourses are largely mutually constitutive. Policy-makers and academic theorists “[b]oth use and are used by language ... that dominant powers ... always dream of fixing” (Der Derian 1990: 297), and which is ‘fixed’ in the authoring of documents such as UNSCR 1325.

The policy relevance of this research is the exploration of different possibilities. I do not wish to map out ‘the best’, or even ‘a better’, way that UNSCR 1325 could have been written. I wish to think gender, violence, security and the international differently through this research process, joining Butler in her desire to

follow a double path in politics: we must use this language to assert an entitlement to conditions of life in ways that affirm the constitutive role of gender and sexuality in political life, and we must also subject our very categories to critical scrutiny (2004: 37-38).

I do not read the use of ‘must’ in the above exhortation as inscribing a sense of unified agenda, with which I would not be entirely comfortable. Such usage would suggest that work that does not follow this ‘double path’ can be judged by some standard as lesser. Rather, I read it as an acknowledgement that I am (an assumed ‘we’ are) both literally and philosophically bound by the language available to discuss ‘conditions of life’, by the limits of the discourses. Therefore, the insistence on focusing on the words that are used to make policy, on subjecting those words to ‘critical scrutiny’, is certainly compatible with the approach I take in this research.

Chapter Outline

Guided by the central research question, ‘How are the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence discursively constituted, and with what effects?’, this research seeks to answer a series of related questions pertaining to the discursive construction of international security and gender violence. Each chapter addresses a specific question in relation to the broader question that guides this investigation. In Chapter One, I ask, ‘What are the most

appropriate analytical strategies to use in this research project?'.¹⁷ Given that one of the strategies I employ is the critical analysis of the rhetorical schemata of the documents at issue, to identify the ways in which a sense of order is constructed within the texts, the decision to arrange the chapters such that the methodology precedes the literature review was not taken lightly. Arranging the chapters thus offers to the reader the sense that consideration of analytical strategies occurred prior to the consideration of extant literature on the subject with which I am concerned. This is true, but I also wish to draw attention to the ways in which the review of the literature in Chapter Two is informed by the strategies I discuss in the previous exploration of ontology, epistemology and methodology, a linkage that is not commonly acknowledged.¹⁸

Chapter Two explores several related questions, and functions as a review of the relevant extant literature. This chapter is central to the research project as a whole, asking as it does, 'What are the differences between thinking about 'violence against women' and thinking about 'gender violence'? Similarly, what are the differences between thinking about 'national security' and thinking about 'international security'? Which approaches – and therefore, which conceptualisations – are currently dominant?'. The analysis I conduct, which begins in Chapter Three with the Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, both textually and intellectually develops from the literature review through the ordering of the reflections on method and the literature review, and I bring the analytical strategies outlined in Chapter One to bear on the literature in this chapter, to identify dominant conceptualisations of gender, violence, security and the international. This critical review therefore establishes these dominant conceptualisations, which is necessary for the reconceptualisation that I wish to undertake.

¹⁷ Neils Andersen explores the difference between method and analytical strategy, where he argues that "[a]nalytical *strategy* [is] a way to stress the deliberate *choice* and its implications" with regard to the ways in which "the epistemologist will construct the observations of others ... to be the object of his own observations" (2003: xiii, emphasis in original). This way of conceptualising analytical strategy is useful, as it highlights the ways in which I am embedded in my research, even as I conform to the rigours of a discipline that requires at the very least an attempt at scientific method.

¹⁸ The majority of texts aimed at assisting research students in the production of a doctoral dissertation suggest that the thesis is structured such that the literature review precedes the discussion of methodology (see, *inter alia*, Burley and Moreland 1998: 80; Levin, 2005: 74-77; Phillips and Pugh 2005: 60-61). Patrick Dunleavy offers three different models of structure, all of which give textual priority to a review of the relevant literature (2003: 55-62).

Surveying two bodies of literature, one concerned with security situated firmly in the discipline of International Relations and the other more broadly sociological, addressing violence and gender, demands that careful consideration is given to the links between them. Therefore, in Chapter Two, the questions that I ask relate to the organizing concepts of these two literatures. In the discussion of the security literature, I question how different approaches to security conceive of the referent object of security, and how they conceive of threat. Similarly, in the discussion of the violence literature, I draw out the ways in which the various approaches conceptualise the referent object of their analyses, and how they too conceive of threat – in this case, violence. Finally, I draw together these discussions and relate them to more specific writings on gender violence as an international security issue, arguing that these conceptualisations are dominant in academic debates and policy making.




	Violence	Security
Empiricist	'Violence Against Women'	
		'National Security'
Constructivist	'Gender Violence'	
		'International Security'
Discourse-Theoretic	'Violent Reproduction of Gender'	
		'Violent Reproduction of the International'

Table 1: Illustrating the Dynamics of Critique

Through a discourse-theoretic analysis of the Secretary-General's Reports, Chapter Three asks, 'How has UNSCR 1325 affected/effectuated the treatment of 'gender violence' as an 'international security' issue? What are the dominant explanations offered by the United Nations Secretary-General's

Reports (2004; 2002) regarding the lack of gender equality in relation to peace and security?'.¹⁹ This chapter refers to literatures concerning gender and peacekeeping, gender mainstreaming, sexualised violence in war, gender and conflict, gender and peace processes and the domestic-international dichotomy in the analysis of the explanatory factors offered in the Reports. The conclusions detailed in the Reports are problematised, as I question the dominant explanations offered by the United Nations Secretary-General's Reports (2004; 2002) regarding the lack of gender equality in relation to peace and security. Thus, this chapter forms the basis for the analysis of UNSCR 1325. I seek to demonstrate in this chapter that, whether or not the factors offered in explanation by the Reports are convincing, it is of vital importance to interrogate the concepts around which UNSCR 1325 is organised.

Chapter Four details the discourse-theoretic analysis of UNSCR 1325, seeking to identify and explore the conceptualisations of gender, violence, the international and security that order the document through asking, 'How did UNSCR 1325 come to be written in the way that it was? And, what are the discursive conditions of possibility constructed by UNSCR 1325?'. It is argued that these conceptualisations construct the horizons of possibility for the successful implementation and utilisation of the Resolution by UN institutions, NGOs and independent activists. To provide a basis for the analysis of the narratives of production of the Resolution, this chapter investigates the documents and organisations to which the Resolution explicitly refers. UNSCR 1325 refers to four UNSC Resolutions in its Preamble: UNSCR 1261 (1991); UNSCR 1265 (1999); UNSCR 1296 (2000) and UNSCR 1314 (2000). These are Resolutions that refer to the experiences of civilians and children during periods of armed conflict, and are offered in UNSCR 1325 as the documentary heritage of the Resolution, alongside "relevant statements of its [the United Nations'] President" (UNSC 2000a: Preamble).

¹⁹ In order to provide a sense of temporal context, Chapter Two presents an analysis of the United Nations Secretary-General's Reports published in 2002 and 2004. Insights from subsequent reports are integrated into the concluding Chapter. This is in part an analytical decision, in that the 2004 Report is much more detailed and comprehensive than the 2002 Report, but treating the two as an analytical whole allows for the interrogation of the ways in which conceptualisations of gender, violence, security and the international change over time in the Reports. However, the decision is also practical, in that it was necessary to focus on the Reports as a temporary whole for the purposes of conducting the analysis and writing up the findings.

In Chapter Five, I explore the contested narratives of production of UNSCR 1325, asking, ‘Which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence played a significant role in the construction of UNSCR 1325? Which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence were marginalised?’. Both the United Nations and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security deploy narratives that seek to explain the production of the Resolution. This chapter analyses these narratives, using documents freely available from the UN and the NGO Working Group. For each institution, I provide a conventional descriptive account of their involvement in the construction of the Resolution, and then proceed with a discourse-theoretic analysis that draws out the tensions and compatibilities in these narratives of production. In the concluding section of this chapter, I draw out various conceptualisations of, for example, global governance and global civil society that delimit the discursive terrains of the institutions in question. I then problematise the conceptualisations of international security and gender violence in relation to these organizing concepts, exploring the conditions of possibility enabled by these discourses in the treatment of (gender) violence as an (international) security issue.

Finally, in Chapter Six, I explore the different possibilities that could have been enabled through different discourses of international security and gender violence. This concluding chapter asks, ‘How could different possibilities have been enabled through different discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence?’. The UN Secretary-General’s Report of 2004 mandates annual Reports to assess the successes and failures of UNSCR 1325. I integrate these Reports in this concluding chapter to illustrate the ways in which UNSCR 1325 has, for the most part, failed to address effectively the issues with which it is concerned, and has thus been recognised as having very limited successes even by its own standards. I argue that there is a violence done to the concepts of gender and the international through their ordering according to binary logics: the domestic/international divide and the assumption of differentiated genders. Furthermore, I problematise the articulations of gender and the international that inform and organise the dominant discourses of violence and security that are product/productive of UNSCR 1325. To draw together the preceding chapters, I consider the ways in which UNSCR 1325 was constructed and could have been

constructed differently, reflecting on the conceptualisations of the violent reproduction of gender and of the international that inform my analysis and the impact of this research on the policymakers and academics with whom I seek to engage.

Endings and Beginnings

It may seem that there is a tension between espousing a feminist poststructural politics and undertaking a research project that seeks to detail, through deconstruction, the ways in which particular discourses have failed to manifest the reforms needed to address security and violence in the context of gendered subjectivity and the constitution of political community. In keeping with the ontological position I hold, I argue that Resolution 1325 could have been constructed differently: there is nothing inherent in the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence that necessitated their being made meaningful in the way they were. However, through the exploration of the discursive terrains of the institutions that claim author-ity over the Resolution, I show that the contextual configuration of these terrains was such that the Resolution was both produced by, and continues to be productive of, the discourses of gender violence and international security that I problematise through my review of the relevant literature. Finally, I suggest that those working on policy and advocacy in the area of security and violence can use the reconceptualisation I offer “to enable people to imagine how their being-in-the-world is not only changeable, but perhaps, ought to be changed” (Milliken 1999: 244).

As a research student, the question I have grown most used to hearing is not ‘What?’ or ‘How?’ but ‘Why?’. At every level of the research process, from securing funding to relating to the post-graduate community, it is necessary to be able to construct a convincing and coherent argument as to why this research is valuable, indeed vital, to the field in which I situate myself. A discourse-theoretical approach, as detailed in the following chapter, acknowledges that my legitimacy as a knowing subject is constructed through discursive practices that privilege some forms of being over others. In the study of security, because of

the discursive power of the concept, and of violence, which can quite literally be an issue of life and death, these considerations are particularly important.

Furthermore, as a result of the invigorating and investigative research conducted by exemplary feminist scholars in the field of IR, I felt encouraged to reclaim the space to conduct research at the margins of a discipline that itself functions under a misnomer, being concerned as it is with relations inter-state rather than inter-national. As Cynthia Enloe has expressed it:

To study the powerful is not autocratic, it is simply reasonable.
Really? ... It presumes *a priori* that margins, silences and bottom rungs are so naturally marginal, silent and far from power that exactly how they are *kept* there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reasonable explainer (1996: 188, emphasis in original).

If this is the case, I am more than happy to be unreasonable, and I am in excellent company.

Chapter One: Analytical Strategies

In a very crucial sense, there is no methodology without *logos*,
without thinking about thinking

(Gerring 2001: 12, emphasis in original)

In analysing discourses of security, violence, the international and gender through the vehicle of UNSC Resolution 1325, I make a series of implicit and explicit statements about the world as I see it and judgements about how best to go about finding out about that world. In order to give context to these judgements and expand upon these statements, I reflect here on my chosen analytical strategies in five sections. Firstly, I give a brief explanation of what I am *not* doing. Discourse analysis as a method of inquiry encompasses a broad range of approaches supported by ontological and epistemological positions both compatible with and contradictory to my own. In order to better explain the approach I use, I explore some alternatives in a critical review and offer, through critique, a justification for the methodology I espouse.

In the second section I discuss the conceptualisation of discourse that informs the analytical approach that I use in this investigation, which leads on to the third section in which I reflect on the Foucauldian conceptualisation of power as productive and, more specifically, intrinsically related to the production of meaning. In order to give focus to the analytical strategies that I employ in my research, in section four I attempt to define some key concepts such as articulation, representation and text. Finally I give a full account of the three related analytical strategies that I use to conduct my research and reflect on the textual placement of this chapter within the thesis as a whole.

Reflections on Method

The attempt to construct a rigorous and useful methodology using discourse theory is made particularly demanding by the various ways in which the label ‘discourse theory’ is utilised by various scholars to mean different things, both in theoretical and practical application. Discourse theory has developed over time, drawing on cultural theory, literary theory and linguistics (Mills 1997: 1-16) as well as social and political theory and there are competing

theories of discourse within the broad umbrella term of ‘discourse theory’. Broadly speaking it is possible to trace the divisions along ontological lines, where empiricist understandings of discourse conceptualise discourses as “frames, ... primarily instrumental devices that can foster common perceptions and understandings for specific purposes” (Howarth 2000: 3). According to the assumptions of this approach, it is possible to measure how effectively a discourse is *used* by people. Meaning is assumed constant and identifiable through the discourse, rather than constituted by discourse, and for the reasons I expand upon below, I cannot subscribe to this approach.

Ontologically compatible with the above approach is another realist understanding that conceives of discourses as “particular objects with their own properties and powers ... and the task of discourse analysis is to unravel ‘the conceptual elisions and confusions by which language enjoys its power’” (Parker cited in Howarth 2000: 3). Discourses have causal effects that can be analysed and the *structures* of language and language-in-use are of analytical primacy. The development of Critical Discourse Analysis as a distinct school of thought draws on this realist approach, integrating these foundational assumptions with an understanding of human agency such that there exists a dialectical relationship between “discourses and the social systems in which they function” (ibid.: 4). Scholars who associate themselves with Critical Discourse Analysis or Text-Oriented Discourse Analysis (see *inter alia* Fairclough 1992; Jaworski and Coupland (eds.) 1999; van Dijk (ed.) 1997a, 1997b) support this notion of discourse. It is predominantly this conceptualisation of discourse analysis from which I wish to differentiate the type of discourse analysis that I will use.

What Norman Fairclough labels Text-Oriented Discourse Analysis (1992: 37) is explicitly allied to “critical approaches” that “differ from non-critical approaches not just in describing discursive practices, but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies” (Fairclough 1992: 12). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as explicated by Fairclough and Ruth Wodak (1997) focuses on the ways in which “discourse is socially *constitutive* as well as socially shaped: the discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258, emphasis in original). CDA subscribes to three principles, of which this

dialectical relationship between discourse and society is one. The second is a firm commitment to reflexivity in research. “CDA sees itself not as dispassionate and objective social science, but as engaged and committed” (ibid.). The third principle of CDA is related to this second, and concerns the identification of CDA as a consciously emancipatory strategy (ibid.). Openly owing an intellectual debt to Bakhtin, Gramsci, Althusser and Michel Foucault (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 260-262), Fairclough and other proponents of CDA have explored and expanded upon the possibilities for engagement with political analysis by CDA and developed useful tools and strategies for analysis that have enabled to some extent the ‘mainstreaming’ of discourse analysis in social science (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 1).

However, there is a distinct difference between CDA and the type of discourse analysis that I employ in my research. This is evident in a close examination of the way in which Fairclough (1992), Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and Teun van Dijk (1997a, 1997b) posit a distinction between the realm of the discursive and the ‘non-discursive’, which, as I will discuss below, I do not. As Jane Sunderland argues, “CDA *entails* the extra-discursive: ... a ‘real world’ where reality does not depend on what is known about it” (2004: 11, emphasis in original). While Fairclough talks of “discursive practices” (1992: 60), the notion of language in use, and accepts that discourse can encompass more than just language, he insists that “these [discursive] practices are constrained by the fact that they inevitably take place within a constituted, material reality” (ibid.). Although Fairclough conceives of a dialectic relationship between the discursive realm and reality, he struggles to offer a convincing account of how exactly the ‘constituted, material reality’ is constituted. I find this problematic as, in linking ‘material’ with ‘reality’ so explicitly, Fairclough does not problematise the processes through which the ‘reality’ is constructed and the ‘material’ given meaning as a ‘reality’.

Despite suggesting that “besides being subject to the social constraints of the context, they [discourse users] also contribute to, construe or change that context” (van Dijk 1997a: 20), van Dijk also appeals to observable divisions between meaning and reality that I find unsustainable. In his analysis, van Dijk “begin[s] with what is rather metaphorically called the ‘superficial’ or

‘observable’ level of *expression*, then work[s] ‘down’ to the ‘deeper’ or ‘underlying’ levels of *form, meaning and action*” (1997a: 6, emphasis in original). Van Dijk suggests that CDA is able to analyse “the many things we ‘do with words’ *that we usually accomplish more or less intentionally and purposefully*” (van Dijk 1997b: 8, emphasis added). I find this problematic as it assumes that analysts will be able to identify meaning in each observable case, tracing intention through expression, and therefore subscribing to an empiricist epistemology incompatible with my own position. I do not seek to explain what each text ‘means’ in a wider social context through my analysis; I wish to explore the construction of meaning in both text and context. Therefore, while Fairclough argues that “structures are reproduced or transformed depending on the state of relations, the ‘balance of power’, between those in struggle in a particular sustained domain of practice” (1992: 58) but does not expand on the factors influencing the ‘state of relations’, the analytical strategies I employ are more concerned with the processes of (re)production and transformation of meaning and the practices of power inherent in them.

As mentioned above, I do not conceive of a distinction between a discursive and a ‘non-discursive’ realm. However, I do draw heavily on Foucault in the construction of my analytical strategies, so it is important to recognise that Foucault himself is inconsistent in his treatment of the issue of the possibility of theorising a ‘non-discursive’ realm. In his early work, describing the “the conditions necessary for the appearance of an object of discourse” (Foucault 1972: 44), Foucault identifies three realms of relations, the first of which is “*real or primary* relations” which “independently of all discourse or objects of discourse, may be described between institutions, techniques, social forms etc.” (ibid., emphasis in original). These can be seen to represent precisely the same kind of ‘non-discursive’ realm as Fairclough posits. Foucault goes on to delineate “a system of *reflexive or secondary* relations, and a system of relations that might properly be call *discursive*” (ibid., emphasis in original). It seems, from this passage at least, that Foucault would wish to posit some extra- or non-discursive realm, which is compatible with, and insufficiently theorised in much the same way as, the ‘constituted, material reality’ to which Fairclough refers. However, in a later work, Foucault refers to “[d]iscursive practices” that are

“embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission or diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them” (1977: 100).

The imbrication of the discursive within the ‘non-discursive’ effectively collapses the ‘non-discursive’ as a theoretical or analytical device, as the primary relations to which Foucault refers in the earlier writing are five years later ‘embodied’ in the discourse at the same time as the discourse is embedded in them, rendering all ‘discursive’. Furthermore, it is in this later work that Foucault theorises the conceptualisation of power that informs my research, as I will discuss below, and explicitly defines discourse as comprising more than language. According to Foucault, discourse analysis “consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as *practices* that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (1972: 49, emphasis added). Therefore, I remain unwilling to dismiss the potential of analysis that draws explicitly on Foucault, an analysis in which I might endeavour to “show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such” (Foucault cited in Campbell 1998: 191).

However, Foucault does not explicitly discuss the processes of ‘contents or representation’ that he counterposes to discursive practice, and I wish to retain a notion of representation, as it is both conceptually useful and analytically fruitful. Therefore, in addition to Foucault I explore the analytical strategies utilised by theorists who explicitly acknowledge a debt to Foucault in their own research. Jacob Torfing suggests that the analytical approach of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and that of Foucault’s later work “can be viewed as two of a kind” (Torfing 1999: 91), that is, ontologically and epistemologically compatible. Thus, drawing predominantly on Foucault (1972; 1977; 1978; 1984), Laclau and Mouffe (2001), and Roxanne Doty (1993; 1996), I have constructed the analytical strategies that I expand upon below. To draw attention to the difference between CDA and the strategies employed by Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe, Torfing suggests the term “discourse-theoretical analysis” (DTA) (1999: 12), and I will use the same terminology to describe my methodology. However, contriving a suitable label for the methodology is meaningless, or at

least means less, if consideration is not given to the conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ through which I focus my analytical approach.

On Discourse

DTA provides me with analytical strategies that allow me to identify, problematise and challenge the ways in which ‘realities’ become accepted as ‘real’ in the practices of international relations. Defining the analytical tools with which I investigate the discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence requires that attention is given to understanding *how* I can identify the discursive practices to which Foucault refers. Devising an appropriate set of analytical strategies that will enable me to answer the research questions outlined in the previous chapter has entailed considerable time spent thinking about the ontological and epistemological positions I espouse, and the ways in which these inform my notions of methodology. When I first began to consider these issues, and attempted to construct a justification for the way in which I see the world, all I could come up with was, ‘I see the world like *this* because *this* is the only way that the world makes any sense to me’. However, the very act of acknowledging that the way I see the world is perhaps different to the visions of others is a performance of an ontological position, which then has epistemological and methodological implications.

In this section, I explore and explain the conceptualisation of discourse that informs my research. I consider the ways in which practices of (re)production, (re)presentation and (re)legitimation²⁰ are all ‘discursive’ practices and the ways in which these practices relate to the concept of discourse. As Doty cogently expresses it, “[a] discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility *whereby a particular reality can be ‘known’ and acted upon*” (1996: 6, emphasis added). Discourses are therefore recognisable to me as systems of meaning-production rather than simply statements or language,

²⁰ As mentioned in the previous Chapter, I employ the bracketed (re) to indicate that these practices draw on existing knowledges about these subjects and objects in order to construct or (re)legitimise an intelligible ‘reality’. It also signifies that these processes are always ongoing and never complete. I discuss representation in more detail in section four. In the following section I explore in more detail the relationship between discourse and power, specifically the conceptualisation of discursive practices as practices of power.

systems that ‘fix’ meaning, however temporarily, and enable us to make sense of the world. In suggesting that discourses ‘fix’ meaning I do not want to imply that there is any transhistorical continuity or universality to meaning. Rather, the ‘terms of intelligibility’ are “multiple, open and fluid” (Swingewood 2000: 198). This conceptualisation is explicitly poststructural, according to Alan Swingewood, as acknowledging the fluidity of discourse entails the recognition that a discursive field “does not constitute a totality since it lacks a unifying centre but consists of fragments, perspectives, discontinuity” (ibid.).

Laclau and Mouffe affirm this conceptualisation of discourse in the context of clarifying their position on the possible existence of a ‘non-discursive’ realm. Their contribution is particularly useful and is worth quoting at length:

Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 107).

Using Doty’s conceptualisation of discourse, in which “a discourse is inherently open-ended and incomplete ... [and] [a]ny fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it can only ever be of a partial nature” (1996: 6), it is the *partial* nature of fixing that allows critical space for engagement. “No discursive formation is ever a sutured totality” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 107), and each formation is contingent, relying on the articulation, as discussed below, of discursive elements to (re)produce meaning. Discursive practices maintain, construct and constitute, legitimise, resist and suspend meaning, and it is these practices that theorists can analyse using DTA.

This theoretical commitment leads to the explication of a number of analytical strategies that can be integrated into DTA with great effect, as it is possible to analyse the ways in which specific discursive practices function to position objects and subjects in relation to each other in configurations that change over time. These strategies are: double reading, analysis of rhetorical

schemata/nodal points and analysis of predication/subject-positioning.²¹ I discuss these strategies further in the following section. Doty (1993; 1996) influences my research in her operationalising of a set of analytical strategies that are similar in intellectual heritage to my own²² and encourages the asking of questions that “examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects and objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that create certain possibilities and exclude others” (1996: 4). Power is central to the creation of ‘certain possibilities’ and to the processes of exclusion to which Doty refers, and is therefore central to this research.

On Power

As I mention above, this conceptualisation of discourse is consciously poststructural. Butler eloquently expresses her interpretation of what this means for political research when she suggests that

if there is a point ... to what I ... understand as poststructuralism, it is that power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including the subject position of the critic; and further, that this implication of the terms of criticism in the field of power is ... the very precondition of a politically engaged critique (1994: 157).

Like Butler, I am influenced by Foucault in the construction of an appropriate set of analytical strategies with which to conduct my research. In addition to drawing on particular tools or methods in his own research, I make explicit use of Foucault’s conceptualisation of power in my work. I subscribe to a Foucauldian vision of “[t]he omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1978: 93).

²¹ As discussed below, I conceive of these sets of textual mechanisms (rhetorical schemata/nodal points and predication/subject-positioning) as congruent, recognisable in the theorising of different authors under specific names but referring to the same practices, hence I run the terms together in my discussion of them.

²² Doty is explicit about the influence that Foucault has had on her analytical strategies, but it is important to note that she also draws heavily on Derrida (1996: 6), especially in the strategic destabilising of binary oppositions.

Thus everything we can see or conceive of is a product of power relations.²³ This renders every decision, every representation, every aspect of the social world, political. As Enloe comments, “[o]ne of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights in that ‘the personal is political’. Disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were private or merely social are in fact infused with power, usually unequal power” (2000: 195). Although there are distinct differences in our analytical strategies, and Enloe draws her conceptualisation of power from feminist theory rather than Foucault, this explication of the ubiquity of power is both concise and useful. Furthermore, the relationship between power and politics is fundamental to the way in which I conceive of my analytical approach. Through DTA, analysis can “reveal a body of political knowledge that is not some kind of secondary theorizing about practice, nor the application of theory. ... It is inscribed, from the outset, in the field of different practices in which it finds its specificity, its functions and its networks of dependence” (Foucault 1972: 214). These ‘different practices’ are discursive, as described above, but power is immanent in discourse and therefore in discursive practices.

As Kathryn Woodward comments, “signifying practices that produce meaning involve relations of power” (1997: 15). Power is understood by Foucault as “a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than ... a negative instance whose function is repression” (1977: 119), and this is the conceptualisation that informs my analytical strategies. Power produces conditions of meaning, instances of meaning, webs of meaning that are both locally specific and ‘run through the whole social body’ – or rather, are productive of the ‘social body’. If power is ‘productive’, as Foucault argues, and discursive – or signifying – practices are also productive, specifically of meaning, and involve ‘relations of power’, then it is reasonable to sustain the theoretical assumption that power is implicated in the production of meaning. That is to say, the ways in which discursive practices construct an intelligible reality that then itself acts as a referent for the construction of meaning are intrinsically related to power.

²³ Skunk Anansie phrased this idea more succinctly when they sang ‘Yes it’s fucking political/ Everything’s political’.

DTA, then, gives analytical primacy to this Foucauldian conceptualisation of power. It is this primacy of power that makes the approach so useful, whereby “the polymorphous techniques of power” (Foucault 1978: 11) can be identified, problematised and challenged. In understanding that discursive practices are practices of power, DTA provides theorists with the tools to question *how* meanings become fixed, however temporarily or partially, as discussed above. Stuart Hall states that “meaning ... depends on the contingent and arbitrary stop – the necessary and temporary ‘break’ in the infinite semiosis of language” (1997a: 54), and DTA allows for the investigation of these ‘contingent and arbitrary’ breaks. More specifically, it investigates “the interrelationship of power and representational practices that elevate one truth over another” (Der Derian 1992: 7). However, in order to proceed with the formulation of specific analytical strategies, it is first necessary to theorise the relationship between ‘representational practices’, power and discourse.

On Representation

If discursive practices both manifest and construct discourse through (re)presentation and (re)production, then practices of (re)presentation and (re)production are the sites at which it is possible to locate power in a given discursive terrain. Thus DTA is concerned with representation as a source for the (re)production of knowledge (Hall 1997b: 43). Woodward suggests that “[r]epresentations produce meaning through which we can make sense of our experience and of who we are. We could go further and suggest that these symbolic systems create the possibilities of what we are and what we can become” (1997: 14). DTA would certainly ‘go further’, following Butler in her argument that representations “are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and, as such, exclusionary” (1994: 166). Butler is specifically referring to representations of identity in this context, but drawing out the wider implications of such a position, it is possible to theorise representation not only as a repository of meaning but also connective and constitutive.²⁴

²⁴ Tarak Barkawi uses this construction in the context of theorising globalisation as “referring to relations of *interconnection* and *mutual constitution* in world politics” (2004: 162). This claim entails the recognition that connective relations are always already constitutive relations:

In this investigation I use the concept of representation in two ways: representation as an *instance* and representation as a *practice*. Firstly, representations can be seen as instances of discursive practice. For example, taking a photograph produces a representation of a situation. However, the image in the photograph is determined by the photographer, the subject, the lighting, the notions of appropriate subject-material for a photograph, whether the photograph will be developed privately or commercially, whether the photograph is meant for a personal collection or a more formal display and so on – these are all discursively constructed. As Jutta Weldes notes, “[d]ifferent representations of the world entail different identities, which in turn carry with them different ways of functioning in the world, are located within different power relations and make possible different interests” (1996: 287). In this vision, representations are texts, where text is “the fabric in which discourse is manifested” (Talbot cited in Sunderland 2004: 7). Text is not limited in this conceptualisation to written material, but rather refers to “utterances of any kind and in any medium, including cultural practices” (Scott 1994: 284).

The notion of text entails consideration of intertextuality. According to Julia Kristeva, “text is ‘a permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text’” (cited in Allen 2000: 35). This is evident in two ways. Firstly, a text such as this one – or any academic work – is an intertext in that it directly refers to other texts. Extrapolating out from this premise, a photograph is an intertext as it references other texts (such as cars, bodies, buildings) through representation, a film is an intertext as is a novel and so on.²⁵ Secondly, the intertextuality of text is established by its social context. “Texts do not present clear and stable meanings; they embody society’s dialogic conflict over ... meaning” (Allen 2000: 36). Therefore, in analysing texts as representations, DTA “obviates the need for recourse to the interiority of a conscious, meaning-giving subject ... In the Discursive Practices Approach signifiers refer only to other signifiers, hence

“Apparently discrete entities in world politics – such as colonies, states and national societies – are produced out of fields of mutually constitutive relations” (ibid.) at the same time as connections between them are articulated.

²⁵ See Weldes (ed.) (2003) and James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (ed.) (1989) for further discussion of intertextuality and International Relations.

the notion of *intertextuality*, i.e., a complex and infinitely expanding web of possible meanings” (Doty 1993: 302, emphasis in original).²⁶

Conceiving of representation as practice is slightly different. It refers to the process of meaning-making immanent in the production of representations. Hall refers to these processes as ‘articulations’:

The term has a nice double meaning because to ‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of an ‘articulated lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, *but need not be* connected to one another (cited in Weldes 1996: 285, emphasis added).²⁷

The emphasis on contingency refers back to the contingency of meaning, as discussed above, and therefore the opening of analytical space to identify the practices of power that represent these contingent relations as ‘natural’ and seamless.

To summarise, then, discursive practices are representations and representations can be (inter)texts or articulatory practices. Furthermore, articulatory practices are evident in (inter)texts, made possible by the analytical separation of representation into both noun and verb for the purposes of this investigation. The (inter)texts with which this research is concerned, the Report of the UN Secretary General (2004; 2002), the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, the competing narratives of production issuing from the United Nations and the NGO Working Group, are all simultaneously practices of articulation, sections of a social text and products/producers of meaning. Researching the ways in which discourses of gender, security, violence and the international are articulated, inter-related and in conflict in these textual localities of power calls for methods that engage with the production of meaning within and between the texts. The final section of this review explores such methods.

²⁶ Roxanne Doty labels her analytical approach ‘the Discursive Practices Approach’ (1993: 302) as distinct from what I am calling Discourse Theoretic Analysis, but the two approaches are very similar.

²⁷ See also Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 113) on articulation.

Analytical Strategies

Following a critical review of the literature relevant to this project, I begin with the analysis of the Secretary General's Reports (2004; 2002), identifying and exploring in turn a series of explanatory factors mentioned in the report as key to the failure of UNSCR 1325. In doing this, I aim to illustrate that, despite the persuasiveness of one or more of these factors, the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325 ultimately has had an enormous influence over the practicalities of its implementation. Through the analysis of the ways in which the Secretary-General's Reports represent the successes and failures of UNSCR 1325, I will work back to the resolution itself. The concepts around which UNSCR 1325 is organised and the meanings thus constructed and reproduced within the document and the tensions and inconsistencies within it have had huge material impact. The discursive construction of the resolution is analysed through the identification of practices of (re)production, (re)presentation and (re)legitimation in the document itself, with specific reference to articulations of gender, violence, security and the international. The same strategies are then applied to the competing narratives of production. The DTA that I employ in this investigation is tripartite. The first analytical strategy I discuss in this section is double reading. I then go on to explore the two sets of strategies that I operationalise in my investigation: analysis of rhetorical schemata/nodal points, and predication/subject-positioning.

In addition to the intellectual debt owing to Doty, Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe that I acknowledge, it is also important to engage with the theories of knowledge propounded by Jacques Derrida (2000; 1978; 1974), given that I conceive of my analytical approach as being broadly deconstructive, a description with which Derrida is closely associated (Derrida 1974: 10-18). I take 'deconstruction' to be "a reading which is sensitive to what is irreducible in every text, allowing the text to speak before the reader, and listening to what the text imposes on the reader" (McQuillan 2000: 5). Deconstruction is not a 'method' or strategy, rather "[d]econstruction is what happens" (ibid.: 6) *as a result of* strategies of analysis employed in research – in the context of my own research, the strategies of analysing rhetorical schemata/nodal points and predication/subject-positioning, which I discuss further below.

The tripartite DTA that I employ in this investigation is compatible with a Derridean understanding of critique, in addition to drawing on the theorists mentioned above. As Kanakis Leledakis explains, Derrida's "call is for the acceptance of 'openness', of indeterminacy, of the impossibility of any full closure and determination" (2000: 176). In this research, I hope to illustrate the ways in which UNSCR 1325 and associated documentation attempts to effect 'full closure and determination' on the concepts of gender, violence, security and the international through the intrinsically political representation of these concepts as discourses of (gender) violence and (international) security. The strategies that I use to do this are not explicitly Derridean but there are significant similarities, despite differences in terminology.

Primarily, as mentioned above, compatibility exists on the meta-level of analytical approach. Derrida questions the notion of inherent rationality, or the ordering of the universe through "metaphysics in its totality" (Derrida 1974: 13), entailed in his exploration of 'logos' and attention to the play of signification. As he argues, "[t]here is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitute language ... [t]his, strictly speaking, amounts to destroying the concept of 'sign' and its entire logic" (ibid.: 7). The "destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the significations that have their source in that of the logos" (ibid.: 10) draws attention to the ways in which premising order on the divisibility of signifier and signified, and the hierarchical organisation of these two concepts, informs contemporary Western critical thought. These insights then inform the theorising of a potentially useful notion of 'exteriority' to which I will return below.

However, Derrida suggests that

it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse to mark the conditions, the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their intimate relationship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit; and, in the same process, designate the crevice through which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be glimpsed (1974: 14).

These analytical strategies are comparable to those I employ in this investigation, where the 'critical concepts' are those of gender, violence, security and the international and their articulation through specific discourses; the 'machine'

refers to the regimes of truth that claim to fix their meaning; and the ‘glimmer beyond closure’ is illustrated through the discourse-theoretical analysis.

The second similarity is that of deconstruction and “double reading” (Ashley 1988: 235). This primary analytical strategy shapes the research as a whole: each text is interpreted through a descriptive reading, and then subjected to a second, discourse-theoretical reading. Deconstruction illustrates the ways in which the master signifiers, or nodal points, work to (re)produce, (re)legitimise and (re)present the concepts with which I am concerned in the texts I use as vehicles for analysis. What Richard Ashley calls ‘double reading’ is a very similar strategy. In his analysis of ‘the anarchy problematique’, Ashley establishes the “heroic practice ... the foundational presence to which this discourse endlessly returns, the totalising principle from which everything in this discourse originates” (1988: 232), which, as outlined above, is recognisable as the master signifier or nodal point of this discursive terrain. As Derrida comments, this master signifier – or Ashley’s ‘heroic practice’ – organises the terrain but can never fix the discourse, instead offering a semblance of fixity. The “coherence of the system” depends on accepting the ‘truth’ of the master signifier or nodal point, through which the “play” of the discursive elements is limited “inside the total form” (Derrida 1978: 351-352).

Through his first – or “monological” (ibid.:229) – reading, Ashley “determine[s] indubitably what may be counted as the meaning of the text and what, by contrast, is extraneous, accidental, unintended” (ibid.: 232). That is, the reader in this first reading submits to the prescribed limits of the discursive terrain, accepting the hierarchical organisation of the texts around the implicitly unproblematic presence of the nodal points. Following this, Ashley conducts a second (dialogical) reading in an effort to illustrate “that the supposed fixity and ‘deep structuring’ of a sovereign presence, and the resultant ‘hard core’ homogeneity and continuity of meaning ascribed to a text, is always to be grasped as a problematical historical effort” (Ashley 1988: 233). These two readings can then be considered, with a view to asking questions that

do not invite certain answers. They are not oriented to the problem of disciplining an ambiguous history. They are oriented, on the contrary, to the exploration of possibilities hitherto closed off (ibid.: 260).

This exploration is exactly what I intend to undertake in the DTA that I employ in this investigation.

In the context of theorising a politics of rape, Sharon Marcus draws on Foucault and Butler to construct the claim that “violence ... is enabled by narratives, complexes and institutions which derive their strength not from outright, immutable, unbeatable force but rather from their power to structure our lives as imposing cultural scripts” (1992: 389). I prefer to employ the concept of discourse, congruent with Doty’s conceptualisation of discourse, but there are some similarities between the concept of discourse that informs my research and Marcus’s notion of script, evident when she argues that a “script should be understood as a framework, a grid of comprehensibility” (ibid.: 391). The notion of script is problematic in its connotations of boundedness, beginning and end and authorship, but in order to be comprehensible, discourses must conform to the temporary boundaries of a given discursive field. Thus (inter)texts must be intelligible and more or less coherent in order for the text to be meaningful within its social context. It is possible to analyse this coherence through the investigation of the organisation of the texts. Foucault describes this cohesion as “the various rhetorical *schemata* according to which groups of statements may be *combined* (how descriptions, deductions, definitions, whose succession characterizes the architecture of the text, are linked together)” (1972: 63, emphasis in original).

Laclau and Mouffe refer to ‘nodal points’. These are recognisable in Derridean theorising as ‘master signifiers’, “the so-called quilting point or *point de capiton* around which the shifting of signifiers is temporarily halted and meaning installed” (Edkins 2002: 72, emphasis in original). Despite the differences in terminology, both concepts – master signifier or nodal point – “[conceal] the lack around which the social order is constituted, the antagonism at its heart” (ibid.). In the context of this investigation, the nodal points are the concepts of gender, violence, international and security, and through analysis I explore the different ways in which these signifiers are ordered within the texts so as to inscribe a meaningful relationship between them. Analysing these nodal points allows me to disturb the coherence of these texts, to demonstrate the antagonisms, in a broadly deconstructive approach.

Therefore, analysis of the rhetorical schemata of the text also entails the analysis of the emergence of “nodal points” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112). This requires a degree of flexibility, of back-and-forth within and across texts produced in a discursive terrain. That is, the nodal points emerge *as* nodal points through the organisation and coherence of the text, through predication and subject positioning, but the construction and recognition of nodal points allows ‘meaning’ and therefore the representational practices that allow their emergence.

The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there has to be partial fixations – otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be *a* meaning. ... Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, *nodal points* (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112, emphasis in original).

The representational practices analysed in the first stage of DTA are the combination of grammatically correct statements (meaning in this context ‘groups of words’) into a coherent text. This will include the analysis of the rhetorical tropes used in the (inter)texts, as these figures of speech are themselves representational practices. As Laclau and Mouffe explain, “[s]ynonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not forms of thought that add a second sense to primary, constitutive literality of social relations; instead they are the primary terrain itself in which the social is constituted” (2001: 110). Thus, in the first phase of DTA, I look for the ‘forms of thought’ or linguistic structures that provide a sense of order in the texts, thus constructing the meaning of the concepts with which I am concerned. In the identification of representational practices specific to gender, for example, I look for instances of gendered identities described ‘as’ or ‘like’, statements about gendered identities that can be problematised and emphasis on aspects of gender provided by placement within the text and/or repetition.

The second stage of discourse analysis investigates the articulation of subjects and objects, what Doty terms predication, which “affirms a quality, attribute, or property of a person or a thing” (1993: 306), and the positioning of these subjects and objects in relation to each other in the texts. As Doty explains,

“[t]he production of subjects and objects is always vis-à-vis other subjects and objects” (ibid.). For example, I look at the multiple ways in which violence is represented, as legitimate, as gendered, as threatening to civil society and so on, and investigate how these predicates affirm the properties of violence within these narratives. These representational practices are ‘articulatory’ as they establish a “relational complex” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 93). These articulatory practices manifest and (re)produce the discourses with which I am concerned, and the representations in the text of violence, for example, illustrate the ways in which attempts are being made to transform the discursive elements (for example, ‘violence’ and ‘legitimate’) into a relationary moment (‘there are times when violence is legitimate’), so that the identity of the discursive elements are modified (‘so not all violence is bad’) (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105).

As mentioned above, the analytical strategies that I employ can be broadly considered deconstructive, and therefore I need to acknowledge a debt to the theorising of Derrida. However, another of Derrida’s most renowned contributions to political theorising also influences my research project and design. The considerations of method, the exploration of concepts of discourse, power and representation that inform my analytical strategies must owe to the intellectual influence of Derrida and his assertion that “[t]here is *nothing outside of the text*” (1974: 158, emphasis in original). This recognition affirms the legitimacy of analytical strategies that prioritise the textual (re)production, (re)presentation and (re)legitimation of meaning, and use text as the vehicle for this analysis. It is not to say that the social world is reducible to textual ‘truth’, but rather that textual ‘truths’ should be problematised – or deconstructed – in order to illustrate the contingency and fragility of that which is taken as empirically, verifiably, solidly, real.

It is not the overall aim of this research project to juxtapose the different readings with a view to dismissing one or another of the narratives as ‘untrue’. Looking for the origin or root of meaning, the reality to which a representation purports to relate is not the task of DTA. Rather, I offer these readings in an effort to draw out and comment on the ‘regimes of truth’ operant in this discursive terrain. “Truth is a thing of this world. ... Each society has its regime of truth ..., the type of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true”

(Foucault 1977: 131). This has profound implications for political research, in that a search for the ‘truth’ of the matter/‘reality’ becomes in this mode of investigation a search for the “systems of power which produce and sustain it [truth], and the effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (Foucault 1977: 133). Through my research, I hope to encourage critical interpretations of and reflections on the policy documents that order the lives of individuals everywhere, employing as they do concepts that, like all concepts, are inherently value-laden. As Dvora Yanow points out, “[i]nterpretations ... are more powerful than ‘facts’. That makes the policy process, in all its phases, a struggle for the determination of meanings” (1996: 19). The value in telling a different story is in the telling, in illustrating the ways in which these stories are constructed and could be constructed differently.

DTA as I have described it above would be recognisable to David Howarth as what he terms a “strategy of problematization [that] carries with it an intrinsically ethical connotation, as it seeks to show that dominant discursive constructions are contingent and political rather than necessary” (2000: 135). This definition appeals to me, congruent with what I have outlined above as the primary aims of DTA: to identify, problematise and challenge. The processes of identification are themselves problematic, as such processes can only ever be interpretation – to take meaning from a given text and write a convincing story about that meaning. In my own research, then, I reflect on the ways in which the meanings that I make of the texts with which I work are themselves challengeable, asserting as they do a truth claim about the text under consideration. John Tomlinson expresses these concerns with great eloquence and his appeal to continued reflexive awareness is extremely convincing. “For not only will I, through ignorance, ‘silence’ voices in the discussion, I will also organise and ‘discipline’ the discourse via my discursive categories” (1991: 28). However, reflecting on the analytical strategies I choose to employ in my research, as well as reflecting on the motivations I have for undertaking this project at this time, and continuing this reflexivity throughout the research experience, at least ensures that I am conscious of my “privileged discursive position” (ibid.).

I have considered the textual placement of the exploration of appropriate analytical strategies and the critical review of the literature that informs this research, and it is important to me that expanding upon the strategies I employ in this research is given textual priority. This decision reflects three considerations. First, as I mention above, I am deeply committed to espousing a poststructural politics. The analytical strategies I develop in this chapter impact on the critique that I undertake in my review of the relevant literatures, and, given my belief that research is inherently political, this would be the case whether or not I were explicit about it. It therefore makes sense to me that the reader of my research is equipped with as much information as possible concerning my ontological and epistemological assumptions and how these inform my analytical strategies before I apply these strategies to a critical review.

Second, the chapter order I have chosen also indicates the centrality of my literature review to the research project as a whole. The literature review enabled me to identify dominant conceptualisations of (international) security and (gender) violence, which was necessary for the reconceptualisation that I wish to undertake. Thus it is logical to demonstrate that the analysis I conduct, which begins in Chapter Three with the Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, both textually and intellectually develops from the literature review. Finally, giving primacy to the analytical strategies I use allows me to make a textual statement about the value I attach to the research I produce. The strategies that enable this research are developed from an intellectual heritage that considers the value to be in problematising rather than establishing truth claims. That is, I proceed with the awareness that the claims that I make are contingent and are themselves open to challenge. In exploring the most appropriate analytical strategies, above, I am also making a claim as to the validity of the research as a whole: these strategies will enable me to ‘get at’ what I want to analyse and therefore produce valuable and interesting research.

It is necessary to reflect on the issues of textual representation, power and discourse throughout the research process, and to evaluate the ways in which it is possible to engage critically with naturalised knowledge, the ways in which cultural and historical specificity is key to understanding, and that knowledge is inseparably related to power and practice (Foucault 1972: 48-49). Identifying the

discursive practices through which identities are temporarily fixed in specific historical and cultural locations, and investigating how these identities enable certain behaviours and performances for lived individuals “is not politics as a means to truth but as the activity of contesting truths” (Aladjem 1991: 280). Refusing to accept that there is any ‘natural fact’ that cannot be contested, any essence to the identity of subject or object, allows for multiple interrogations of truth claims that can expose the very political processes that are naturalised through practices of power. Recourse to the insistence that this or that is ‘natural’ effects closure on reflective politics and it is this closure that I seek to resist.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Having established the analytical strategies that will guide this research, in this chapter I undertake a critical review of the literatures to which I owe an intellectual debt and to which I wish to contribute. This chapter is divided into three sections, drawing on a wide range of literature from various disciplinary homes. The first section explores dominant academic conceptualisations of gendered violence. This section has three subsections in which I map out the contours of each of the three approaches I have identified: ‘violence against women’, ‘gender violence’ and ‘the violent reproduction of gender’. The subsection addressing ‘violence against women’ outlines six critiques of this literature, leading on to the second subsection in which I offer six critiques of the literature concerning ‘gender violence’. The final subsection details the analytical approach that I find most persuasive, which I have labelled ‘the violent reproduction of gender’.

The analysis of the literature on international security proceeds in the same way in the second section of this chapter, and is divided up similarly, with three subsections addressing ‘national security’, ‘international security’ and ‘the violent reproduction of the international’. In the subsection on ‘national security’, I level six critiques at this literature. The second subsection explores the literature on ‘international security’ and I offer a further six critiques of this body of work. Finally, I demonstrate that security can be conceptualised as a set of discourses that function to reproduce ‘the international’ in various ways. Comparisons are drawn across the two bodies of literature regarding the ontological and epistemological assumptions that inform each conceptualisation, including the reconceptualisations that I offer. I argue that the different approaches have more common ontological and epistemological ground across the two literatures than the approaches within each literature do with each other.

In the concluding section of this chapter, I draw together the critiques of the two literatures that I establish in the first two sections. I argue that treating two literatures – one concerned with gender violence, the other with international security – that are assumed to be analytically and theoretically separable as an analytical whole for the purposes of critical review is not only legitimate but also instructive. I want to investigate the ways in which gendered violence has been

articulated as a security issue with specific reference to UNSCR 1325. Thus, the review of literature I offer in this chapter does more than provide an overview of the relevant academic work on the subject. It provides an insight into dominant discourses of (gender) violence and (international) security. I argue that the literatures, despite their differences, can be mapped according to their analytical foci, their underlying assumptions, and the types of subjects produced through each discourse, and I provide a tabular representation of this argument at the end of this chapter. The reconceptualisations I offer do not seek to represent fixed definitions of the concepts with which I am concerned. Rather, in both cases, I wish to explore how discourses of violence and security function in the literatures under discussion, and how they are product/productive of policy and advocacy concerning (gender) violence and (international) security.

(Gender) Violence

In the various histories of the development of feminist theory/practice, some consensus has developed concerning the division of feminist work into first, second, and potentially third ‘waves’. Within ‘second wave’ feminism in the 1970s and 1980s in both the UK and the USA, divisions between so-called ‘liberal feminism’ and its ‘others’ – more radical feminist projects based on critiques of liberalism from a variety of theoretical positions – led to serious internal conflict over the formulation and implementation of ‘a/the’ feminist emancipatory project (see Nicholson 1997: 1-5). Given the issues with which this chapter is concerned, it is noteworthy that “[t]he conflicts were as much over the perspectives and priorities of feminism itself [as they were] over whether we saw the sphere of the sexual and the problem of male violence as the root of women’s oppression” (Segal 1987: 208).

Continued debate over the issue of feminism and its place, not only in academic circles but also as part of wider social discourse, has constructed fragmented feminist movements attempting to create paths forward for feminisms which are no longer necessarily congruent or even mutually acceptable. In the 1980s, the recognition of difference among women questioned the legitimacy of an emancipatory politics that had taken the unity of its subject

as a given. The influence of postmodernist/poststructuralist thought became apparent as feminist academics struggled with the concept of feminism ‘without women’. As Butler writes, “[w]ithout a unified concept of woman ... it appears that feminist politics has lost the categorical basis of its own normative claims” (Butler 1990: 327). These debates, as mentioned above, are not ‘merely’ academic; they go to the heart of what it means to espouse a feminist politics, however that politics is conceived, and of what it means to construct feminist theory/practice and the issues with which this theory/practice should be concerned.

The development of distinct but related bodies of literature that, as mentioned above, are founded on different assumptions about gender and violence, has affected the language with which those concerned with these issues can speak of them. The literatures are related to different conceptions of feminist theory/practice through their foundational assumptions, without necessarily mapping directly to these broad ‘strands’. Thus, it is possible to speak of issues of gender and violence with a variety of feminist voices. I do not wish to inscribe rigid boundaries on the categories I discuss, nor do I assume that positioning a given author in a particular literature at a certain time entails her/his permanent placement there. With this in mind, it is possible to sketch in the links between radical feminism and the discourses of ‘violence against women’, between liberal feminism and discourses of ‘gender violence’ and finally between postmodern feminisms and discourses concerning the violent reproduction of gender.

The foundational assumptions of each of the bodies of literature I discuss in the first half of this Chapter, that which addresses ‘violence against women’ and that which addresses ‘gender violence’, are often implicit, or taken to be unproblematic. Each literature speaks to a specific manifestation of violence and is informed by a particular theory of gender. On its own terms, each literature is internally both coherent and consistent, and there are significant differences between the ways in which this coherence and consistency is constructed. However, there is a third mode of thinking about the issues of violence, gender and power that I expand upon in the third subsection below. This position, that I have labelled the ‘violent reproduction of gender’, is premised on the idea that it is the reproduction of gender difference that is analytically interesting.

'Violence Against Women'

Jill Radford, Liz Kelly and Marianne Hester are prominent researchers concerned with 'violence against women' and they situate their work in a context of the debates within wider feminist theorising, stating that "throughout the 1980s a series of separations occurred: of women's studies from feminism; of theoretical writing from women's lived experiences; of knowledge creation from activism" (1996: 8). Their implicit placement within these dualities is on the side of an activist feminism concerned with 'women's lived experiences'. Researching and writing about 'violence against women' has a particular, albeit internally differentiated, politics that differs in several key ways from researching and writing about 'gender violence', and one aspect of this is the location articulated by Radford, Kelly and Hester above.

Researching 'violence against women' was an explicit challenge to the self-proclaimed objectivist and value-free research programs of mainstream social science. This was a political undertaking in two main ways; research was conducted "with the aim of *achieving a description* as well as a *comprehensive understanding* of the problem" (Dobash and Dobash 1992: 283, emphasis added). It is vital to note that the academic study of 'violence against women' claims as its intellectual heritage critically important activity and activism in communities throughout the UK and the USA. "Starting at the grass roots level, feminists named its existence ... and began to put into place an underground network of shelters and safe houses for women. Only then did significant numbers of mental health professionals, social science researchers ... and policy makers begin to notice" (Bograd 1988: 11).

The importance of being able to talk about 'women' and the violences they experience as part of their oppression in a patriarchal society is central to this understanding, as "[v]iolence against women has been termed one of six 'structures of patriarchy', which control women and consolidate men's political, economic and social dominance" (Walby cited in Pickup, Williams and Sweetman 2001: 19). Thus, from this perspective, the claims of feminists regarding the illusory nature of the notions of 'subject', 'truth' and 'knowledge'

have been vigorously refuted if not dismissed out of hand. Researchers who work on 'violence against women' situate themselves firmly in opposition to the "insidious and unhelpful ... critique ... [that] includes the suggestion that work on sexual violence is 'essentialist' and that it constructs and positions women as inevitable 'victims' (Radford, Kelly and Hester 1996: 9).

Based on an "interpretive analytic" (Dobash and Dobash 1992: 282), the language employed to describe the issue of violence against women in society, aimed at drawing public attention to the gravity of the situations faced by many women in different communities within the UK and the USA, was largely related to the descriptions given by participants in research as well as the language used by the researchers themselves. In this way, the connection to the grass roots level remained central to the politics of theorising 'violence against women' and the women in question were able to set their own threat agenda relevant to their own experiences: the ownership and authority of this knowledge was firmly rooted in these experiential accounts. Thus, research into 'violence against women' sustains an empiricist epistemology.

Thus qualitative reports of violence against women are relatively well documented, especially by the IGOs and NGOs working to combat such violence and, as mentioned above, the representational categories used in these documentations are taken to be unproblematic. Within this approach, the violences that are addressed are those perpetrated against individuals who are socially identified as women, perpetrated as a result of this identity. The position of women, treated within this discourse as a relatively homogenous group that shares more cross-cultural similarities than it has differences when it comes to experiences of violence, is seen as one of marginality and of lived oppression. Those who write about 'violence against women' reinforce this perception, using terms such as "wall of silence" to describe the ways in which society ignores the plight of victims (Gough 1998) and depicting the struggle for recognition as the "invisible" war" (Kelly 2000: 46).

Raising the profile of women's experiences of violence, and seeking to bring these experiences from the margins to the centre of the political agenda, the documentation of violence against women can be seen as an effort to overcome this 'silence', and also to go some way towards constructing a better, safer world.

This is an ongoing project, drawing critical attention to the ways in which various knowledges and practices have been subjugated. The empowering of women to tell their own stories of life experiences, including those that are violent, has impacted on the ways in which violence against women is researched, and is also a function of the ways in which knowledge is understood within this conceptualisation. To say that “sexual violence was discovered: unearthed from layers of historical disbelief and denial” (Kelly, Burton and Regan 1996: 84) privileges a focus on the *reclamation* of knowledge. Just as ‘women’ exist unproblematically as the subjects of this discourse, the knowledge they possess concerning their lived experiences is conceived of as reflecting an objective reality that can be communicated without concern for the ways in which ‘reclaiming’ this knowledge relies upon its interpretation

An alternative conceptualisation of knowledge and meaning would emphasise the ways in which knowledge is *constructed* rather than reclaimed. To speak of construction is in no way to suggest that the accounts are somehow fabricated. Rather, it draws attention to the processes of representation involved in the telling and retelling of these accounts. While the violences reported by those who have experienced them are in no way ‘untrue’ and it is vital to raise awareness of these issues, it is also important to problematise the politics of constructing these accounts and the ways in which processes of interpretation and representation are implicated in the ‘reclamation’ of knowledge that is perceived as unproblematic within this conceptualisation. This is the first of six critiques I offer of an approach that seeks to theorise ‘violence against women’: the suggestion that in claiming a truth based in experience, whatever the strategic gains, literature that addresses ‘violence against women’ is largely insensitive to the ways in which these claims appeal to the existence of an objective reality that is difficult to sustain.

Articles that aim to raise the profile of violence against women also construct the profile of violence against women, who are vulnerable and often infantilised. Elizabeth Stanko encapsulates this idea when she writes that “women *know*, consciously or unconsciously, what it means to be vulnerable to sexual and/or physical male violence” (Stanko 1985: 1, emphasis in original). This construction of women-as-victim has negative consequences noted even by

those who work on violence against women using the same referents. Liz Kelly, Sheila Burton and Linda Regan give an example of an exercise they use when working with women who have experienced violence in which the group are asked to free-associate using 'victim' as the point of departure. Words that are frequently mentioned include: "Passive Helpless Weak Vulnerable Shame Small Hurt Powerless Confused Controlled Guilty" (1996: 91).

A second critique of this literature is this: in suggesting that 'men' hold and exercise power this approach is founded on a certain conceptualisation of power that is never fully explicated as male power *over* women. Kelly discusses sexual violence, defined as "a collective noun to encompass all forms of male violence against women and girls" (Kelly 1988 cited in Kelly 2000: 62), conceiving of it as "one of the most extreme and effective forms of patriarchal control" (Kelly 2000: 45). Kelly argues that violence against women is a means by which men gain and retain power; the perpetrators are "men who presume power refusing to give up one iota of historical privilege" (ibid.) and the victims are women.

Thus, this approach, thinking about 'violence against women', is congruent with existing gender narratives, which tell of 'men' as being empowered, controlling, and active, as well as aggressive. However, violence, as a key organisational concept within the discourse of 'violence against women', is itself inherently gendered. The dominant conceptualisation of violence "rests upon unstated and unquestioned commentaries about gender, and masculinity in particular" (Stanko 1994: 32), and it is represented as violence *towards* a person or object. The discourses of gender through which this conceptualisation constructs the notions of what it means to be a woman or a man, to be a victim or a perpetrator of violence, relate male bodies to action rather than passivity, and to aggressive and controlling behaviours rather than defensive and controlled.

My third critique of this conceptualisation I offer challenges the ways in which theorising 'violence against women' denies women agency as a result of these processes of representation. Jill Radford suggests that "while men are murdered more frequently than women, men are rarely murdered simply because they are men ... Most murders by women are in self-defense or represent a desperate attempt at self-preservation" (1992: 10). In disallowing women the

potential to be actors in violent situations, these constructions are inherently political and serve to define violence as the preserve of masculinity, which ‘naturally’ maps to male bodies. “The agency which women exhibit... in resisting and coping... through collective opposition” (Kelly 2000: 46) is not critically examined, although it represents a thoroughly feminised sense of agency, congruent with dominant traditionalised narratives of gender.

A fourth critique challenges the way in which a chapter that explicitly addresses ‘Wars Against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics and the Militarised State’ (Kelly 2000), the implications of introducing a discussion of the violences done to children, without adequately exploring the ways in which making the link between women and children in this manner has important consequences for the meaning made of women through this discourse, should be noted. This forms the fifth critique. Using words such as “vulnerable” and “exploitation” (Kelly 2000: 58), and continually running together the two collective nouns “women and children” (ibid.: 58-62) serves to associate women with children and thereby bracket the two together conceptually, constructing what Cynthia Enloe calls “womenandchildren” (1990). Given that children are not fully mature, are depicted as not fully capable of rational thought and are also seen to be in need of care and protection, this association is inevitably problematic.

Finally, the sixth critique concerns the construction of masculinities and ‘men’ within this conceptualisation, largely marginalised and precluded from study as victims of violences themselves. There is very limited space for the expression of positive masculine agency, in terms of explaining why the majority of men do not perpetrate violence against women, resulting in an almost crude rendering of one-size-fits-all masculinity in which “[m]en affirm one another as men through the exclusion, humiliation and objectification of women” (Kelly 2000: 57). While Kelly’s analysis is both insightful and compelling, as an example of thinking about ‘violence against women’, it displays two further weaknesses. Thus I argue that the ‘violence against women’ literature tends to pathologise relations between gendered individuals, supported by the unproblematic linkages presumed to exist between ‘men’ and power and ‘women’ as victims. This tendency is a result of other assumptions Kelly sustains

throughout her analysis, namely the gendered dichotomy of power that sees power as always-already a male *possession* and the preclusion of positive male agency.

Six Critiques of 'Violence Against Women' Literature

- Claims that truth is experiential
- Power is conceptualised as (men's) 'power over' (women)
- Women are denied agency
- Men are precluded from being victims of violence
- Women(andchildren) are represented as eternal victims
- Gender is pathologised

Figure 1: Six Critiques of 'Violence Against Women' Literature

Research that focuses on 'violence against women' posits women as coherent and stable subjects whose life experiences can be ameliorated by appropriate policy practice. This approach identifies materially determined gendered individuals as a result of its empirical approach to the study of politics and social life. The notion of sovereignty is central here, and provides an important link to the literature on international security, an issue to which I return in the final section of this chapter. The subject constructed through the discourse of 'violence against women' is assumed to be sovereign; the 'women' affected by violence have sovereign rights over their own material forms and should not therefore be subjected to violence. Moreover, this sovereignty is preconstituted and taken to be an empirical 'reality'. In the following section I illustrate how research that focuses on 'gender violence' problematises this assumption of a stable sovereign subject, as well as the implications that this assumption has for the development of a political project addressing gendered violence.

'Gender Violence'

As a conceptualisation, 'violence against women' prioritises practice over theory and activism over academia; similarly, the conceptualisation of 'gender

violence' has its own politics of location. However, the location articulated within this discourse is one of multiple and fluid sites of study and perspectives from which to study. Work on 'gender violence' can be located within the academy affiliated with the disciplines of sociology, criminology, development, law and politics. The sites of study may be domestic, international, contemporary or historical, and the context also diverse, with theories of gender violence concerned with the experiences of individuals and societies at every stage of life in every possible social context.

Laura O'Toole and Jessica Schiffman argue explicitly that the theorising of 'gender violence' is qualitatively different from the theorising of 'violence against women'. "By widening our analytical lens, we are able to incorporate important connections among violence against heterosexual women and men, lesbians and gay men, and children and suggest important questions about structural and interpersonal violence for future analysis" (1997a: xiii). Thus theorising 'gender violence' partly becomes possible due to the increasing recognition of the critiques mentioned above that have been raised and integrated into the academic study, research and activism related to gender and violence.

Challenging the narrow focus of studies addressing 'violence against women' has resulted in a broader multifaceted analytic and a recognition that "[t]he complexity of the nature of violence means that the necessary social changes should also be diverse and wide-ranging" (Alder 1997: 442). However, the first of six critiques I offer of 'gender violence' challenges the ways in which 'gender violence' is assumed to be 'knowable'. I acknowledge that it is vital to understand the various effects and implications of violence on gender relations and the lives of individuals globally. However, research on 'gender violence' tends to assume that the collection of case study evidence (to draw attention to the context-specific social construction of gender relations, see Moser and Clark 2001: 4) and its analysis, using appropriate frames and devices (see Moser 2001), will enable the eradication of such violence (see Moser and McIlwhaine 2001). While research on 'gender violence' differs importantly from research on 'violence against women', in that it espouses a constructivist rather than an empiricist epistemology, it still makes claims based on 'giving voice' to

survivors of gendered violence (see Ibáñez 2001) and constructs policy suggestions based on this knowledge.

Some theorists, such as Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman, who comment that “it would ... be perilous to ignore the larger political environment which addresses the hurts that have been incurred in acts of violence” (2001: 19), explicitly make the connection between the organisational notions of violence, gender and power that are implicated in the study of ‘gender violence’.²⁸ Theorists working within this conceptualisation suggest that thinking about ‘gender violence’ enables a different approach to thinking about ‘violence against women’. This approach is based on an understanding that “the ‘language’ of a violent act, the way the violence manifests itself, can only be understood within a certain social experience” (Kaufman 1997: 33) and that this ‘social experience’ also impacts upon the construction of gender. Thinking about ‘gender violence’ centralises the narratives of gender that are subjected to a partial or limited critique using an approach that takes ‘violence against women’ as its analytical focus. In doing so, theorising ‘gender violence’ takes a particular conceptualisation of power as the point of analytical departure where power is seen as integral both to the conceptualisation of gender and to the conceptualisation of violence.

Within the discourse of ‘violence against women’, power is conceived of as male ‘power over’ women, in that men hold the power that enables them to oppress women through acts of violence. Power as conceived in theorising ‘gender violence’ is reconfigured as ‘power to’, a conceptualisation that envisions power as affirmative and capacity-building, as well as oppressive. This creates the space to conceive of violences as regulatory and themselves contributing to the very normalising practices through which they are sustained. “Wheresoever power orients practice - and that is everywhere - there is violence” (Kleinman 2000: 238). This vision of power is more compatible with what Steven Lukes called “the radical conception of power” (cited in Digeser 1992: 979) in which structures of power are implicated in the construction of experiences, interests and social interactions. However, the productive power of

²⁸ See also Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank (eds) 2000; Moser and Clark (eds) 2001; Giles and Hyndman (eds) 2004.

violence is under-theorised in this account, despite analytical attention being paid to different cultural and historical contexts in which such violence occurs.

‘Gender violence’ offers “a close examination of structured inequalities and the ability to devise a framework to transform unequal power relations” (Sharoni 2001: 90). This is my second point of critical engagement with this approach, as I argue that inequalities – and the exercise of power – cannot be so easily identified. Given the theory of power I outline in Chapter One, the ‘transformation’ of power relations is difficult, if not impossible, as power is omnipresent and not by definition repressive (Foucault 1977, 1978).

A third critique relates to the ways in which violence is theorised within the account of ‘gender violence’. Single acts of violence are impossible (see Moser 2001). Rather, the societal, the communal, the interpersonal and the individual levels function together to produce violences, which regulate and are regulated by existing social norms and practices. In much the same way as discourses of ‘violence against women’ can be said to homogenise women as a social group regardless of their socio-historic and cultural location, this approach could be seen to homogenise acts of violence as power. “This entanglement of the larger political environment in ... the acts of violence” (Das and Kleinman 2001: 19) must be established and adequately theorised. Using this conceptualisation, an explanation of honour killings in Pakistan, for example, implicates not only the direct perpetrator/s of the act of violence, but also the community which implicitly or explicitly condones the murder to appease family honour of a woman who has transgressed the boundaries of her ‘proper’ place, and the legal structure which supports it. “In the 1990s there had been no single case in which a man was criminally prosecuted under sections 299 to 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code. These sections deal with offences ‘affecting the human body’ and cover domestic violence” (Fox 1999).

It is important to note that the power structures that support gender violences are in no way absent from Western society; it is not the case that they represent a ‘traditional’ means of conflict resolution or are a product of a peculiar (read ‘Other’) ‘religious’ culture. The normalisation of violence in particular historical and cultural settings is evident, although notions of legitimate and illegitimate violence vary with these settings, and the sensitivity of representing

these cases through existing value-systems attached to the physical and symbolic spaces they inhabit should be noted. Vivian Fox notes that “the law in the west ... played a significant role in articulating and re-enforcing male superiority and domination” (2002: 19) through the normalisation of violent relations between spouses²⁹ and the principles of non-intervention in cases of such violence adhered to by the majority of police forces in the UK and the USA until relatively recently. “Ten years ago, when asked why the US Senate was not holding hearings on wife abuse, as it did for child abuse, a senator replied sarcastically that eliminating wife abuse ‘would take all the fun out of marriage’” (Gelles 1997: 71). Legislation that regulates gender is a global phenomenon, taking culturally specific forms. Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, which intended to “make it unlawful for local authorities to ‘intentionally promote homosexuality’” (Weeks 1989: 295) in the UK was founded on notions of appropriate gendered behaviours, and ultimately aimed to protect and maintain the institution of ‘the family’ in a time of increasing social change and instability.

Within this conceptualisation, gender violence can occur at every level of social interaction, not just the inter-personal.³⁰ As Cynthia Cockburn notes, “[g]ender links violence at different points on a scale reaching from the personal to the international” (2004: 41, see also Giles and Hyndman 2004). Although researchers working on ‘violence against women’ would identify the (patriarchal) power structures that facilitate the continuation of violence against women, thinking about ‘gender violence’ enables a more sensitive understanding

²⁹ “Although legend has it that Blackstone’s codification of English common law in 1768 asserted that a husband had the right to ‘physically chastise’ an errant wife provided that the stick was no thicker than his thumb - and thus the ‘rule of thumb’ was born - such a passage cannot be found in Blackstone” (Sommers cited in Gelles 1997: 22). However, the existence of such charming rhymes as ‘The spaniel, the wife and the walnut tree, the more you beat them, the better they be’ suggests that violence towards wives were commonplace and thus normalised.

³⁰ Individual violence also plays a role; substance abuse and self-harm may be more prevalent in those who are marginalised by society for displaying inappropriate behaviours. Similarly, the gendered dimensions of image-related obsessive-compulsive disorder have been well documented, and the pressure to achieve a particular idealised notion of femininity has had extremely destructive results in far too many instances. I object to the representation of anorexia nervosa, bulimia and compulsive over-eating as ‘eating disorders’. I believe that this construction has been detrimental to the efforts to alleviate and overcome the symptoms of various ‘eating disorders’, as it perpetuates the notion that these disorders are *about* food rather than manifested *through* food. It is important to analyse the power dimension of IROCDs and to perceive them as individual violence, sustained by the same culturally relative discourses of gender, control and the body. As long as deliberately starving yourself to death is an ‘eating disorder’, all you need to do to overcome it is to start eating again - an attitude which is unhelpful, misguided and unfortunately all too prevalent.

of the representation of women as simultaneously “victims, perpetrators [and] ... actors” (Moser and Clark 2001) and the different conceptualisation of power that this representation entails. The conceptualisation of power that underpins work on ‘gender violence’ is implicated in the conceptualisation of violence. Caroline Moser suggests that there is a “gendered continuum of conflict and violence” (2001: 31), and, moreover, that this continuum is a result of the ways in which “gender is embedded in relations of power/powerlessness” (ibid.: 37). This forms my fourth critique of this literature, as, while I sustain the challenge to a unidirectional power-violence relationship as offered by work on ‘violence against women’, the ‘embedded’ nature of gender in power as suggested by Moser and others does not fully problematise the links between masculinity and violence that are assumed by the previous literature. Moser offers Robert Connell’s theory of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as a potentially more useful analytical device than patriarchy (ibid.) but nonetheless continues to associate power “with male authority and dominance” (ibid.).

The power involved in making meanings of gender and of violence is, however, placed under scrutiny in accounts of ‘gender violence’. Lillian Artz argues that the telling of an incidence of gender violence is made intelligible through structures of masculinised power. “A woman’s story of abuse ... is ‘organised’ for her ... Anything that appears ‘inconsistent’ ... erodes her legal position as a victim of a violent crime” (2001: 14). Thus challenging the representation of gender violence is as much concerned with exploring the boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate behaviour as it is concerned with the inscription of these boundaries. Violence is normalised in a vast number of social settings, and images and representations of violence are common in literature, in film, in news media. “Community acquiescence to gender violence certainly varies ... yet analysts continue to show the ways in which the larger social contexts shape and reproduce the meanings and practices that hold sway in the most basic relationships we form” (O’Toole and Schiffman 1997b: 69).

However, metaphor and imagery used to describe ‘gender violence’ is often similar in conceptual make-up to the language used to talk about ‘violence against women’. This is the fifth of six critiques I offer of this conceptualisation, related to the critiques laid out above of the theorising of ‘violence against

women'. Primarily, while attention is paid to the specificities of situational manifestations of violence, issues of cultural 'difference' and relativism have required the negotiation of critical issues of representation and discursive privilege. Artz constructs a strong argument for the importance of paying serious attention to the culturally specific regulatory practices that organise gender and sexuality when theorising violence, but in both the title and the body of the article itself, the women with whom she is working to stop gender violence are referred to as "the weather watchers", and no critical attention is given to this self-identification or the consequences of reproducing it. Thus the fifth critique concerns the way in which literature discussing 'gender violence' can still act to inscribe a crude rendering of masculinity that marginalises the lived and often violent experiences of 'men'. Describing violent acts perpetrated by particular male individuals as "like a storm ... the storming thunder that bangs down upon you" (participant in research cited in Artz 2001: 8) re-inscribes the naturalised link between masculinity and violence that should be examined as part of any theorising of gender and of violence (see also Moser 2001; Cockburn 2004).

The final critique I suggest is that 'gender violence' literature has not successfully overcome the tendency within analysis to pathologise gender. In an attempt to move beyond what she terms "gender traditionalism", in which gender is readable from sex and differences between genders are thus biological, and "gender liberalism", which stresses the equality of the genders despite differences between them, both of which "can combine in unfortunate ways ... to prevent gender from being seen as significant or explanatory" (Cockburn 2001: 14), Cynthia Cockburn develops a subtle and thoughtful account of gender violence with specific reference to situations of armed conflict. Centralising the power inherent in gender relations enables the "uncovering [of] the differentiation and asymmetry of masculine and feminine as governing principles, idealized qualities, practices or symbols" (ibid.: 16).

However, Cockburn "calls, first, for a sensitivity to *gender difference*" (2001: 28, emphasis in original) that I believe may undermine the utility of this approach. It does, in a way, put the empirical cart before the theoretical horse, in much the same way as the framework employed by Kelly described above. If difference between the genders is taken as a starting point for the analysis of

gender, then the (re)production of this difference is obscured from critical attention. This potentially allows for a third conceptualisation that differs slightly from the notions of ‘violence against women’ and ‘gender violence’. It is specifically the discursive practices through which gender is (re)produced that I seek to analyse in this project, and, while the conceptualisation of ‘gender violence’ can constitute a particular form of critical engagement, assuming that gender has a stable ontology of difference does not allow for the type of investigation I wish to undertake.




Figure 2: Six Critiques of ‘Gender Violence’ Literature

The approach I discuss in this section, which focuses on ‘gender violence’, in contrast to research addressing ‘violence against women’, does not assume sovereignty of a stable subject. Attention is paid to the ways in which individuals are both product and productive of their social environments, positing a socially constructed individual within a similarly socially constructed matrix of gender relations. Gender is therefore not assumed to be a transhistorical or universal system of identity production, nor is it assumed that individuals experience gender in the same way, even within a particular social/political context. This emphasises the ontological difference between research on ‘violence against women’ and ‘gender violence’. The former assumes a material reality, and in the context of gender, gender can thus be read unproblematically from sexed bodies. The latter approach focuses on gender as a social construct, where sexed bodies are gendered in accordance to variable matrices of gender

norms. The approach I outline below offers an alternative to both these approaches, investigating the ways in which gender violence can be conceptualised as the performance of gender through instances of violence.

'The Violent Reproduction of Gender'

While thinking about 'violence against women' can be seen as politically located in feminist activism the approach to which I now turn is more broadly conceived of, by both its proponents and its critics, as based in the academe (Evans 1982: 17; Jeffries 1999). The bifurcation of feminist work into two strands, alluded to by Radford, Kelly and Hester as noted above, one of which became academically disciplined as Women's Studies and the other that focussed on activism as conventionally conceived, has allowed for the proliferation of feminist theorising about the concepts of gender, violence and power, and also for the continued theorising about theory/practice. Undoubtedly influenced by postmodern, poststructuralist and postcolonial literatures and theorising, this approach, which investigates 'the violent reproduction of gender', works from the premise "that there is no necessary difference between reported, subjective experience and theoretical and analytical work" (Evans 1997: 18). Language, representation, and the construction of meaning are central to both and thus the distinction between theory and practice should be collapsed.

Furthermore, it has been argued that "queer and 'postmodern' theory has affected the ability of feminists and lesbians to organise against, or even to recognise violence against women" (Jeffries 1999). As mentioned above, in the literature addressing 'violence against women' the women in question are identified unproblematically *as* women; as Sylvia Walby asserts, in a possibly unintended witticism, that "the concept of 'woman' [is] essential to grasp the gendered nature of the social world" (1992: 48). Those advocating caution as regards these notions have been variously characterised as nihilistic, apolitical, traitorous and elitist (see Francis 2002: 15-17; Stanley 1997: 276-277 *inter alia*). While it may overstate the case a little, Brown's statement that "postmodern deconstruction of the subject incites palpable feminist panic" (1995: 39) has particular resonance in this discussion.

Against claims that post-modern feminism is unsustainable, that feminism is inherently modernist in its claim to rights on behalf of a stable subject and the eventual emancipation of this subject, I would suggest that being *suspicious* of the truth claims of such grand narratives is not only desirable but also necessary, and that this suspicion does not preclude political action. Where thinking about ‘violence against women’ fails to problematise the categories around which it is organised, and thinking about ‘gender violence’ does not fully explore the possibilities that problematising these categories offers, a discourse-theoretical approach in which thinking about ‘the violent reproduction of gender’ directly addresses these concepts as a vehicle for the construction of a feminist politics of uncertainty, of instability and fluidity holds, for me, far greater appeal.

Gender can be understood as a form of identity for the ordering of society, one that is culturally specific but globally recognised. Putting the analytical category of gender under critical scrutiny allows for a theory of gender that questions the reproduction of difference rather than assuming difference and progressing from there. As Butler writes, “this is the occasion in which we come to understand that what we take to be ‘real’, what we invoke as the naturalised knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and revisable reality” (1999: xxiii). Just as power is central to the process of maintaining the fictions of gender as a reality, the relations that define gender are power relations. However, the most important aspect of gender for the purposes of this analysis is that social understandings of gender are never *fixed*, meaning that gender needs to be reproduced through any means, violent if necessary.

This approach draws heavily on Butler’s theorising of gender as performative. Rather than proceeding from a preconceived notion of difference, this approach investigates the ways in which “gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through *a stylised repetition of acts*” (Butler 1999: 179, emphasis in original). To argue that gender is performative is not to deny the materiality of gendered bodies, it is to acknowledge that this materiality, what Butler refers to as “the ‘I’”, emerges “within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves” (1993: 7). These ‘gender relations’ are “the differentiating relations by which speaking subjects

come into being” (ibid.). Gendered violence, on this view, is conceivable as a physical manifestation of ‘differentiating relations’.

I find it far more persuasive to conceptualise gender violence, of which violence against women is a part, as violences that are both gendered and gendering. Power is conceived of within this mode of analysis as productive, a conceptualisation that Peter Digiesser has called “the fourth face of power” (2002: 980). Influenced by the theorising of Foucault, “the critical issue[s are] ... ‘What kind of subject is being produced?’” (ibid.) and through which discursive practices are these subjects being produced? Thinking about ‘the violent reproduction of gender’ allows for the consideration of the ways in which culturally and historically specific narratives or discourses produce particular understandings of notions of violence, gender and power, thus enabling the emergence of gendered subjects. By analysing the ways in which these subjects are temporarily ‘fixed’ through discursive practice, through their *performance*, it is possible to investigate “the discursive practice by which matter is rendered irreducible” – that is, how it comes to be accepted that subjects embody a pre-given materiality – and to refuse the conceptual bracketing of the “problematic gendered matrix” that organises the logic of this materiality (Butler 1993: 29).

Instances of violence are one of the sites at which gender identities are reproduced. Thus, gendered violence is the violent reproduction of gender. This conceptualisation of gendered violence, taking power as its definitive component, allows for a wider remit, so that gender violence can be taken to include such instances as homophobic ‘queer-bashing’ and other forms of discrimination which discipline gender (McGinnis 2001; Tatchell 2002). These examples, and all of the examples given in the two sections above, serve to (re)produce specific gender orders by dividing and controlling gendered identity groups through violence. “Forms of violence against women, from rape and domestic violence to sexual harassment and sexual abuse are perhaps the most oppressive by-products of what Foucault calls ‘technologies of sex’” (cited in Lees 1997: 86).

Gender myths serve to naturalise a configuration of the gender order particular to a given space and time. Furthermore, this naturalised gender order is

performed daily, through bodily acts of obedience to and transgression of gender norms, in culturally specific ways, across the world, and notions of the ‘natural’ regulate this performance. Transgressants, or those who deviate from this norm, may be punished, and this is where the theorising of violence begins to take shape. An account of the masculinisation of ‘men’ in a township in Cape Town, South Africa eloquently encapsulates this notion. Ramphele comments on the existence of “repeated stories of the men and women they ought to become. Forms of storytelling are varied: Gentle cuddles, coaxing whispers ... firm drawing of boundaries, harsh words for non-conformists, or even *physically imposed pain* all find a place” (Ramphele 2000: 102, emphasis added).

To illustrate this perspective, I investigate the ways in which it is possible to make meaning of rape as an instance of the violent reproduction of gender. When I describe the discursive construction of rape, I wish to make it clear that I am not disputing the ‘reality’ of rape as a crime; rather, I follow Marcus when she asserts that “rape is a question of language, interpretation and subjectivity” (1992: 387). Along with Marcus, I am working towards the formulation of a politics of rape, which conceives of the act itself, the circumstances which ‘allow’ for the act, the immediate and long-term legal procedures following the act and associated reportage and documentation as equally implicated and important in the theorising of rape, arguing “against the political efficacy of seeing rape as the fixed reality of women’s lives, against an identity politics which defines women by our violability” (ibid.).

The legal definition of rape was amended under Section 1 of the UK Sexual Offences Act 2003. Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 stated that ‘[i]t is an offence for a man to rape a woman or another man’; the relevant legislation now rules that ‘A person (A) commits an offence if - a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis; b) B does not consent to the penetration; and c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents’ (OPSI, 2003). This legal definition of rape is interesting on many levels, but for the purposes of this analysis I would like to consider the implications of closing off the discursive space for women to be agents of rape. While ‘men’ have been added to the construction of potential victims of rape, ‘women’ are legally precluded from the list of aggressors. “Male rape victims

often feel stigmatised as female or homosexual, whatever their sexual orientation. This was a major reason why men [in the study] did not report the offences to the police. When asked why he didn't tell the police, one man replied 'Only women are raped'" (Lees 1997: 95). This is partly a product of the ways in which rape is (re)presented in society as something done *by* men *to* women (and children). In dominant social constructions of gender, masculine behaviours are associated with aggression, control and action, femininities with their antonyms. Current theories of rape perpetuate this linkage, thereby reinforcing these gender stereotypes. Preserving the masculinity of rape is fundamental to its discursive construction, and therefore must be exposed and challenged as a base for the formulation of a politics of rape.

Rape can be seen as a cultural sanctioned masculine realm; although the legislation talks of 'men' the assumption is that masculinities will map on to socially defined 'male' bodies, following the myths of a 'natural' gender order. In the UK, rape is discursively constructed as a resource of gender violence, a violent means of inscribing the boundaries between masculinities and femininities, apparent from the outset once the legal definition of rape has been examined. "[R]ape is predominantly carried out by men whose sexual orientation is heterosexual ... and [is] related to the control of homosexuality and the hegemonic heterosexuality" (Lees 1997: 106). The cultural conditions that sustain gender violence are pervasive and deeply internalised. Not only does violence rely on these cultural conditions, but to an extent, these cultural conditions also rely on violence for their (re)production.

To summarise, this section has investigated the dominant conceptualisations of gender violence that are evident in academic and policy work on this subject. Each of the three approaches I identify above are organised around specific ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments, which produce different understandings of gendered subjects and the social/political realms that these gendered subjects inhabit. For clarity, I have outlined the three approaches in Table 2:

Approach	Focus	What kinds of subjects are being produced?
‘Violence Against Women’	Empirically identifiable gendered entities and the violences they experience	Sovereign individuals
‘Gender Violence’	Constructed gendered entities and the violences they experience	Constructed individuals
‘Violent Reproduction of Gender’	Discursively constituted gendered entities and the function that violence performs in (re)producing these discourses	Performative individuals

Table 2: Critical Review of Gender Violence Literature

There must be no tolerance for violence against women, but addressing violence against women in isolation will not reduce the incidences of the violent reproduction of gender as I conceptualise it. I would suggest that any gains made would be temporary and unlikely to have any permanent effect; it is far more likely that resources would be directed toward shelters, counselling, and treatment of ‘victims’ - all of which are both worthy and necessary but none of which challenge the underlying problem. Enabling the security of people to live free from gendered violence necessitates an exploration of the ways in which security has been conceptualised, as well as an exploration of the ways in which attempts have been made to frame gendered violence as a security issue. Thus, in the second section of this chapter, I conduct a critical review of the literature on security.

(International) Security

International Relations, along with every other discipline, has a dominant narrative that allows scholars to develop an understanding of the history, relevance and appropriate subject matter of the discipline as a whole. Through its very act of naming, IR has asserted itself as a discipline concerned with the international, and relations in this domain. The assumption is that these relations are political, as described by Robert Keohane: “For over 2000 years, thinkers have sought to understand ... the most basic question of world politics; the sources of discord and war and the conditions of cooperation and of peace” (1986: 3). In making such a statement, Keohane (re)inscribes the venerable heritage of the discipline

of IR and also (re)affirms the appropriate subject matter with which scholars of IR should be concerned. As Christine Sylvester reminds us, IR differentiates by definition “relations international from other types of relations” (1994: 6).

Relations international, I argue below, are relations that occur in the domain of ‘high politics’ – the arena in which, as Keohane suggests, decisions about war and peace are made. Security, as it is discussed in the literature I review in this section, is central to relations international, and to the academic discipline of International Relations.

It has been suggested that security is “what W. B. Gallie has called ‘an essentially contested concept’” (Buzan 1991: 7), and that the degree of debate over the precise meaning, application and utility of security as a concept within the discipline is partly a result of this contested-ness. Others have pointed to the “ambiguous” nature of security as a concept (Wolfers 1952), to the fact that analysts “have not found it intellectually easy” (Ullman 1983: 129) to develop a pertinent and useful definition of the concept, and to the complexities inherent in recognising and theorising the proliferation of “diverse terms (common, cooperative, collective, comprehensive) as modifiers to ‘security’” (Krause and Williams 1996: 230). In this analysis I intend to address these concerns through the mapping of security literature in a different way. The division into ‘national security’ and ‘international security’ is one that I have made for the purposes of analysis, the reasons for which will become clear as I expand on these approaches. Those who work within the approaches specified below do not necessarily use these modifiers to describe their own work.

I begin by considering the assumptions and normative implications of considering security with the modifier ‘national’, which, similar to the work on ‘violence against women’ discussed above, supports an empiricist epistemology. Within this approach I consider literature produced by those working predominantly within classical and neorealist theoretical frameworks. Through the analysis of a selection of this literature, I investigate the ways in which the concept of security offered by those working within this approach is problematic. Those who work with a conceptualisation that takes ‘international’ as a modifier for security have offered some cogent critiques of the former approach, and these will

be integrated into my analysis of the assumptions and implications of studying ‘international security’, which is built on a constructivist epistemology.

The literature on ‘international security’ incorporates work on ‘human security’, ‘critical security’ and ‘common security’.³¹ The literature represents a variety of different theoretical frameworks, and draws heavily on representations of, and arguments concerning, ‘global civil society’ and cosmopolitanism, as I discuss further below. However, in this analysis I treat these works as minimally unitary, and label them ‘international security’ for three interconnected reasons.³² Primarily, the term ‘international’ easily differentiates this approach from the literature on ‘national security’. Second, the use of the modifier ‘international’ denotes the association of this approach with global, or universal, values. Third, the term resonates with the discipline in which this literature is situated – International Relations.

In the final section of this analysis I offer a third, discourse-theoretical conceptualisation of security, building on the insights of the first two conceptualisations, which conceives of the study and politics of security as performative. The assumptions and implications of this third approach, which speaks of the violent reproduction of ‘the international’, will be opened to critical scrutiny. This alternative is a conscious effort to avoid producing a contribution to an already pre-determined field of security studies, an unsettling of disciplinary boundaries as indicated by the re-mapping of the literature that I undertake. Challenging the conceptual and theoretical boundaries of the literature in an effort to conceptualise security such that both the concept and the literature, which I conceive of as intimately related, are reconfigured is an integral part of this analysis.

The conceptualisations that I outline here map to the conceptualisations presented in the previous sections concerning the differences in thinking about ‘violence against women’ and thinking about ‘gender violence’. In the same way

³¹ On ‘human security’, see, for example, UNDP 1994; Tehranian (ed.) 1999; McRae 2001; Newman 2001; Paris 2001; Thomas 2001; Thomas and Tow 2002. ‘Critical security studies’ is exemplified by Booth 1991, 1995. See also Krause 1998; Croft and Terriff (eds) 2000; Booth 2004; Dunne and Wheeler 2004; Booth (ed.) 2005; Sheehan 2005.

³² See also Roland Paris (2001: 87) and Edward Newman (2001: 240-242), both of whom offer a similar justification for treating these works as a conceptual and analytical whole.

that those working within the approach broadly conceived as ‘violence against women’ take as unproblematic the identification of violence and women, there are certain assumptions either implicit or explicit in the theorising of ‘national security’ that relate to the ‘realities’ of the organisational concepts. Similarly, while ‘gender violence’ literature problematises gender as relational and conceives of violence more broadly, the literature that addresses ‘international security’ is largely built on critiques of literature that addresses ‘national security’. In the exploration of the possibilities for a third conceptualisation concerning security, just as in the formulation of a conceptualisation that addresses the ‘violent reproduction of gender’, I will build on a critical review of the existing literature and offer some suggestions as to how security could be usefully reconceptualised.

‘National security’

According to Keohane, “[i]t is important to understand realism and neorealism because of their widespread acceptance in contemporary scholarship and in policy circles. Political realism is deeply embedded in Western thought” (1986: 4). The different strains of realism benefit from these claims to legitimacy and authority; realist theories are given credence through their relation to philosophers and social theorists throughout history.³³ The most regularly cited are Machiavelli, Thucydides and Hobbes, who are represented as the forefathers of international relations in a highly effective genealogical sleight-of-hand.³⁴ Every time a view such as this one is expressed, it (re)presents realism as the orthodoxy that it professes to be, thereby increasing its status as the orthodoxy.

³³ It is vital to note that there is huge diversity within the bodies of theory commonly referred to as ‘realist’. The representation of realism as singular and cohesive functions discursively to suggest a level of coherence that, implicitly, is lacking from alternative bodies of theory, and contributes towards the construction of a position from which the ‘mainstream’ can name itself thus. However, these varied theories do share certain foundational assumptions that for the purposes of this analysis enable me to treat them as minimally unitary.

³⁴ For literature that performs this representational practice, see, *inter alia*, 1939: 62-65; Morgenthau 1973: 9-10; Waltz 1959. The way in which IR is often taught reinscribes this mythical heritage through the organisation of popular textbooks; see, *inter alia*, Jackson and Owens 2005: 50-51; Jackson and Sørensen 2003: 41; Viotti and Kauppi 1999: 57-61. Critical interjections to this narrative have drawn attention to the ways in which such a representation (re)produces “the authority of classicism” (Burchill 2001: 98, see also Steans and Pettiford 2001: 52-53; Sterling-Folker 2006: 15).

While the discipline of IR proclaims itself to be concerned with *International Relations*, it would be more appropriate within a realist framework to refer to the study of relations between *states*. The assumption that guides this act of boundary inscription is that the ‘national’ will always be congruent with the ‘state’, as discussed further below. Thus, the primary object of analysis for realisms is the state, assumed to be unitary and cohesive, that acts on behalf of its population in a system of states functioning with no higher authority than the state itself. Thus both internal and external sovereignty are central to the conception of the state, and the logical corollary of this conception constructs the state system as anarchic. Realist IR theory ‘sees’ the state as its object of analysis and therefore “[s]tates are the principle referent objects of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest sources of governing authority” (Buzan 1991: 22).

The initial point of critical engagement with this approach to security is the way in which the state is conceptualised. Within both classical (or ‘political’) realism and neorealism (or ‘structural realism’), the state is represented as a unitary actor.³⁵ Both variants proceed according to the assumption that all human existence is bounded by states, according to the assertion that states are the primary object of analysis. If, as Kenneth Waltz claims, “[s]tatesmen and military leaders are responsible for the security of their states ... no one at all is responsible for humanity” (1959: 416), then states are further assumed to be the object to which security policy and practice refers and humans can only be secured to the extent that they are citizens of a given state.

Given the foundational assumption of anarchy, discussed in more detail below, states are only able to achieve security, and thus survival, through self-help aimed at self-preservation. This is where the formulation of a concept of security as ‘national security’ begins to take shape, as the internal logic of a realist framework demands that security refers to the ‘national’, that is assumed to be congruent with the state. The state is what exists to be secured, thus “[t]he main focus of security studies is easy to identify ... conflict between states is always a possibility ... Accordingly, security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use and control of military force*” (Nye and Lynn-Jones cited in

³⁵ For representations of the former, see Morgenthau 1948: 154; 1973: 6-7. For the latter, see Waltz 1993: 76-77; Waltz 2000: 5. Keohane offers a useful overview of both strands of thinking on ‘national security’ (1986: 7-16).

Walt 1991: 212, emphasis in original), where military force is assumed to be within the control of the state as a component of sovereignty. “[C]onflict between states is always a possibility” (ibid.); thus, conflict is, by definition, *between states*.

Containing human existence within the boundaries of the state and assuming that individuals are defined in relation to the state that is in turn assumed to have ultimate authority, seen as domination, over its peoples, is problematic. In studying the peace camps at Greenham Common, for example, feminist IR scholars also challenged this interpretation of identity and experience as being contained by the state. The individuals at Greenham, who were exercising agency through the use of their bodies in protest against the fact that nuclear ‘security’ didn’t make them feel secure, “subverted the security-based strategic vision of international relations by showing ... acts of everyday insecurity” (Sylvester 1994: 193). The very articulation of these “acts of everyday insecurity” challenges conventional logic as represented within this conceptualisation of ‘national security’, and demands that the relationship between individuals and the state be examined and problematised.³⁶

The second critique concerns the construction of the state in classical realist theories on ‘national security’. In classical realist theory, representations of state behaviours draw heavily on ideas relating to ‘human nature’ (Morgenthau 1952: 963). As mentioned above, classical realism claims as its antecedents theorists of ‘human nature’ such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, and appeals to logics of ‘human nature’ to explain self-interest and rationality as ‘evidenced’ by the unitary state. As Gilpin argues, “political realism itself ... is best viewed as an attitude regarding the human condition” (1984a: 290). With no higher authority to whom to appeal for justice or protection, according to this literature on ‘national security’, the anthropomorphised state must act on its own behalf. “As Thomas Hobbes told his patron ... ‘it’s a jungle out there’. Anarchy is the rule, justice and morality are the exceptions” (ibid., see also Carr 1939: 80-81).

³⁶ For other examples of work that problematises this particular assumption of the ‘national security’ literature, see, *inter alia*, Tickner 1992: 27-67; Dalby 1997; Krause and William 1997; Walker 1997; Blanchard 2003; Youngs 2003.

The construction of ‘human nature’ that is seen to define the behaviour of states is untenable (See Hoffman 2001; Grant 1991), but enjoys considerable discursive privilege in academic and policy discussions of ‘national security’.³⁷ The ‘human nature’ under discussion is, on closer inspection, the nature of ‘man’ (see Morgenthau 1973: 15-16), and is thus problematic in its partiality as well as its pessimism. John Herz’s conception of the ‘security dilemma’ is explicitly premised on these assumptions regarding the potential of human nature, and therefore state behaviour, to provide circumstances of collaboration and co-operation. “[I]t stems from a fundamental social constellation ... where groups live alongside each other without being organised into a higher unity ... Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world ... power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on” (Herz 1950: 157). The ‘fundamental social constellation’ posited by classical realists is a population of rational, unitary, masculine entities that will never, and can never, be otherwise.

The third critique challenges neorealist theories of state behaviour in the literature on ‘national security’. Neorealist theories of ‘national security’ prioritise structural logic, rather than relying on the logics of ‘human nature’ as discussed above. While classical realist assumptions are informed by an explicit link between ‘human nature’ and state behaviour, neorealist assumptions concerning the construction of security in an anarchic system appeal to a structural logic of uncertainty. “Uncertainty is a synonym for life, and nowhere is uncertainty greater than in international politics” (Waltz 1993: 58). These arguments are still underpinned by an assumption of systemic anarchy.³⁸ Anarchy “will exist so long as independent states endure” (Waltz 1959: 417), and is represented as the permissive cause of violence. It is the organisation of the realm external to the state – the domain of the international – or rather the lack of organisation in this realm that governs the quest for security according to neorealist work on ‘national security’. “In anarchy,” Waltz has stated, “security

³⁷ This is evidenced by statements such as that made by a US senator at a meeting to discuss the future of security in a post-Cold War era. When suggested that policy could be directed at reassurance rather than deterrence, “a major shift in the organising principles of international security” (Steinbruner 2000: 2), the senator commented: “Well, ... you have human nature and all of history going against you there. What have you got going for you?” (Nunn cited in Steinbruner 2000: 2).

³⁸ See Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986; Baldwin 1993: 4-5

is the highest end” (1979: 126). This allows for the conceptualisation of ‘national security’ as necessary in response to certain objectively identifiable security threats. As states are not organised into a social hierarchy of states in the external domain, it may become “necessary to undertake war ... out of apprehension for one’s own security ... [*This*] amounts to doing what necessity dictates” (Waltz 1967: 206, emphasis added).

John Mearshiemer develops a critique of alternative approaches to security premised on neorealist assumptions again concerning “the basic nature of states” (1990: 55). The suggestion that a bipolar balance of power during the Cold War afforded greater stability and therefore security to the world is similarly premised on these realist assumptions: “there is little room for trust among states ... each state must guarantee its own survival since no other actor will provide its security ... States seek to survive under anarchy by maximising their power relative to other states” (Mearshiemer 1990: 12). Thus the state is assumed to be a rational actor with regard to its international relations, seeking both to accumulate knowledge concerning the activities of other states but also to gear all statecraft towards the essential survival of the state as a territorial and political unit.

However, despite the reductive logic of neorealism that upholds claims to abstraction, the conceptualisations of states and state behaviour that inform these abstractions remain thoroughly masculinist. International Relations as a discipline and relations international remain, on this view, the preserve of ‘men’ (Waltz 1993: *passim*; 2000: *passim*; Mearsheimer 1990; *passim*; 1995: *passim*) and behaviours of the state are premised on masculinist understandings of subjectivity. Mearshiemer insists that “[s]tates ... look for opportunities to take advantage of each other” (1990: 53) while weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of their behaviours in a purely self-interested manner. While Mearshiemer suggests that this behaviour is a product of the anarchic system, this conceptualisation of the cooperative impulses exhibited by states, or lack thereof, rests on a masculinist understanding of international politics.

A fourth critique relates to the conceptualisation of violence within this approach to security. If security threats are eternal and external, then security “is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a negative value so to speak” (Wolfers 1952: 488). The construction of a non-society of states, each rationally

seeking to maximise their gains and preserve their territorial and political integrity, in which threats are reducible to the hostile use of force by other states leads to the assertion that it is a “*fact* that security is being sought against external violence” (ibid.: 490, emphasis added). While some theorists working within this conceptualisation have admitted the possibility that threats may equally arise from internal unrest and civil violence,³⁹ the predominant vision is one of threat as objectively identifiable and external to the state. This also functions to exclude the possibility that states may be the actors that threaten their own populations,⁴⁰ through the inscription of the state as the referent object of security policy and practice.

Mearshiemer’s analysis of security during the Cold War period, in which he argues that the bipolarity of power provided a more secure system than the ensuing multipolarity in the post-Cold War period, affirms this conceptualisation of violence. However, the argument that, “*ceteris paribus*, war is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar one” (Mearshiemer 1990: 14, emphasis in original) is problematic. Furthermore, in admitting that “[i]n a bipolar system ... major powers generally demand allegiance from lesser states” (ibid.) Mearshiemer alludes to a weakness in this conceptualisation of violence. Allegiance may be coerced, or achieved through interventions that lead to ‘lesser states’ feeling less than secure by any realist definition of the term, and these violences seem to fall outside of an analysis that not only equates violence with war, but with war between ‘major powers’. While the logic of “conflict dyads” and “miscalculations” (ibid.) appears convincing, it is unreasonable to assume that *ceteris* is ever *paribus* in the practice or study of IR. The complexities of lived experience do not easily lend themselves to such abstraction.

That is, the source of threat is external to the state within this approach, and threats are narrowly conceived as the use of force. Just as within the literature addressing ‘violence against women’ women exist unproblematically to be secured against violence, within this literature, states exist unproblematically

³⁹ See, *inter alia*, Arquilla 2001; Huntington 1993; Hoffman 2002; Herz 2003.

⁴⁰ A view advanced by, for example, Ayoob 1984; Jackson 1990; Jackson 2001. While these theorists remain, for the most part, faithful to the foundational assumptions of the ‘national security’ literature, they draw attention to the difficulties inherent in a Procrustean approach to security given the global multiplicity of processes of state-formation. For critical analyses of state-as-threat, see, *inter alia*, Agamben 1998; Niva 1999; Connelly 2004; Shapiro 2004.

and they can be similarly secured against objectively identifiable external threats.⁴¹ It is also worthy of note that within this conceptualisation, security can only ever be relative rather than absolute as a result of the ways in which interactions between states are defined.

This leads me to the fifth point of critical engagement. As states can only ever achieve relative security, the quest for security is a never-ending search for research and development that leads to better policy and practice. This secures the future prospects of those who work within this conceptualisation, as long as they are not “diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world” (Walt 1991: 223). The diversion warned against by Stephen Walt is an effort to secure the disciplinary boundaries against the incursion of critical theories. “If participants observe the norms that have guided the field in recent years ... prospects for continued advance are good” (ibid.: 232).⁴² As long as it is as it has always been, the study of ‘national security’ will continue to be as it has always been – and the world will be perpetually *insecure*.

The concept of security driving these prescriptions is premised on a particular vision of the social relations between states, and furthermore constructs a particular notion of what is considered to be a security threat within this conceptualisation, as eternal and external to the state. The necessity of security behaviours is derived from the anarchic system and “rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace” (Mearshiemer 1990: 6). Thus threats, reduced to external violences and ultimately war between states, are perpetual, a theoretical move that serves to perpetuate the understanding of security as reducible to military force. This functions to blind those working within a conceptualisation of ‘national security’ to the possibility that threats are variously constructed depending on context. Moreover, the assumption context of anarchy that is taken to be a foundational reality within this conceptualisation prescribes and proscribes certain behaviours that are then never opened to critical scrutiny.

⁴¹ For further examples of the ‘national security’ literature that makes this argument, see, *inter alia*, Morgenthau 1948; Morgenthau 1952; Gilpin 1984a; Gilpin 1984b; Desch 1998; Walt 2000; Waltz 2000.

⁴² For an excellent critique of Walt’s article concerning security studies as an academic discipline, see Edward Kolodziej 1992.

The implications of insisting that “the world can be used as laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics” (Mearshiemer 1990: 9) are not addressed by theorists working within this conceptualisation. However, in raising this as a focus for critical interjection, I draw attention to the impossibility of constructing a concept of security that is not founded on value-laden theoretical assumptions. The world is not a laboratory, and the abstraction demanded by this framework is untenable. Deconstructing the ‘scientific’, detached observer of the realist theoretical tradition enables IR scholars to reflect on their position as thoroughly embedded subjects within their research, complete with the internal conflicts and inconsistencies of self-hood that are part of social identity.

The cumulative impact of the five critiques detailed above is “that military force, not security, has been the central concern of security studies” (Baldwin 1997: 9). This is the sixth, and final, critique of the literature on ‘national security’. The militarisation of the study of ‘national security’ has affected the ways in which it is studied, the policy prescriptions offered by the experts in the field and the funding afforded to research programs that attend to this central issue in the discipline of IR. It allows for the construction of research addressing ‘national security’ to speak of ‘the real world’ while maintaining “[t]he hygienic order of neo-realism [as] one manifestation of the ‘escape from the real’” (Booth 1995: 105). ‘The real’ world constructed through the representations of those who work on ‘national security’ is one in which “relative harmony can, and sometimes does, prevail among nations, but always precariously so” (Waltz 1993: 76), a world that is indeed, as Hobbes would have it, ‘poore, nasty, brutish and short’. The inhabitants of this world are thus justified in taking up arms to ensure their own survival.

Six Critiques of 'National Security' Literature

- All human existence is assumed to be bound by the state
- Classical realism assumes state behaviour derives from human nature
- Neorealism assumes state behaviour derives from anarchic system
- Violence is eternal and external to the state
- Security can never be achieved
- Adherence to this approach increases militarisation

Figure 3: Six Critiques of 'National Security' Literature

Research on 'national security' takes as unproblematic the existence of the sovereign state, as described above, and the protection of the territorial integrity of this sovereign state is – or should be – the focus of security studies. The approach described above “fits comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm” (Walt 1991: 212), and the academic conceptualisation of security *as* national fits comfortably with the ontological assumptions of research addressing 'violence against women'. Those engaged in both forms of research posit the empirical reality of the subjects that they study, and the social/political realities in which these subjects function. In the case of research on 'national security', the explicit 'outside' of the sovereign state is the anarchic international system, which is an issue to which I return below.

New approaches to the study of security and new challenges to the existing literature are disciplined in such a way as to re-affirm the primacy of 'national security' as a conceptualisation for considering security concerns. Despite claims that “it is no longer helpful or reasonable to define the field in dualistic terms: with the realist, state-centric military-minded approach at the core” (Paris 2001: 101), the very articulation of a core of security studies reproduces the dominance of this literature. While work on 'national security' admits a proliferation of alternative approaches to security (see Baldwin 1997), the military defense of state interests is constituted as the base-line of security to which other understandings can be added. However, those working on 'international security' conceive of the referent

object(s) of security, and the threats posed to it/them, very differently, as I discuss below.

'International Security'

It is vital to recognise that the concept of 'national security' has developed in a specific cultural context (Haftendorn 1991: 5), the context of predominantly Anglo-American positivist-oriented and science-dominated IR scholarship within which realism is the self-proclaimed orthodoxy. Thus, 'national security' is premised on particular assumptions that need to be made explicit for the purposes of critical analysis, and this recognition has encouraged the development of a second approach. An awareness of 'national security' as partial and problematic, much as 'violence against women' can be critically rethought, and the interaction with those who write to a different conceptualisation of security, has led to the formulation of an alternative conceptualisation, that of 'international security'. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the literature on 'international security' encompasses work on security from a variety of perspectives, bound by its adherence to assumptions concerning security, community and emancipation, as I discuss below.⁴³

The arguments presented within the framework of 'international security' are more loosely bound by their theoretical assumptions and research priorities. Just as the literature addressing 'gender violence' encompasses a more diverse and eclectic approach to the issues with which it is concerned, the literature within this conceptualisation of security is not necessarily built on an integration of the six points of critique outlined above. However, the foundations of this literature are built on engagements with 'national security' as a concept and research program. Broadly speaking, these literatures respond to those who write within a conceptualisation of 'national security' in an effort to challenge the boundaries that the latter construct around the concept of security within the scholarship of IR. The perspectives from which they engage with the concept of 'national security' are varied, but, as I will discuss below, they are minimally unitary in their desire to

⁴³ A recent collection edited by Ken Booth divides up the chapters according to this schema (Booth (ed.) 2005).

reconceptualise security and demand a qualitatively and quantitatively better concept with which to proceed in their analyses.

Often tracing its heritage back to the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report,⁴⁴ which includes a chapter entitled ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’, work on ‘international security’ seeks to reconceptualise security such that the referent object is no longer conceived, as in ‘national security’, as the sovereign state (see Newman 2001: 240; Booth 2004: 5). As McDonald explains, this reconceptualisation is “a potential response to the growing insecurity of security” (2002: 277) and incorporates several of the critiques discussed above. Roland Paris argues that this “paradigm shift” does not necessarily represent a coherent research agenda (2001: 92-93), but recognizes that this work comprises “a distinct branch of security studies that explores the particular conditions that affect the survival of individuals, groups and societies” (ibid.: 102). Broadly, the analytical focus of ‘international security’ is “we, the peoples” (Dunne and Wheeler 2004) and research within this conceptualisation requires the recognition of “both the indivisibility of human rights and security, and the concomitant responsibility to rescue those trapped in situations of violence, poverty and ill-health” (ibid.: 20).

In my discussion of the literature on ‘gender violence’, above, I engage critically with the literature while wanting to acknowledge that it represents positive critical engagement on its own terms with the literature on ‘violence against women’. I proceed with the analysis of work on ‘international security’ in the same way. That is, the works cited in this section are all ‘critical’, in that they are founded on critiques of the literature on ‘national security’ and on an active desire to find a ‘better’ conceptualisation of security with which to proceed (see Sheehan 2005: 4). However, I share with Matt McDonald a concern that such an undertaking necessitates a certain wariness “of imposing an alternative structure of power in ways that may simply replace one power structure with another” (2002: 293).

The first point of critical engagement with the literature on ‘international security’ concerns the assumptions that underpin the arguments for the recognition of the ‘international’ as a domain of cooperation rather than conflict. The

⁴⁴ See Thomas 2001: 162; Paris 2001: 89; Thomas and Tow 2002: 178; Smith 2005.

‘international’ is still represented as always already external to the state (see Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 10; Newman 2001: 241), as in the ‘national security’ approach, but is premised on ideas of collectivity and connectivity that are as unsustainable as realist insistence on seeing the world as an inherently aggressive and hostile environment. Work on ‘international security’ gives primacy to “human beings and their complex social and economic relations” (Thomas 2001: 161) over state behaviours, but in the last instance, it is the cooperative “world community” (Booth 1991: 318) to which this approach appeals. It could be that articulating a vision of world politics in which ‘the international community’ plays a central role actually serves to absent the state from discussions of democracy, agency and politics. Locating these values in the domain of the ‘international’ could prove dangerous, in that there is nothing inherent in this domain that necessitates the ‘better’ provisions of security that work on ‘international security’ seeks.

Theorists of ‘international security’ have argued that “[e]ven though state-based conceptions of security have taken precedence, alternative ways of thinking that give priority to individual and social dimensions of security” are also possible (Bilgin 2003: 203). If “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992: 395) and states are not constructed as the unproblematic unitary rational actors pursuing defensive policies, as assumed by theorists of ‘national security’, then cooperation is as likely as hostility in the domain of international relations. In fact, it is argued, conceiving of security as ‘international’ highlights the importance of relations between states and the salience of the construction of an ‘international community’ (McRae 2001: 19). However, just as the state is asserted as autonomous with the conceptualisation of ‘national security’, as I have described above, in this conceptualisation ‘international security’ is similarly asserted as relational. These assumptions are in opposition but are equally problematic, as both assumptions treat the state and the international as pre-determined objective realities, which impacts on the ways in which it is possible to conceptualise security.

The second critique I make of the ‘international security’ literature derives from the first: ‘global civil society’ is implicitly and explicitly the locus of agency in the ‘international community’ assumed by this approach. In place of the state of nature/systemic uncertainty posited by theorists working within the conceptualisation of ‘national security’, Booth suggests that “the embryonic global

civil society” (1991: 326) can function co-operatively and with compassion for their fellow citizens to construct a safer world (see also Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 10; Paris 2001: 88). In contrast to the assertion of an anarchic international system by those working on ‘national security’, those researching ‘international security’ see cooperative collectives as the desired mode of political organisation. The institutionalisation of compassion is an inherently political process and it seems that, within this conceptualisation, insufficient attention is paid to the ways in which the violences experienced in the construction of community and co-operation are glossed over and fall outside the parameters of discussion.

McRae, for example, argues that “global civil society” (2001: 20) needs to address the issues of insecurity facing those “citizens of ... noncountries” (ibid.: 19) whose governments are unable to provide adequate security measures. Dunne and Wheeler also cite the cooperation of “an alliance of states and transnational civil society” (2004: 10) needed to “rescue those trapped in situations of poverty and violence” (ibid.: 20). Recognising the “structural inequalities generated by global capitalism” (ibid.: 16) goes some way towards challenging the assumptions of ‘national security’ literature, in the same way as work on ‘gender violence’ offers sustainable critiques of the literature on ‘violence against women’. However, theories of ‘international security’ neither take into account the implications of their representations of a ‘global civil society’ versus citizens of ‘noncountries’ who need rescuing, nor engage in critical discussion of the very notion of ‘global civil society’.

The concept of ‘global civil society’ is ideologically and normatively loaded with implications of its global reach, its civilised nature and its social form. All of these characteristics are in opposition to their relevant ‘others’: the local/parochial, the uncivilised, and the forms of behaviour associated with states and international institutions, all of which are conceived of as negative.⁴⁵ Despite this, the construction of ‘global civil society’ is under-theorised, represented unproblematically in the literature on ‘international security’ and assumed to confer authority and legitimacy in the realms of morality, efficacy, democracy and social cohesion (Scholte 2002: 159-164).

⁴⁵ See, *inter alia*, Shaw 2001 and Chandhoke 2003 for explorations of the discursive construction of global civil society. See also Hopgood 2000 for an excellent critical approach to this issue.

Just as the referent object of security is multi-level and complex, violences and threats are conceived of more broadly within this approach. This forms the third critique of this literature that I identify. The narrow military focus of those addressing ‘national security’ is critiqued, on this view, as a wider variety of threats are recognised (see Smith 2005: 40-46; McDonald 2002: 277). Threats are not necessarily eternal and external, as a function of the anarchic international system. However, these threats and violences are still objectively identifiable, but within this conceptualisation they are many and various, ranging from the interpersonal to the systemic level and encompassing gender violences and global warming, earthquakes and economic deprivation.⁴⁶ Representing threats in this way assumes that such events, or acts of violence, affect all individuals in the same way. In addition, through listing threats in this way, theories of ‘international security’ inscribes a division between inhabitants of ‘noncountries’ and the ‘international’, as theories of ‘international security’ are most often concerned with providing security for “the oppressed, women, poor, middle powers and so on ... rather than focusing only on the hopes and fears of the greatest *power* in the world” (Booth 2004: 5, emphasis in original).

Furthermore, ‘international security’, in both broadening and deepening the concept of threat (Booth 2005: 14-15), implicitly conveys the urgency and priority built in to the concept of security propounded by work on ‘national security’, in which security is, as discussed above, “the highest end” (Waltz 1979: 126). “An implicit assumption ... is that the elevation of issues of human rights, economic inequality and environmental change, for example, to the realm of security will allow greater priority to these issues” (McDonald 2002: 277). Even as it problematises the conceptualisation of security evidenced in the conceptualisation of ‘national security’, literature on ‘international security’ tends to naturalise it, constructing security as a “single continuum ... protected and enhanced by a series of interlocking instruments and policies” (McRae 2001: 22). This suggests that the approach to ‘national security’ is broadly valid, needing only supplementary analysis to fill in the gaps rather than a thorough reconceptualisation of its basic organisational concepts.

⁴⁶ For just a few instances of the representational practice of listing threats in the literature on ‘international security’, see Booth 1995: *passim*; Newman 2001: 245; Thomas 2001: 166; Dunne and Wheeler 2004: 16.

The fourth critical interjection I offer concerns the conceptualisation of security as not necessarily relative, as assumed by ‘national security’, but potentially absolute. Within the conceptualisation of ‘international security’, it is argued, “the study of security ... is finally beginning to engage comprehensively with the real” (Booth 2004: 8). This engagement, in addition to inscribing the appropriate interpretation of ‘the real’, can – and should – “have a real impact” (Newman 2001: 250) and “prevent, or halt, threats” (McRae 2001: 26). The suggestion is that the objectively identifiable and multiple threats faced by citizens of ‘noncountries’ and those at the sharp end of structural inequality. The conceptualisation of ‘international security’ is firmly embedded within a normative and problem-solving framework, arguing that security for all is the future of ‘the real’ so long as security providers work with ‘global civil society’ towards “the reduction of global poverty, the reduction of inequality between states and between human beings; and the harnessing of scientific advancement for the benefit of the majority of humanity” (Thomas 2001: 166-167). I am not arguing that ‘international security’ should retain a commitment to objectivity and shy away from critical engagement with security problematics (cf. Smith 2005: 46). Rather, I challenge the assumption that absolute security can be achieved, which not only ignores the way in which discourses of security function in world politics but also is modeled on a foundational commitment to human emancipation that is difficult to sustain.

The conceptualisation of security as emancipation forms the fifth point of critical engagement with literature on ‘international security’. If ‘national security’ is concerned with security defined in terms of power, then ‘international security’ views security as ‘freedom from’ (Ullman 1983: 152-153). This is the central thesis in theories of ‘international security’: “Emancipation should logically be given precedence in our thinking about security over the mainstream themes of order and power” (Booth 1991: 319).⁴⁷ Therefore, as opposed to the relative gains of ‘national security’, security within this conceptualisation can be achieved as absolute because threats can be adequately neutralised and security is reducible to freedom. “Emancipation from oppressive power structures, be they global, national

⁴⁷ See also Thomas 2001; Booth 2004, 2005; Dunne and Wheeler 2004; Alker 2005; Wyn Jones 2005; Smith 2005.

or local in origin and scope, is necessary for security” (Thomas 2001: 162). This is an intuitively positive formulation of the concept of security, but there remain some serious issues to be addressed in this fifth section of critique. Focusing on freedom without adequately addressing the ways in which this freedom is to be conceptualised or achieved renders the concept of security within this conceptualisation as partial in application and utility as the concept outlined in the conceptualisation of ‘national security’.

Booth asserts that “[i]n a world of global communication few should feel entirely helpless” (1991: 326), but the existence of communication networks doesn’t mean that those networks will be put to positive use. Furthermore, we do not live in a ‘world of global communication’, given that the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) admits that “the world continues to be separated by major differences and disparities in terms of ICT [Information and Communications Technology] levels” (ITU 2006). Conceptualising security as freedom carries with it implicit judgements regarding the provision of freedom from exclusive political practices, enabling all to enjoy a minimal standard of life experience. In the face of the huge disparities in access to such freedom, the suggestion that security can be achieved as absolute remains a hollow promise and security itself a hollow concept. Moreover, work on ‘international security’ does not recognise that security policy premised on a notion of “freedom from fear” (McRae 2001: 15) assumes that the benefits and promise of freedom are universally applicable and achievable, paying scant attention to social/political context.

Finally, I argue that the conscious universalism of the ‘international security’ approach (Booth 2005: 1) and the solution it offers to the problems it tries to solve – global emancipation – is deeply problematic. Those working within this approach delimit the boundaries of ‘the real’ as much as those working with the conceptualisation of ‘national security’ discussed above. ‘International security’ recognises an ever-proliferating range of threats but argues that transnational cooperation can effectively provide security for all, which is all premised on this notion of security as emancipation. “Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose

to do” (Booth 1991: 319). This philosophical underpinning is entirely devoid of any suggestion that freedom is an idea most closely associated with liberalism. Thomas argues that “[h]uman security is far removed from liberal notions of competitive and possessive individualism” (2001: 161). However, the centrality of freedom to the organisational logic of ‘international security’ suggests that this approach derives more from liberalism than it would like to admit.

The assumptions underpinning literature on ‘international security’ lead to policy prescriptions premised on the triumph of liberal values, implemented by “a progressive alliance between ... cosmopolitan transnational civil society and enlightened state leaders” (Booth 2004: 6). The formation of an informed and activist global civil society, with all the problems inherent within that concept, is seen as a necessary step to the provision of security. Well-established international institutions and collectives capable of providing security and guaranteeing freedoms are also vital on this view. Ultimately, the critique I offer is concerned that the conceptualisation of ‘international security’ I discuss here “constitutes a Western project, predicated on the values of the developing world” (McDonald 2002: 293). In the articulation of this conceptualisation of ‘international security’, the values upon which the prescriptions are founded are not opened to critical scrutiny, and effect closure on the ways in which it is possible to think not only about security but also international relations more broadly.




Figure 4: Six Critiques of ‘International Security’ Literature

The six points of critical engagement outlined above are themselves critiques of the literatures within the conceptualisation of ‘national security’.

However, reconceptualising security with the modifier ‘international’, even suggesting as it does a more holistic and complex approach to the concept of security, is not sufficient. As Ole Waever states: “The traditional progressive approach is: 1) to accept ... that security is a reality prior to language ... and the more security the better; and 2) to argue why security should encompass *more* than is currently the case” (1995: 46-47). While this approach does engage with the boundaries of ‘national security’ literature, the boundaries are then reinscribed elsewhere; though conceived of as more complex, more multi-level, more permeable, these boundaries are still constructed through the representation of security as ‘international’.

The ontological assumptions of this approach differentiate it from work on ‘national security’, as this approach posits the international as a socially constructed zone of cooperation rather than assuming the existence of a conflictual international domain. Violence and threat are still ever-present in this conceptualisation, but thoughtful security policy and practice can ameliorate the situations of individuals, societies, communities, states....⁴⁸ These subjects are recognised as constructs of their social/political milieu on this view. Just as research on ‘gender violence’ does not see a universal stability to matrices of gender norms, research on ‘international security’ investigates the ways in which norms and ideas function in international relations to construct the subjects of enquiry – states. In the final subsection of this review, I attempt to formulate a third conceptualisation of security that conceptualises discourses of security as productive and performative of these subjects.

‘The Violent Reproduction of the International’

The basis of the tensions in the two former approaches to security are cogently summarised by Lene Hansen thus: “whether one should conceptualise security in individual or in collective terms, and ... whether to understand security as a matter of national security only, or to open up the concept” (2001: 56). The six critiques of each conceptualisation enable those who would wish to overcome these tensions to begin the reconceptualisation of security through critical

⁴⁸ Regional blocs? Continents? The planet? The universe? ...

engagement with the foundational assumptions and constructs that guide approaches either to ‘national’ or ‘international’ security, thus overcoming the dichotomies to which Hansen refers. In this section I will draw on these alternative conceptualisations, believing that scholars of IR “must have the will to dream alternatives based on issues of social justice and refuse to be limited by the proposals on offer” (Broadhead 2000: 42).

Research that addresses the ‘violent reproduction of the international’ conceives of security as a set of discourses rather than as something that can be achieved either in absolute or relative terms. Engaging with research that works within this conceptualisation can explore how these discourses function to reproduce, through various strategies, domains of the international with which IR is self-consciously concerned. Thus the violences and the threats, as much as the states and security itself, are interpreted through the practices that enable individuals as social beings to make sense of their social location and identity.

Literature that addresses ‘the violent reproduction of gender’ conceives of violence as a site at which genders are reproduced; literature that addresses the ‘violence reproduction of the international’ conceives of violence, of which security practice and policy is an integral part, as sites at which the international is reproduced. Including not just acts of inter-state war, but also instances of civil conflict and oppressive practices within and between states, expanding further to problematise the legal structures, policy practices and the research that guides these, theorists are enabled to investigate the ways in which these acts of violence articulated through discourses of security function to perpetuate ‘the international’ as various spatial and conceptual realms. Thus, within this conceptualisation it is possible to say that states, acting as unitary authoritative entities, perform violences, but also that violences, in the name of security, perform states. Undertaking research within this conceptualisation allows for an holistic perspective on the ways in which discourses of security reproduce grammatically correct narratives of identity and being-in-the-world, of which in international relations the ‘international’ is a key organizing concept.

This conceptualisation goes beyond even the critical theorising of those who work within a conceptualisation of ‘international security’. Booth suggests that “the post-modern tendency in the study of international politics ... can obscure

that meaning is not everything” (1991: 316). Theorising the ‘violent reproduction of the international’ takes the opposing view: that there is nothing without meaning. In an excellent analysis of security problematiques that works within the conceptualisation I describe here, James Der Derian suggests that scholars of IR “[b]oth use and are used by language ... that dominant powers ... always dream of fixing ... [R]ationalists demonstrate this power play when they construct a transcendental privileged space to make truth claims about international relations” (1990: 297). An awareness of the fluidity and ambiguity of discourse, and therefore meaning, enables a more coherent conceptualisation of security than allowed for in the two conceptualisations discussed above.

It is not that this approach conceives of security as somehow less ‘real’ than the former approaches, or that there is some gap of misperception that can be righted with careful analysis. I disagree that “[s]ymbolic analysis seeks to explain why what we believe occurs is often different from what actually occurs” (Buzan and Herring 1998: 180). Rather, in this reconceptualisation it becomes possible to ask how ‘what actually occurs’ becomes possible and is made meaningful both in theory and in practice. The symbolic politics of representation allows for the analysis of the processes through which meaning is made and therefore ‘reality’ is (re)produced. Reconceptualising security discourses in this way allows for detailed investigation of the ways in which they function to construct through representation the international as a spatial and conceptual domain. Along with David Campbell, among others, “I embrace a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying the ‘real causes’ and concerns itself instead with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another” (Campbell 1998: 4).

If security is not ‘achievable’ but instead functions in particular ways in particular contexts with related effects and differential impacts, all integrated into the wider reproduction of ‘the international’ as a separate domain, then security policy and practice must be analysed differently. For example, it has been claimed that post-Cold War security studies is no longer concerned with “how to manage an arms race and superpower competition, but how to manage the implosion of a superpower ... and how to organize not an arms race but graceful disarmament”

(Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall 1999: 3). If security is seen as a set of discourses, in ‘managing’ and ‘organising’ these issues scholars and security ‘experts’ were simultaneously ‘managing’ and ‘organising’ a particular configuration of the international as a conceptual domain.

One aspect of the ways in which discourses of security, and the violences undertaken with reference to these discourses, function within international relations is to simultaneously delimit the state as boundary between the domestic and the international realms. States are assumed to be unitary and authoritative, to maintain both internal and external sovereignty, and furthermore, it is assumed that the internal organisation of the state is undertaken in the best interests of the citizenship – to protect and serve the population. Unsettling ‘the international’ as an *a priori* unsafe/safe domain (in the discourses of ‘national security’ and ‘international security’ respectively) challenges this truth of security as propounded by the two conceptualisations outlined above. Considering the ways in which this domain is (re)produced is vital to understanding how security functions as a discourse. Der Derian addresses the “new technological practice” of simulation as a means of identifying “the reality principle that international relations theory in general seeks to save” (1990: 300). The reality principle of the international as a conceptual domain is undermined by the intertextuality of simulation and policy procedure and discourses of security help to reassert the primacy of the international in the ways described above: through the identification of objective threats, the construction of international order and the perpetuation of the myth of the state.

In this way, security ‘issues’ such as nuclear proliferation and the framing and discussion of these issues function to reproduce an international realm in which “widely shared propositions [such] as these: ... the United States is threatened by Russian, but not British, nuclear weapons; ... Iraq’s nuclear potential is more threatening than the United States’ nuclear arsenal; and ... the United States is safer with nuclear weapons than it would be without them” (Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall 1999: 12) are taken to be self-evident. The processes of securitisation and desecuritisation (Waeber 1995) that speak to an issue’s discursive purchase on the reproduction of the international, and the processes through which threats and insecurities are socially constructed (Weldes,

Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall 1999: *passim*), are all central to this conceptualisation of security.

Those working within a conceptualisation that addresses ‘the violent reproduction of the international’ explicitly challenge the assumptions concerning the objective reality of threats. “[O]bjects and events do not present themselves unproblematically to the observer ... Rather than being self-evident ... threats ... are fundamentally matters of interpretation” (Weldes 1996: 279). The same is true of states and violences within this conceptualisation, and discourses of security reproduce dominant representations of threats, violences and states. Der Derian analyses processes of surveillance to illustrate this point, in which the domain of the international is conceived of as a panopticon and surveillance as a security measure functions to breed insecurities. In this way, the uncertainties and instabilities inherent in the dominant construction of the international are perpetuated: “the superpowers have created a cybernetic system that displays the classic symptoms of advanced paranoia” (1990: 305) through which discourses of security then reproduce insecurity through interpretation.

Simultaneously, these technologies function not only to reconfigure the meanings of and give meaning to security, they also reproduce the contours of the international. The spatial arrangement of IR relies on these conceptualisations of security for its perpetuation, and through shifts in security discourse, this arrangement can be reconfigured. Security arrangements between states simultaneously act to posit states as unitary entities, to reproduce the identities of these states, to reaffirm security as the concern of states and to reproduce a particular configuration of ‘the international’ in opposition to the domestic realm. Furthermore, borders and boundaries are not only important to the practices of politics on a global scale, they are also identifiable in academic discourses, for example, on security. Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes note that “border policing is ... part and parcel of the coercive underpinnings of the ... world order” (2005: 71); within this conceptualisation, border policing, articulated through discourses of security, functions to reproduce that world order. Furthermore, policing of the boundaries of security discourse within the discipline of IR functions to police what is ‘thinkable’ in the context of security, boundaries that I seek to transgress in this reconceptualisation.

The discursive privilege of IR scholars who speak of security as the concern of the state imbue the state with the powers to construct in/security and to carry out actions that further entrench this privilege. As Enloe reminds us, “it has become almost a cliché to say that the world is shrinking, that state boundaries are porous. We persist, nonetheless, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states” (2000: 196). The conceptualisation of ‘the violent reproduction of the international’ interprets this form of discursive violence as appropriate a focus for analysis as instances of physical violence. Furthermore, the practices of power that construct the authority and the legitimacy of the state and its ability to speak on behalf of its grateful population must also be problematised (see Enloe 1996). Borrowing from Butler’s theorising of the violence done to bodies in the context of theorising gender, “I would like to suggest that this kind of categorisation can be called a violent one, a forceful one, and that this discursive ordering ... is itself a material violence” (1994: 168).

Theorists of IR, and more specifically security, need to give due consideration to the kinds of social/political orders that are produced through their discourses. Without this consideration, security as a concept becomes theoretically and analytically bankrupt, a term invoked to justify any policy or practice. Without this consideration, the theorists and politicians who invoke the concept of security are reproducing social/political orders that manifestly do not provide security for the individuals at the sharp end of these actions, policies or practices. Establishing a reconceptualisation of security that is founded on different ontological and epistemological claims, which acknowledges that it is not possible to identify objectively, categorise and secure against eternal, external threat, entails “having ‘the courage of our confusions’ and thinking and acting without certainty” (Booth 1995: 113).

The gendered dimensions of understanding security as discourse are an integral part of analyses that work within this conceptualisation. Any understanding premised on a notion of security as existing outside of the power relations through which discourses operate is both inadequate and incomplete. Furthermore, gender, as a discursively constituted identity, informs interpretation and the construction of conceptual organisation and logics. The links between the

two bodies of literature, discussed further below, become clear when the critical review of the literature undertaken in this section is represented in tabular form:

Approach	Focus	What kinds of subjects are being produced?
‘National security’	Empirically identifiable (state) entities and the violences they experience due to the anarchic international system	Sovereign states
‘International security’	Constructed (state) entities and the violences they can prevent due to the co-operative international system	Constructed states
‘Violent Reproduction of the International’	Discursively constituted entities and the function that violence performs in (re)producing various international systems	Performative states

Table 3: Critical Review of International Security Literature

In the final section of this chapter, I draw together the strands of critique from the review of the literature undertaken above. I outline what it is I hope to achieve through my treatment of these literatures as an analytical whole, and how this review is central to the research that I undertake in the chapters that follow.

The Potential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence

Before beginning the analysis of the Secretary-General’s Reports (2004; 2002) that address “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (United Nations Security Council 2002, Preamble), it is interesting to explore the ways in which the conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security are informing contemporary academic work. A brief review of academic literature spanning the time period concurrent with the period during which the Secretary-General’s Reports were researched and published demonstrates that the dominant conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security that inform this literature are compatible with the approaches above that I have labelled

‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’. The examples that I cite in this section are both sophisticated and convincing analyses, problematising spatiality, gender and violence in the construction of their critical interjections. However, as I argue below, the two reconceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security that I offer, the violent reproduction of gender and of the international, provide more scope for critical analysis of the ways in which the discourses that we use construct and (re)produce ‘reality’ and how there is more to be analysed in the words that we use than mere description.

Debby Bonnín investigates the ruptures and disjunctures of a rigid conceptualisation of public and private spaces through a qualitative analysis of women’s involvement in protest movements in KwaZulu-Natal. Drawing on interviews with protesters and their relatives, Bonnín indicates how gender functioned as an axis of inclusion and exclusion in the political violence: “Initially the preoccupation with political affiliation only affected boys ... Soon girls were being interrogated ... and girls and female leaders were being raped” (2000: 307). In situations of militarised violent conflict, given the breakdown of organisational infrastructure that often occurs and the pressure to secure resources when such resources may be extremely scarce, rape continues to codify the violent reproduction of gender. Wendy Bracewell argues that the incidences of rape in Kosovo during the conflicts there were represented through discourses of nationalism and masculinity. The way in which the rapes were narrated “reinforced the idea that sexual violence could be an effective instrument of politics; and rape an activity in which men might demonstrate their nation’s power and masculinity” (Bracewell 2000: 582).

As every aspect of society is gendered, it is no surprise that violent conflict is gendered. Rape in war can be seen as a means of inscribing economic, political and organisational violence on the ‘female’ body.⁴⁹ In her discussion of the political economy of rape, Meredith Turshen identifies several ways in which rape was used during the wars in Mozambique and Rwanda, drawing the conclusion that “armies use rape systematically to strip women of their economic

⁴⁹ There is, of course, a significant literature on martial rape. In addition to the literature cited above, see, *inter alia*, Copelon 1995; Niarchos 1995; Allen 1996; Littlewood 1997; Crawley 2000; El Bushra 2000; El Bushra 2004; Williams 2004; Oosterveld 2005. For a very useful mapping of literature on rape in war, see Skjelsbæk 2001.

and political 'assets' (Turshen 2001: 56). During the genocides in Rwanda in 1994, it is estimated that "15,700 women and girls between the ages of 13 and 65" were raped (WHO cited in Turshen 2001: 58). Both the threat of rape and the act itself were used to terrorise communities during the conflict, and to undermine an already perilous and insecure feminine subjectivity.

Bonnin's analysis draws attention to the complexities of basing political activism within conventional narratives of gender but Bonnin maintains that "[t]he activities themselves remained within the discourse of the 'good wife' yet at the same time they subtly undermined the practice" (2000: 316). Her study relates to other examples of women organising as wives and mothers (see *inter alia* Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Radcliffe 1993), for example the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. While the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo did manage to effect, to a degree, the social transformation they sought, I do not believe that they effected any such transformation in the discursive construction of the 'mother'. Furthermore, describing the 'politicisation' of motherhood denies a fundamental aspect of gender politics: that the positioning of the mother in narratives of gender forms the base of and informs the perpetuation of gender inequality. Dominant gender narratives *require* the classification of 'mother' as apolitical, and the alignment of 'mother' with 'female' and 'domestic' in order to construct a complementary public sphere where masculinities are valorised. Thus to speak of 'politicising' motherhood denies the politics of gender which construct motherhood as apolitical rather than deliberately de-politicised. Thus I have some problems with Bonnin's conclusion that the discourse of 'good wife' was "undermined" by the political protests of women.

Helen Crawley conducts a spatial investigation of legal and judicial processes relating to women's claims for asylum in the UK that is compatible with Bonnin's analysis. She argues that "while the rules of international law purport to be abstract, objective and value free, this preoccupation with neutrality serves to disguise the importance of gender" (2000: 89). Within this analysis, gender is seen as a structural relation impacting on the organisation of public and private space (2000: 90). Gendered violence features as a "strategy of power and domination" (2000: 93), but is used specifically against women either by private individuals or agents of the state. Crawley argues that sexual violence should be

conceptualised as a weapon of war, “an attack on the body politic” (2000: 95) and a means of subduing and controlling women. The investigation is thorough and compelling but does not investigate the ways in which gender is reproduced through acts of violence (in contrast, “violence [is] produced by gender relations of domination and subordination” (2000: 101)), nor does it engage with the politics of representing such violence as exclusively affecting women.

In a spatial analysis of the domain of the international, Catherine Moore makes specific reference to its legal structures and the implications of a public/private dichotomy. It is argued that CEDAW re-evaluates “the public/private dichotomy in its advocacy that the state has a responsibility to intervene in the private sphere to prevent, investigate and punish violence therein” (2003: 94). With specific reference to domestic violence, which “is reported to be endemic to all societies” (2003: 95),⁵⁰ Moore argues that prevention and punishment for perpetrators is systemically under-resourced and implemented. To conduct a thorough analysis, Moore considers the ways in which the notion of a ‘private’ space has enabled homosexual men to challenge current legal provisions that impinge on their rights to live peacefully with whom they please. However, as Moore points out, “the basic premises of the dichotomy are not respected comprehensively by those in positions of power in society but rather applied arbitrarily in accordance with the preservation of the status quo” (2003: 103).

From her analysis of CEDAW Moore concludes that, despite the potential for advancement inscribed within the document, “it was found that this document was impeded by the absence of a judicial enforcement mechanism” (2003: 122). Rather oddly, Moore advocates a revision “of the conventional application of the public/private dichotomy ... so ... it is protective and beneficial to all” (ibid.), despite the concerns raised throughout her analysis. Furthermore, although Moore refers to the “social and cultural norms” (ibid.) that sustain the dichotomy, she does not explore the gendering of the dichotomy; nor does she problematise the association of women with the domestic sphere through her analysis of “domestic violence”. Instead she refers to “men who commit crimes against women” (2003: 95), crimes that vary in severity and

⁵⁰ See Christine Helliwell (2000) for a convincing refutation of this claim.

location – Brazil, Honduras, Nigeria, Albania and Northern Ireland are just a few of the examples given (2003: 95-98) – but are always perpetrated by men, against women.

These are examples of academic research that draw together the concepts of gender, violence, security and the international, and so are part of the literature that forms the heritage of this research project. As I work through the investigation, I engage with various secondary literatures in the process of analysis, but it has been useful to map, however broadly, the conceptualisations of gender violence and international security that have enabled the reconceptualisation I offer in this project. The potential for a feminist reconceptualisation of international security and gender violence is both limited and enabled by the literature that already exists on these subjects. Furthermore, without a clear understanding of the ways in which existing academic approaches to security have precluded the study of gender, articulating gender violence as an international security issue is extremely problematic.

Table 4, summarises the findings from the critical review detailed above. From this table, it is clear that the empiricist, constructivist and discourse-theoretic conceptualisations of gendered violence and global security share more in common with each other than they do with the competing approaches. In the chapters that follow, I demonstrate that the dominant conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security that are represented in the documents I analyse are, indeed, ‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’, the constructivist approaches described above. However, the discourse-theoretic conceptualisation in each case offers different potentialities for articulating gendered violence as a security issue. Although it is not the task I undertake here, for persuasive and effective policy reform the concepts that are used are due careful analytical attention. Thus, in the following chapter, I begin the exploration of the ways in which the concepts of (international) security and (gender) violence are discursively constituted through the analysis of United Nations Security Council 1325. First, I undertake the analysis of the Secretary-General’s Reports (2004; 2002), with a view to illustrating that gender in conflict situations cannot be sufficiently theorised through an evaluation of “the impact

of armed conflict on women and girls” (United Nations Security Council 2002, Preamble).

GENDER VIOLENCE					INTERNATIONAL SECURITY		
Approach	Focus	Subjects	Subjects	Subjects	Focus	Approach	
Violence Against Women	Empirically identifiable gendered entities and the violences they experience	Sovereign individuals	Sovereign states		Empirically identifiable (state) entities and the violences they experience due to the anarchic international system	National Security	
Gender Violence	Constructed gendered entities and the violences they experience	Constructed individuals	Constructed states		Constructed (state) entities and the violences they can prevent due to the co-operative international system	International Security	
Violent Reproduction of Gender	Discursively constituted gendered entities and the function that violence performs in (re)producing these discourses	Performative individuals	Performative states		Discursively constituted entities and the function that violence performs in (re)producing various international systems	Violent Reproduction of the International	

Table 4: Towards a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence

Chapter Three: The Secretary-General's Reports

Resolution 1325, adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2000, addressed “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” and the ways in which the full participation of women and girls in peace processes “can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). In the following chapters I discuss the construction of the resolution itself and the narratives of its production. However, before I undertake the analysis of UNSCR 1325, in this chapter I conduct an analysis of the Secretary-General's Reports (2004; 2002) that were mandated by UNSCR 1325. The Resolution required “the Secretary General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (UNSC 2000a: Article 16-17) and this Report, produced in 2002, offers explanations for the failures to implement UNSCR 1325 in conflict and post-conflict zones. A subsequent Report, produced in 2004, contains more detailed evidence of particular successes and failures. In order to provide contextual foundations for a research project that investigates the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325, it is crucial to explore the explanatory factors offered by the United Nations Security Council itself.

This chapter aims to identify dominant representations of security, violence, gender and the international through an analysis of the Secretary-General's Reports, which treats the Reports as discursive practices. The Secretary-General's Reports offer explanations for the ways in which UNSCR 1325 has failed, and, in doing so, attempt to delimit discursively the boundaries of the Resolution's failures. That is, this chapter conceives of the Reports as discursive practices, and in doing so, recognises that they are also practices of power. As this research is concerned with demonstrating that the discursive construction of the Resolution determined the failures to implement UNSCR 1325 successfully, it is necessary to begin by establishing the explanations against which I intend to argue. Thus, in the first section I interpret the Reports, providing a descriptive reading of the texts. A second, discourse-theoretical, reading of the Secretary-General's Reports allows me to illustrate the ways in which concepts of the international, security, gender and violence that were articulated in UNSCR 1325 continue to inform and produce policy at the highest

levels, further illustrating the importance of problematising the concepts around which the Resolution is organised.

This chapter explores the explanatory factors offered in the Secretary-General's Reports regarding the need for, the implementation and utilisation of, and the specific failures of, UNSCR 1325. The first section describes the actions demanded by the two Reports to enable more successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 and comments on the five areas for improvement that are given priority in the Reports. This strategy enables me to establish a narrative of explanation. In the second section I conduct a discourse-theoretic reading of the two Reports, identifying the rhetorical schemata and strategies of predication and subject positioning that order the texts, in which I analyse the ways in which the Reports (re)produce conceptualisations of the international, security, gender and violence. Furthermore, in this section I investigate the ways in which UNSCR 1325 has affected the treatment of gender violence as an international security issue. It is of great importance that "gender based violence" is recognised as an issue that should be systematically taken up by the United Nations Security Council as relevant to global peace and security. That is, international security could be reconceptualised in conjunction with gender violence. To separate these concepts is to construct an analytical framework that is both partial and highly problematical, with grave consequences for the implementation of any policy document organised around these concepts.

About the Report: Reporting on UNSCR 1325

UNSCR 1325 mandated the production of the first Secretary-General's Report and the representations of author-ity in the 2002 Report reflect this. The Report of 2002 articulates a specific goal: to focus "on the challenges that must be addressed if progress is to be made in the achievement of the goal of gender equality in relation to peace and security" (UNSC 2002a: 4). This representation evidences an organisational scheme that prioritises this aspect of the Report: gender equality in the context of peace and security. The 2004 Report is contextualised slightly differently, being pursuant to the 2002 Report and drawing on information from a number of other UN studies and reports. The

2004 Report “provides illustrative examples of the progress achieved thus far and identifies gaps and challenges in the implementation of Resolution 1325” (UNSC 2004a: 3), with particular reference to “sexual and gender-based violence” as this violence is seen as a “critical issue” (UNSC 2004a: 4). The ‘critical’ importance of addressing gendered violence in conflict situations reflects another element of the rhetorical schemata that order the text. This is of particular interest as I am concerned with the priority given to representations of (gender) violence by institutions concerned with (international) security.

For the purposes of this chapter, which is to establish the explanations given by the Secretary-General’s Reports for the failures of UNSCR 1325, the two Reports are treated as an analytical whole, despite some differences between them in both the structuring of the text and the detail of the analysis provided. In terms of the actions mandated within the two Reports regarding the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325, the responses demanded by the 2004 Report are more concrete than those contained in the Report of 2002. I have divided the actions into five broad categories, which represent the actions mandated in the two Reports that are given priority within the texts, and this section reports on the actions in the order in which they are represented in the texts. This issue of textual priority is related to the way in which the texts are ordered and made coherent. The organisation of the texts around these five groups of actions demonstrates the relative importance of these actions to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 according to the Secretary-General’s Reports. These actions, mandated by the Reports, can then be interpreted as necessary for the successful implementation of the Resolution. Therefore, if these actions are not undertaken, UNSCR 1325 is doomed to fail. The actions mandated by the Reports, then, or rather the failures to undertake them, are the explanations given in the Secretary-General’s Reports for the failures of the Resolution.

The first of these actions relates directly to the role and responsibilities of the United Nations and associated organisations in conflict prevention and resolution, although most of the actions mandated indict these actors in some way. While the 2002 Report makes abstract commitments to facilitating gender sensitivity in conflict resolution (UNSC 2002a: 25), including gender experts on UN missions to conflict zones (ibid.: 36) and the development of “action plans”

with regard to gender mainstreaming post-conflict reconstruction (ibid.: 60), the 2004 Report demands more specific measures. These include the development of a “comprehensive system-wide strategy” for mainstreaming gender perspectives (UNSC 2004a: 20), the systematic review of “recent peace processes [to] analyse the obstacles to and missed opportunities for women’s full participation” (ibid.: 30) and the operationalising of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women as a guiding framework for reconstruction programmes (ibid.: 63). Both Reports articulate the importance of prioritising gender perspectives at the budgetary level of conflict and post-conflict management (UNSC 2004a: 63; UNSC 2002a: 46) to ensure there are resources available for gender mainstreaming. In addition, both Reports insist on the gender sensitivity of economic, social, legal and judicial reform (UNSC 2004a: 63; UNSC 2002a: 60) to “increase the participation of women and girls [and] fully utilize their capacities” (UNSC 2002a: 53), a very liberal notion of ‘gender issues’, as I discuss below. Similarly, the 2004 Report articulates a commitment to setting “indicators and benchmarks for women’s equal participation in all aspects of elections process” (UNSC 2004a: 65).

The second action I identify relates to the experiences of women and girls in conflict. The Reports recognise that the participation of women and girls in post-conflict resolution is dependent on their surviving the period of armed conflict and thus focus a significant amount of their recommendations on this issue of survival. The language in the 2002 Report is tentative, calling for the recognition of “the extent of the violations of the human rights of women and girls during armed conflict” (UNSC 2002a: 15) and the condemnation of these violations (ibid.: 25), although it does provide some detail regarding the “important difference in the experience of women and girls”, as opposed to men and boys, during armed conflict (ibid.: 5-15). The 2004 Report focuses more explicitly on the responsibilities of parties to armed conflict to “cease all violations of the human rights of women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence” (UNSC 2004a: 87). This shifts emphasis from condemning the violations to condemning the perpetrators of the violations. The responsibility of “Member States, intergovernmental and regional organisations, international and national aid and civil society organisations” to ensure that their operatives are not

engaging in such violations, exploitations or abuse, and to ensure punitive measures are taken where such practices occur, is also explicitly recognised in the 2004 Report (ibid.: 103). This is alluded to in the 2002 Report in vague terms: missions are to “investigate any allegations of sexual exploitation or assault by any peacekeeping personnel and to ensure that offenders are duly disciplined” (UNSC 2002a: 45). Giving textual priority to demanding that ‘Member States’ and other actors take responsibility for cessation of violences experienced by women and girls during times of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction illustrates two key discursive elements. Firstly, women and girls are frequent victims of violence in these situations, and secondly, there is a sense of the liability of the ‘Member States’ and other organisations. It is they who must ensure that this violence is stopped.

Both Reports highlight the importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives “explicitly into the mandates of all peacekeeping mandates” (UNSC 2002a: 46) and “into peacekeeping activities at Headquarters” (UNSC 2004a: 40), which forms the third action mandated in the Reports. The issue of gender mainstreaming is frequently and unproblematically represented within the Reports, and emerges as a central explanation for the failure of UNSCR 1325. The United Nations Economic and Social Council defined gender mainstreaming as

the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (cited in UNDAW 2000: 2).

This is the definition that informs the practices of the UN system and therefore is the focus of analysis for this project.

The 2004 Report offers several examples of good practice, including missions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Côte D'Ivoire (UNSC 2004a: 31; 42) and draws attention to the existence of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' ‘Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping

Operations' (2004), suggesting that the concept of gender mainstreaming has been taken up by various institutions in the United Nations system. The details of gender training programmes in Canada and the UK for military and civilian personnel involved in PKOs are also documented in the 2004 Report (UNSC 2004a: 34), although these achievements are tempered by the comment that only 1% of military and 5% of civilian police personnel assigned by states to serve in PKOs in as June 2004 were women (ibid.: 91).

The fourth action relates to the issue of participation. It is highlighted in both Reports, particularly with reference to "contacts with women's groups and networks" (UNSC 2002a: 15). In the 2004 Report, the Secretary-General "urge[s] Member States, United Nations entities, NGOs and other relevant actors to work collaboratively to ensure the full participation of women ... and to strengthen interaction with women's organisations" (UNSC 2004a: 21). The participation is deemed important as women and girls "facilitate the achievement of greater equality" (UNSC 2002a: 26) and make "a critical difference in the promotion of peace" (ibid.: 27). Collaboration with local and regional women's organisations has had positive effects in West Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan (UNSC 2004a: 7), and women have co-operated across "ethnic and religious lines to make valuable contributions to peace processes" in Azerbaijan, Liberia and Northern Ireland (ibid.: 27). The 2004 Report pays particular attention to the involvement of women in Truth and Reconciliation Programmes, mandating a "review [of] the extent to which women have participated and their concerns met in truth and reconciliation processes" (UNSC 2004a: 64). Safe access to these processes for women is also demanded (ibid.: 52).

Finally, the fundamental importance of the physical safety of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict resolution is well documented in both Reports. "During conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation" (UNSC 2002a: 7). The specific reference to gender-based violence in UNSCR 1325 "has contributed to increased recognition of the escalation in scope and intensity of sexual and gender-based violence as one of the most visible and insidious impacts of armed conflict of women and girls" (UNSC 2004a: 73). The only

action mandated by the 2002 Report in relation to gender-based violence referred to the development of “programmes on the prevention of domestic violence” (UNSC 2002a: 65); elsewhere in the Report, gender-based violence is articulated as a violation of human rights and protection needs are articulated through a human rights framework (ibid.:11; pg. 15; pg. 25).

All five actions mandated in the Reports are aimed at redressing “cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls” (UNSC 2002a: 5) to ensure “the full implementation of Resolution 1325” (UNSC 2004a: 1). Within this remit, gender-based violence is represented in both Reports as having “political and symbolic significance” (UNSC 2002a: 7), a strategic weapon within wider structures of discrimination during periods of armed conflict (UNSC 2004a: 9). The 2004 Report calls for “adequate human and financial support to programmes that provide care and support ... to survivors of gender-based violence” (ibid.: 88) that occurred during armed conflict, giving examples of such programmes functioning in Rwanda and Haiti (ibid.: 83). However, the 2004 Report recognises that there is “unacceptable violence against women and girls in peacetime” (UNSC 2004a: 76) and that the response to this violence “remains inadequate” (ibid.). The Report insists that states must “recognize their responsibility and ... enforce law, end impunity, prosecute perpetrators of violence and provide redress and compensation to survivors of gender-based violence” (ibid.: 81).

The wide-ranging mandates in the two Reports reflect the difficulties that have been experienced in the implementation of UNSCR 1325. “Despite significant achievements, major gaps and challenges remain in all areas” of conflict and post-conflict resolution (UNSC 2004a: 4). The partial or total failure to undertake the actions outlined in the 2002 Report is the implicit explanation given for the failure of UNSCR 1325 to ameliorate the situations of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict zones as UNSCR 1325 suggests. “In order to effectively respond to the needs and priorities of women and girls during armed conflict, gender perspectives have to be integrated into all peace-building, peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts and during humanitarian operations and reconstruction processes” (UNSC 2002a: 66). Thus, ineffective response is based on the failures to integrate such ‘gender perspectives’. The 2004 Report identifies

many areas in which UNSCR 1325 was successfully implemented by various actors in many conflict and post-conflict zones. However, the Report concludes that “in no area of peace and security work are gender perspectives systematically incorporated in planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting” (UNSC 2004a: 118). The lack of “political will, concerted action and accountability on the part of the entire international community” accounts for the failures to successfully implement UNSCR 1325 (ibid.: 121), which is a damning indictment of the international system.

This section has considered the actions mandated in the two Secretary-General’s Reports; the failure to undertake the required actions forms the explanation for the deficiencies in implementation of UNSCR 1325. Ultimately, despite the persuasiveness of this explanation, my research is premised on the suggestion that there are important issues relating to the discursive construction of the Resolution that enable a different understanding of how and why UNSCR 1325 has failed. In the following section I offer a discourse-theoretic reading, investigating the representational practices of predication and subject-positioning alongside analysis of the rhetorical schemata of the texts. I do not undertake this analysis with a view to establishing the ‘truth’ of the Reports, but rather to demonstrate that the Reports themselves, and the explanations offered within them, are a product of particular discourses of international security and gender violence that are in contact in UNSCR 1325. That is, the Reports evaluate the successes and failures of UNSCR 1325 according to the standards of the Resolution itself, standards which are set with reference to concepts of security, violence, gender and the international.

Analysing the Report: Problematising the Secretary-General’s Reports

The Secretary-General’s Reports of 2002 and 2004 suggest that there are objectively identifiable issues of ‘political will, action and accountability’ that have contributed to the failure of UNSCR 1325. However, even given the persuasiveness and relevance of one or more of these factors, I intend to demonstrate that the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325 ultimately influences the processes of its implementation. That is, the concepts around

which it is organised, the meanings (re)produced within the document and the tensions and inconsistencies within it have also contributed to its failure. Before proceeding with analysis of the Resolution, it is vital to explore the representations of gender, violence, the international and security contained in the two Secretary-General's Reports, to illustrate the ways in which these Reports further entrench conventional conceptualisations of gendered violence and security in the international domain. Therefore, this section analyses each of these concepts in turn to enable a more detailed analysis of the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325. Furthermore, it will also provide concrete examples, from specific conflict situations, of the ways in which the concepts of international security and gender violence around which UNSCR 1325 is organised affect the lived experiences of individuals across the world.

Gender

UNSCR 1325 and the two Secretary-General's Reports employ a conceptualisation of gender that is broadly compatible with that employed in the literature on 'gender violence'. Textual priority is given to the predication of 'women' as always different from, and positioned as inferior to, 'men': "Women do not enjoy equal status with men in any society" (UNSC 2000a: 5). Similarly, the experience of women and girls is represented as qualitatively different to that of men and boys (UNSC 2002a: 7). This unequal relationship is "grounded in biological difference" (ibid.: 8), which leads to "specific constraints facing women and girls" (UNSC 2004a: 48). However, as Cockburn points out, "[e]ssentialism is not merely an interesting theoretical concept ... It is a dangerous political force, designed to shore up differences and inequalities, to sustain dominations" (1998: 13). Not only do women have "knowledge and experiences" specific to their gendered identity (UNSC 2004a: 19), they also have "specific needs" (UNSC 2002a: 3) because part of this 'experience' is vulnerability: "During conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence" (UNSC 2002a: 7); women and girls have "specific protection needs" (ibid.: 48). The representational strategies in the Reports suggest that it would be valid to reduce these articulations to their simplest form: "women and girls are vulnerable" (UNSC 2002a: 7). Girls are represented as doubly burdened "owing

to their low status as female adolescents” (UNSC 2002a: 10) – that is, their low status as females, and their low status as adolescents. Thus the universal subordination of women is affirmed through the predication of femininity as vulnerability and the positioning of femininity as ‘low’.

In the 2002 Report, “the role of women” (UNSC 2002a: 9) is discussed in detail. Women are “providers and caregivers” (ibid.). They have responsibility for the “provision of water and energy for household use and ... health care” (ibid.) and these responsibilities increase when households experience the “loss of men and boys” (ibid.). The representation of women in this Report minimises female agency, articulating a feminine subject position that in times of conflict is either “forced out” or “pushed into” dangerous situations (UNSC 2002a: 9). Women lack: they suffer from “lack of land ... lack of access to, or control over, resources” (ibid.). The Report seeks to ameliorate the situations of “populations in need, especially women and girls” (ibid.: 53) but in doing so it seems to suggest that within any given population, women and girls are always more in need. This construction precludes the notion that women can display agency or strength in a positive role, as leaders or organisers. Feminist scholarship on the construction of ‘women as victim’ has forcefully protested and rigorously problematised this association, arguing that “viewing women as homogeneously powerless and as implicit victims does not allow us to theorize women as the benefactors of oppression, or the perpetrators of catastrophes” (Lentin 1997: 12; see also Mohanty 1991; El Jack 2003; Moser and Clark (eds) 2001).

Even in the context of armed conflict, women who are active combatants are represented as having been “driven” to it (UNSC 2002a: 13). In Liberia, “women and girls [were] associated with fighting forces” rather than actively involved (UNSC 2004a: 24). Both Reports do articulate a female combatant – in two sentences in the 2002 Report, and barely more than that in 2004. The 2002 Report acknowledges that “males above the age of 18 ... fit the international definition of soldiers (UNSC 2002a: 62) but insists that “[c]ombatants are not only men, but also women, girls and boys” (ibid.). In reproducing the conventional discursive links of masculinised-soldier in opposition to feminised-peacemaker, which I discuss further below, the Reports reaffirm a very narrow and traditionalised narrative of gender that rests on “assertions around an

essential link between women, motherhood and non-violence” (Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000: 13, emphasis in original). Both the 2002 and the 2004 Report focus in great detail on the involvement of women in peacemaking. According to the Department of Public Information, “the issue of women as peacemakers [is] one of the top 10 unreported stories” (UNSC 2004a: 117). Quite apart from the methodological issues concerning how one would go about measuring the frequency of an unreported story, the discursive link between women and peace is systematically and unproblematically predicated in both the Reports with systemic yet problematic implications. These implications are wide-ranging, from denying legitimacy to female combatants and therefore failing to account for their needs in demobilisation and disarmament programmes, to assuming that women who act outside of their subject-position of peacemaker are somehow lesser women than their counterparts who are obedient to these discursive regimes.

The peace processes and reconstruction programmes undertaken in post-conflict zones are the only sphere in which women and girls are articulated as unproblematically agential. “[W]omen play an active role in informal peace processes” (UNSC 2002a: 13); this construction strengthens the discursive construction of feminised-peacemaker mentioned above. Women are represented as “victims of armed conflict” (UNSC 2004a: 112) but women can also be “actors in early warning, reconciliation, peace-building or post-conflict resolution” (ibid.). Thus readers of the document are told in no uncertain terms what women are and can be in the context of conflict and post-conflict zones; the space for transgression or reversal – that is, for women to be actors in armed conflict or victims of peace-building or post-conflict resolution – is limited. This discursive disciplining reflects feminist concerns about the recognition of women as perpetrators of violence.⁵¹ The Reports are organised around a conceptualisation of gender that assumes women are more likely to support peace movements than their male peers. Whether women and girls are

⁵¹ These concerns are broadly divisible into two strands of argument. The first relates to the “reluctance as exists among *feminists* to discuss women and violence [that] must be seen in the light of well-founded fears that such investigations could be used to mask male violence” (Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000: 12, emphasis in original). The second representation of these concerns relates to the minimising of feminist agency that occurs when the discursive space for women to act as perpetrators is curtailed (see Moser and Clark 2001).

“combatants, abductees, supporters of armed groups, wives or dependents of male combatants” (UNSC 2004a: 66), it is assumed that “women and women’s groups” should be involved “in all aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (ibid.: 7). If the women and girls concerned are deeply committed to the political cause for which they bear arms, it is unlikely that by virtue of their femininity they will seek to provide assistance unless the outcome to the conflict is one they feel is just. There is significant literature concerning women’s involvement with violence and oppression; “feminists in the North and South [have] challenged the so-called peaceful nature of women by examining their involvement in national liberation struggles, their direct and/or indirect support of armed conflicts and their contributions to war and militarism generally” (El Jack 2003: 12; see also Lentin 1997: 12-13; El-Bushra 2000).

Loosely defined ‘women’s groups’ are cited in both Reports as a space for female agency, a construction that is articulated in UNSCR 1325 where “all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements” are called on to include “[m]easures that support local women’s peace initiatives” (UNSC 2000a, Article 8). There are two aspects of this construction that are particularly noteworthy. The first involves the assumption that women and girls who are active in local peace initiatives have a common agenda. “There are many positive examples of women making a critical difference in the promotion of peace, particularly in preserving social order and educating for peace” (UNSC 2002a: 27). This may be empirically verifiable, but the exclusion of the examples of women and girls making a critical difference in the promotion of conflict is a political move that serves to strengthen a specific construction of female identity. As Carol Cohn, Helen Kinsella and Sheri Gibbings argue, “it remains important to ask *which* women are included and are we expecting more from women (super heroines) than we expect of men?” (2004: 136, emphasis in original). Furthermore, drawing attention to women’s organising for peace across “party and ethnic lines”, as mentioned in both Reports (UNSC 2004a: 27; UNSC 2002a: 27), suggests, problematically, that it can be expected that femininity will take precedence as a political identity.

Furthermore, the specific skills that women and girls bring to post-conflict reconstruction are those associated with a feminine subject position

articulated within an essentialist narrative of gender as described above. The emphasis on “preserving the social order” (UNSC 2002a: 27) is constructed through a narrative of gender that sees women as tied to the private sphere, impacting on the public only through expanding care of the household to care of the community at large. Thus the emphasis put on “[w]omen’s contributions to ... ‘people to people diplomacy’” (UNSC 2004a: 12) seems premised on an understanding of gender that is ordered along conventional dichotomous lines. Disrupting these dichotomies draws attention to “the coerced nature of dichotomous gender systems, [and] their effect on the individual’s propensity for aggression and passivity” (O’Toole and Schiffman 1997c: 424). In these Reports, while the privileging is reversed – the feminine-peaceful-private-emotional is held in higher regard than the masculine-aggressive-public-rational – the organising principle is still founded on a very conventional dichotomous and essentialist conceptualisation of gender.⁵²

The second aspect of the construction that is of interest relates to the elision between gender and women in the Reports. Despite the assertion that “promoting gender equality is not women’s responsibility alone” (UNSC 2002a: 44), both Reports address “the gender dimensions of peace processes” (ibid.: 1) as if these dimensions can be adequately theorised through detailed documentation of “women’s equal participation with men and their full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” (UNSC 2004a: 2). Article 4 of the 2002 Report makes this link explicit: “the study on women, peace and security ... focuses on the challenges that must be addressed if progress is to be made in the achievement of the goal of gender equality” (UNSC 2002a: 4). The specific example of peacekeeping operations, represented in both Reports (UNSC 2004a: 31-40; UNSC 2002a: 37-46), reproduce the discursive construction of gender as binary and, moreover, as *about* women. Making “explicit reference to women and girls, or to the different impact of armed conflict or post-conflict recovery on women and girls” would demonstrate “a commitment to gender equality” (UNSC 2002a: 38). In the 2004 Report, men are mentioned: “Training on gender issues should be provided to all

⁵² Along with Peterson, “[w]hat I want to emphasize is that, in contrast to most non-feminist interpretivists, *feminist critiques of dichotomies are inseparable from their critiques of oppression*” (2003: 109, emphasis in original).

staff at decision-making levels, men as well as women” (UNSC 2004a: 97). However, in articulating the suggestion that ‘gender issues’ are relevant to ‘men as well as women’ the Report allows for the suggestion that readers might be forgiven for thinking that gender is just about women. As Terrell Carver (1996) has succinctly remarked, “gender is not a synonym for women”, but nevertheless, “we slip from gender to women and women to gender but have yet to slip from gender to men” (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004: 136). This (re)produces a concept of gender in which “gender describes everything that is weak (old people, women and children) and is in need of protection” (cited in Puechguirbal 2003, p.113).

The different needs of women and girls discussed above also affects these issues of participation and gender mainstreaming. The foundational assumption guiding the policy prescriptions in the Reports relates to “the proactive role women can play in peace-building” (UNSC 2004a: 13) as a result of their essential femininity. While the Reports pay lip service to the anti-essentialist position – “the presence of women does not guarantee attention to gender issues” (UNSC 2002a: 29) – the Reports systematically undermine this position through their insistence that “[s]ustainable and durable peace requires the participation of women and girls” (ibid.: 54). In the final paragraph of the 2004 Report, this articulation is reproduced at length:

Resolution 1325 (2000) holds out a promise to women across the globe that their rights will be protected and that barriers to their equal participation and full involvement in the maintenance and promotion of sustainable peace will be removed. We must uphold this promise (UNSC 2004a: 121)

However, to encourage the participation that the Reports are so keen to facilitate, both Reports reproduce a female subject whose life experiences are curtailed by virtue of her femininity.⁵³ There are “concerns specific to women” (UNSC 2002a: 29); these concerns, and women themselves, are currently marginalised (ibid.: 28). The Reports state that this marginalisation can be overcome by the institutionalising of “[s]pecial measures” (UNSC 2002a: 56). Women “need to

⁵³ Mohanty reflects at length on this construction in the context of post-colonial feminist scholarship: “This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being ‘third world’ (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimised etc.).” (1991: 56).

receive early support and training in order to facilitate their active participation” (UNSC 2004a: 27) and in the context of electoral participation, “women running for office need skills building and support” (ibid.: 58). Access to resources in specific locations have resulted in women’s participation according to the Reports, for example in Afghanistan, which is held as an example of good practice, where women hold 20% of the seats in the Loya Jirga (UNSC 2004a: 54), and in Rwanda and Iraq (ibid.: 55-56).

However, in representing women as needing ‘support’, ‘training’ and ‘skills building’, the Reports construct women as a problem to be overcome, as opposed to problematising the relational complexity of gender. Women are entitled to ‘equal participation and full involvement’, but in suggesting that in order to achieve this they need special training, the Reports continue to provide those who would wish to maintain the status quo of gender inequality and devaluation of the feminine with ammunition to do precisely that. Furthermore, the Reports fail to mention that many men need similar interventions on their behalf as they are marginalised on account of their class, race, politics, sexuality and so on. This may not be surprising in Reports explicitly addressing ‘women, peace and security’, but it is important to remember that men do feature in the Reports – just not in this particular exercise in boundary delimitation.

Violence

Having articulated a dichotomous, broadly essentialist, narrative of gender, the Reports can only articulate a particular understanding of gendered violence. ‘Gender violence’ is explicitly recognised as an issue for the attention of the Security Council by virtue of its inclusion in Resolutions and Reports, but it is necessary to further investigate with which conceptualisation of gendered violence these Resolutions and Reports work. Building on UNSCR 1325, which “calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence” (UNSC 2000a: 10), both Reports represent the concept of violence, experienced by women during conflict, as inherently gendered. The assertion that “[d]uring conflict women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and

exploitation” (UNSC 2002a: 7) in 2002 lead to the treatment of “sexual and gender-based violence” as a “critical issue” in 2004 (UNSC 2004a: 4). Thus the Reports are organised around a concept of violence that is inherently gendered in very specific ways. Moreover, violence is predicated as “a strategic and tactical weapon” (UNSC 2002a: 8) that is used *against* not *by* women and girls (ibid.; UNSC 2004a: 73-88).

The elision of ‘sexual’ and ‘gender-based’ violence is not surprising given the elision of sex and gender in the conceptualisation of identity evident in the Reports. No attempt is made to differentiate between sex and gender in the two Reports: ‘sex’ is only represented as the first three letters of ‘sexual’ which is used to preface ‘violence’. This is because the Reports articulate a concept of gender that is “loosely synonymous with ‘sex’ and lazily synonymous with ‘women’” (Carver 1996: 18). No attempt is made to differentiate between violence based on sex and violence based on gender, although both are used in the Reports. However, the suggestion of difference is minimised, if not completely elided through the representation of the interchangeability of the two terms in the two Reports. What is “gender-based and sexual violence” in the 2002 Report (UNSC 2002a: 8) is “sexual and gender-based violence” in 2004 (UNSC 2004a: 73).

This construction is compatible with the understanding of violence evident in the conceptualisation of ‘gender violence’ discussed in Chapter Two, where “gender violence is often explained as a natural and universal consequence of the biological difference between men and women” (O’Toole and Schiffman 1997d: 3).⁵⁴ The actions mandated in response to gendered violence, as discussed above, are predicated on the understanding that “sexual and gender-based violence ... impacts ... on women and girls” (UNSC 2004a: 73); the Reports document the “widespread use of sexual violence against women and children”

⁵⁴ “The argument that sexuality and sexual acts, including violent ones, are not just a matter of individual preferences but are bound up with power structures in society is, of course, closely tied to feminist theory and constitutes one of its principle challenges to mainstream social science” (Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000: 2). This is an argument that I can sustain, although I conceptualise power somewhat differently, as explained in Chapter Two. I do conceive of power as immanent in the violent reproduction of gender but I identify ‘sexuality and sexual acts’ as performative of gender (see Butler 1999; 1993) and thus violence manifested through ‘sexuality and sexual acts’ as (re)productive of the power relationships rather than conceiving of the power relationships as ahistoric and immutable.

(ibid.: 9). The repetition of these constructions serves to remind the reader not only that sex and gender are intimately related but that women are subjected to violence in ways that men are not. Articulating “women victims of violence” (UNSC 2004a: 86) as the focus of policy aimed at “preventing such violence and protecting women and girls” (ibid.: 76) again predicates ‘women victims’ as the problem, rather than acknowledging that women could be perpetrators of such violence or part of the solutions to such violence, and is heedless of the need for such solutions or any position in between. Furthermore, this construction precludes the notion that men can be victims of gendered violence, which is patently false.⁵⁵

Gendered violence is the only form of violence that is named in both Reports. Thus the Reports are organised around a notion of violence as ‘gender violence’, at the same time as they (re)produce the gendering of this notion of violence. In keeping with the element of violence articulated in the discourse of ‘gender violence’, violence in the Reports is “named after its victims”, in that gender is assumed synonymous with ‘womenandchildren’ (Kappeler 1995: 1). The centrality of violence to the relational complexity of gender is thus affirmed, but the premise that gendered violence affects only women and girls is unsustainable. This articulation is made by omission in the Reports, but the politics of what is *not* contained is as important an analytical focus as that which is. Theorising the various violences that impact on the lives of individuals requires that discursive space is carved out for the recognition *of* violences *as* violences. For example, state-sponsored corporate violence “has not been responded to with the same level of gravity of sanction that is reserved for the violent acts committed by less powerful members of our society” (Alder 1997: 440).⁵⁶ Violence is articulated in the two Reports using the predicate ‘gender’, and positioned as outside of the remit of appropriate behaviours. That is, it is

⁵⁵ For a detailed archive of articles relating to gender violence targeting combat-age males in conflict situations see <http://adamjones.freesevers.com/scholar.htm>.

⁵⁶ To give just one illustration, according to Amnesty International (2004), “[t]he Sudan government is ultimately responsible for the displacement of more than one million civilians and the horrendous cycle of burning of villages, killing of civilians, rape, widespread looting and systematic destruction of livelihoods carried out by government-supported *Janjawid* militias helped at every stage by the Sudanese army and air force” in Darfur. Amnesty International hosts a web-portal devoted to monitoring state-sponsored violence at <http://www.amnesty.ie/user/content/view/full/505>.

represented throughout the Reports as illegitimate, as always requiring first prevention (*inter alia* UNSC 2004a: 19) and then intervention to ensure its cessation (*inter alia* UNSC 2002a: 17).

The Reports perpetuate a conceptualisation of violence that reifies and pathologises gender as dichotomous and essential through their representations of gender violence. Violence, on this view, serves an ordering function (see Jabri 1996: 7-10). The Reports do not explicitly articulate a definition of violence, instead appealing to a broad range of threats including “torture, rape, mass rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and trafficking” (UNSC 2002a: 7). Gender violence is represented as “a form of discrimination” and acts of violence as “violations of *women’s* human rights” (UNSC2004a: 76, emphasis added). Such representations are product/productive of assumptions concerning the necessary materiality of violence. It is not that violence must be *physical* in this conceptualisation of gender violence, rather that it must have visible material effects. There is no space for the suggestion that violence constitutes subjectivity, as I discuss in later Chapters, as the Reports assume predetermined subjects that are constrained/enabled by acts of violence.

Men feature in the policy prescriptions relevant to gendered violence as empowered in a way that women are not: “Gender-based violence ... seriously inhibits the ability of women to enjoy their rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men” (UNSC 2004a: 76). Men also need assistance in overcoming their (natural?) violent tendencies: there is a need to “develop programmes on the prevention of domestic violence, targeting ... especially male combatants” (UNSC 2002a: 65). These positionings fix gender as a pathological relationship based on sexed bodies, an eternal hierarchy in which men enjoy the privileges of their masculinity through their power over women and girls, an articulation that is deeply problematic. The Reports delimit gender violence according to these assumptions, and do not consider the ways in which the violences of which they speak actually function to reproduce gender as a lived experience in a multiplicity of locations.

International

The dominant articulation of space within the Reports counterposes the local with the international. UNSCR 1325 explicitly connects the UN Charter and the existence of the Security Council with “the maintenance of international peace and security” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) and this construction is reproduced throughout the two Secretary-General’s Reports. Both Reports comment on the responsibilities of “the international community” (UNSC 2004a: 121; UNSC 2002a: 3) without specifically delineating the components of this ‘community’ or exploring the connections across values and truth claims that enable the ‘community’ to name itself as such. The assertion of ‘community’ entails the predication of the international as both a spatial domain and also a quality reflecting common interests and ideals. There are marked differences between these articulations of the international in the two Reports that need investigating further. As Gillian Youngs comments: “[t]o think spatially is to take spatial dimensions of social relations seriously, to recognise that political, economic and cultural exchanges take place in different forms of social space and ... [to] contribute to how that space is framed and perceived” (99: 97).

Within the 2002 Report, the existence of the international is asserted as a separate domain from the domestic, which is implicitly the site of the armed conflict that the Report seeks to address. Armed conflict affects “civilian women and girls” (UNSC 2002a: 7) in their “households and communities” (ibid.: 9) and therefore, according to the Reports, it is necessary “to increase community commitment to conflict prevention” (UNSC 2004a: 14). In this representation, the ‘community’ of the domestic realm is positioned differently to the ‘community’ of the international, with the domestic represented as a zone of conflict and the international (community) represented as a mediator in such conflict. This is in opposition to the logic of the security discourse on ‘national security’ explored in Chapter Two, but entirely in keeping with the discourse on ‘international security’ that posits ‘the international’ as a domain of co-operation rather than conflict. The separation between the two realms is maintained in both conceptualisations, however, and can legitimately be challenged. Taking ‘the international’ *a priori* to be a benign locus of positive action is every bit as problematic as asserting that ‘the international’ is by definition anarchic.

However, the positive articulation of ‘the international’ in the Reports leads to more specific critical issues.

The United Nations is repeatedly articulated as the organiser of knowledge concerning the “impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (UNSC 2002a: 1): “The study ... builds on existing research and inputs of the United Nations, its programmes, funds and specialized agencies” (ibid.: 2). The knowledges owned by “scholars and local and international non-governmental organisations” (ibid.) is accredited but through placement in the text implicitly secondary to that of the UN and associated bodies. The ‘international community’ has “responsibilities ... to provide effective responses” (ibid.: 3) and, presumably, to respond to the “recommendations for action” (ibid.: 4) contained in the Report. This is a form of discursive violence, a kind of ‘trickle-down’ theory of expertise. The implication is that the knowledge accumulated by the UN system will guide conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. “[L]ocal sources of information on the impact of armed conflict” are to be ‘identified’ and ‘utilized’ by the international community (UNSC 2002a: 15) to better their understanding of gendered dynamics. Insisting that “consultations with women’s groups and networks can provide important information” (ibid.: 27) strengthens the assumption that constructing the UN as a repository for knowledge is unproblematic, that all actors can gain access to and benefit from this knowledge equally, and does a violence to those involved in the production of context-specific strategies for change.

Furthermore, this construction allows for the suggestion that gender equality can be achieved in all locations for all time through the same policy practices. Constructing the organisation of knowledge in this way is problematic, as it is predicated on a fixed and essentialist concept of gender, seen as a fixed and hierarchical variable. The 2004 Report states that “UNIFEM has created a web portal as a centralized repository of information on women, peace and security” (UNSC 2004: 117), suggesting that these issues can be contained within the immutable boundaries of the categories of ‘women’, ‘peace’ and ‘security’, and, moreover, that locating such a repository in cyberspace allows access to those who seek information. I contest both of these assumptions. I do not wish to dismiss entirely the benefits of increased attention to matters of

gendered violence and security. However, the representation of ‘women’ as an homogenous category and the implied ability of the ‘centralized repository’ to adequately address all issues pertaining to these ‘women’ is deeply problematic as it reinscribes two of the conventional dichotomies I seek to challenge here: woman/man and domestic/international.

The representations of the domestic in the 2002 Report predominantly serve two functions: either to illustrate cases in which gender ‘issues’ have been insufficiently addressed in situations of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction as is the case “in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda ... [and] ... Sierra Leone” (UNSC 2002a: 19); or to celebrate those interventions of the ‘international community’, through its emissary the UN, which have had ‘positive’ effects, for example the “missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo and Sierra Leone” (ibid.: 30). In making this division, the Report further entrenches the conceptual separation of the ‘international’ and the ‘domestic’ and affirms the power of the ‘international’ as a mediator for ‘peace and security’. However, critical feminist scholarship has not only problematised the international-domestic dichotomy (see *inter alia* Youngs 1999: 104-112; Crawley 2000; Peterson 1992)⁵⁷ but also drawn attention to the fact that “national/civil conflicts are not only internal but transnational in nature, as they take place within a particular international context” (El Jack 2003: 9). These interjections render the representation of the international (re)produced within the Reports extremely problematic. Continuing to represent the international in the reified terms used in the Reports obscures the ‘international context’ of armed conflict as well as the involvement of members of the ‘international community’ in the perpetration of violence, gender or otherwise.

In its concluding observations, the 2002 Report recognises that UNSCR 1325 has “galvanized the Member States, the United Nations system and civil society, including at the grass roots level” (UNSC 2002a: 66). As I discuss in Chapter Five, it is claimed that it was activism at the ‘grass roots level’ that initially enabled the production of UNSCR 1325. To position the actors within

⁵⁷ Feminist scholars are not alone in their desire to problematise what could be seen as the foundational assumption of realist IR theory: the domestic/international divide. Other notable contributions to this debate include Ashley 1988; Weber 1992; Falk 1990; Walker 1990; Walker 1993; Linklater 1996; Walker 2002; Lake 2003; Williams 2003.

the text in such a way as to privilege the actions of ‘Member States’ and devalue those of ‘civil society’ is therefore somewhat disingenuous. Furthermore, the conflict that the Reports address occurs ‘at the grass roots level’, so it is completely unsurprising that actors involved seek any means they can to ameliorate their situations. It is claimed that “[i]nternational law and existing strategies and guidelines within United Nations entities provide a strong framework for addressing gender perspectives within the context of armed conflict and its aftermath” (UNSC 2002a: 67). However, having explored the conceptualisation of gender operant within these ‘strategies and guidelines’ it seems problematic to impose these policies without attending to the ways in which they might further entrench existing inequalities or construct new yet similarly pathological power relations.

The 2004 Report still subscribes to the notion that the UN, and in particular the Security Council, can and should act as gatekeeper to the issues of peace-building and security. The Report itself “is based on contributions from Member States and entities of the United Nations system” (UNSC 2004a: 3). Achievements made thus far in the mainstreaming of gender perspectives into issues of peace and security are lauded in the Report. For example, attention is paid to “women or gender concerns” in 15.6% of all Security Council Resolutions in the period 2000-2004 (UNSC 2004a: 6), and “[t]wo presidential statements were issued calling on Member States, entities of the United Nations system, civil society and other relevant actors to develop clear strategies and action plans” (ibid.: 5). The second section of the Report, encompassing paragraphs 4 to 72 inclusive, is entitled ‘Progress in Implementation’, and begins with a discussion of the many and various ways that UNSCR 1325 has made life better, enabling the development of

policies, actions plans, guidelines and indicators; increasing access to gender expertise; providing training; promoting consultation with and participation of women; increasing attention to human rights and supporting the initiative of women’s groups (UNSCR 2004: 4).

Note that ‘the initiative of women’s groups’ is singular, suggesting that women – regardless of their socio-cultural, racial or ethnic and/or sexual identities – have a single agenda. This assumption was problematised by feminist political theorists

several decades ago.⁵⁸ Where these critiques have been noted, recognition of the difference among ‘women’, however ‘women’ are conceived, has enabled the production of policy predicated on those differences, rather than merely reproducing a singular difference – that assumed to exist between ‘women’ and ‘men’.

However, the 2004 Report explores more fully the responsibilities of the ‘international’ and suggests some ways in which these responsibilities demand action. The ‘international’ is repeatedly articulated as a ‘community’, moreover, a community of ‘Member States’, and “States ... have the primary responsibility for the protection of women and children” (UNSC 2004a: 77). While the document offers prescriptions for the behaviour of states, it does not explore the ways in which governments or elites within states might actively engage in the perpetration and perpetuation of gendered violences as part of their strategies to power. The Report does state that “Member States need to send stronger signals to parties to conflict that gender-based violence will be investigated and perpetrators will be prosecuted” (ibid.: 84), but these indictments are hollow in the face of the inability of the UN to impose sanctions in the case of violations. “The involvement of United Nations personnel ... in sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of local populations is particularly abhorrent and unacceptable” (UNSC 2004a: 99) and is something that the UN can actively punish, but the reality principle of the ‘international community’ – as a group of states – undermines the insistence that the United Nations has the power to “[a]pply increased pressure on parties to armed conflict ... to cease all violations of the human rights of women and girls” (ibid.: 87).

The Reports insist that the “International Criminal Court holds promise for meaningful accountability for gender-based crimes against women in armed conflict” (2004a: 79), but fail to point out that such accountability is only possible if ‘Member States’ accept the jurisdiction of the Court.⁵⁹ The examples given in the Report are the successes in referrals from Uganda and the

⁵⁸ On the diversity of ‘women’ and associated debates over what constitutes a feminist political agenda, see, *inter alia*, hooks 1983; Alcoff 1988; Riley 1988; Fuss 1989; Di Stefano 1990; Stanley 1990; Narayan 1997; Francis 2002; Butler 2004.

⁵⁹ According to the web-site homepage of the ICC, 100 states have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute on which the jurisdiction of the Court is premised. See <http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html> for further information.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (ibid.); no mention is made of the states that refuse to recognise the Court and the challenge that this presents to the efficacy of the Court as a tool of retribution. States that have not ratified the Rome Statute include Zimbabwe, Haiti, Iran, Israel and the United States of America. The support that individual states do or do not give to the United Nations and associated organisations is noted in the Report, alongside representations of the ways in which individual states foster grass roots activism in various locations. The example of Afghanistan is used to represent the ways in which states are involved with increasing the participation of women and “promoting gender equality ... [S]everal Member States have funded projects for women and girls ... The United States has allocated funding for projects that assist women with democratic organization and advocacy” (UNSC 2004a: 61). Considering the extensive involvement of the U.S.A. with domestic Afghan politics dating back to CIA sponsored anti-Soviet militia and the more recent attacks of 2001, it is somewhat ironic that the Report praises the U.S.A. in this way.⁶⁰

Both Reports articulate “the changed nature of conflict” in recent times (UNSC 2002a: 24), where “[b]oth State and non-State actors are responsible” (UNSC 2004a: 76). This construction is in itself problematic, as conflict has never been the preserve of the state alone; civil conflict is part of the history of world politics.⁶¹ Furthermore,

war can surely never be said to start and end at a clearly defined moment. Rather, it seems part of a continuum of conflict, expressed now in armed force, now in economic sanctions or political pressure. A time of supposed peace may come later to be called ‘the pre-war period’. During the fighting of a war, unseen by the foot soldiers under fire, peace processes are often already at work. A time of postwar reconstruction, later, may be re-designated as an *inter bellum* – a mere pause between wars (Cockburn and Zarkov cited in El Jack 2003: 9).

In attempting to delineate boundaries of responsibility containing only groups of states – the ‘international community’ – the Reports disable engagement with the ways in which some conflicts may be waged against the state by non-state actors,

⁶⁰ Furthermore, the idea of the U.S. assisting anyone with democratic organisation is rather frightening given the circumstances under which George W. Bush was initially ‘elected’ as president.

⁶¹ See, *inter alia*, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Kalyvas 2001; Gleditch et al. 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

including women and girls, and vice versa. The very existence of UNSCR 1325 and the pursuant Reports claim authority on behalf of the 'international' in the context of the provision of peace and security, at the same time as "the peace and security arena" is represented as "the 'hard core' of international politics (Reanda 1999: 58). The Reports reproduce the 'international' according to conventional narratives of state behaviours, leaving little conceptual space for the radical reforms that the rhetoric demands. Even if all of the actions mandated in the Reports were undertaken tomorrow, it is highly unlikely that the utopian vision of 'peace and security' represented in the Reports would be made manifest, given the problematic conceptualisations of gender, violence and the international that are represented in the texts. The Reports constitute gender as a pathological relationship that positions 'men' as oppressors and 'women' as oppressed, gender violence as a tool of this oppression and the international as a realm apart from the conflicted and battle-scarred locations where such violence occurs.

Security

The concept of security represented within the Reports delimits the security for which the 'international' strives, and it is thus important to interrogate it. The first noteworthy aspect of the concept of security in the Reports is the authorship of the Reports by the Security Council. Both Reports open with a statement by the Secretary-General concerning their institutional heritage:

The Security Council, by paragraph 16 of its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October, invited me to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls (UNSC 2002a: 1)

On 31 October 2002, the Security Council adopted the statement of the President (S/PRST/2002/32), in which it requested the preparation of a follow-up report on the full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security (UNSC 2004a: 1).

Organising the documents in this way emphasises two aspects of their production. Firstly, the existence of the document, in both cases, is attributed to UNSCR 1325. Not only does this reaffirm the need to investigate the documents fully to form the foundations of a project that seeks to analyse the formulation

and implementation of the Resolution, but it also suggests that the Secretary-General, on behalf of the Security Council, acknowledges the unique nature of UNSCR 1325 and the ways in which the Resolution speaks to issues of ‘women and peace and security’.

Secondly, introducing both documents with a statement articulating their author-ity represents a claim to legitimacy that affects both the Reports and the Security Council as an institution. The Reports are afforded the authority conferred upon them by the discursive association with, and rhetorical prioritising of, the Security Council. The United Nations Charter states that “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (UN 1945: Article 24.1). Signatories of the Charter agree to be bound by the principles and procedures therein; therefore, in reminding readers of the institutional heritage of the Reports, their legitimacy is (re)produced.

Furthermore, this process of (re)production simultaneously constitutes the Security Council as a legitimate body. This has important ramifications for the organisation of global security. In asserting the discursive privilege of the Security Council to speak about issues of security in the international domain, the Reports further entrench this privilege, performing the identity of the Security Council as legitimate and responsible. Thus through their organisational form, the Reports contribute to the discursive linking of the concept of security with ‘international’, which impacts on the ability of actors to claim to speak about security and the authenticity afforded to their claims. This is in accordance with the reality principle of the United Nations as an organisation of states, and is potentially disempowering for non-state actors, which may have negative implications for those who wish to organise for peace outside of or indeed against a state structure.

The repeated discursive link between ‘peace’ and ‘security’, evident in the titles of the Reports and throughout the document texts, is also important. This is at odds with the conventional Realist conceptualisation of security, which

sees perpetual insecurity as the organising principle of inter-state relationships.⁶² Furthermore, the security of the individual is conceptually precluded by this understanding, in which security is the preserve of states. The Reports appeal to the ‘international community’ to act as a provider of security, which constructs this ‘community’ as the harbinger of global peace from which all individuals can benefit. However, a critical conceptualisation of security in which security is seen as a discourse that reproduces the international as a spatial and conceptual domain, as discussed in Chapter Two, challenges this predication. As Jenny Edkins comments, “[s]ecurity is not only concerned with how referent objects survive, it is also about how they come into being in the first place” (2002: 79). The concept of security (re)produced in the Reports functions to ‘bring into being’ the nation-state as the referent object of the security policies and practices detailed in the Reports but only in as far as the states are peaceable members of an ‘international community’. This representation impacts on the ways in which states, as functioning imaginaries, can *and are expected to* behave, disciplining state behaviours in the international realm. It also further entrenches the conceptual divisions between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ discussed above.

Peacekeeping operations are one means by which ‘the international’ “establish[es] security” (UNSC 2002a: 39), but according to the Reports there are “[d]ifferences in men’s and women’s security priorities and needs” in these operations (ibid.). This articulation is discursively allowable given the conceptualisation of gender and gendered violence through which the Reports are organised, as discussed above. That is, if gender is pathological and gendered violence is violence against women, then women do have specific ‘security priorities and needs’. Therefore, the Reports (re)produce a concept of security that affirms the conceptualisations of gender and violence around which it is organised, which is unsurprising. The internal coherence of the concept of security represented in the Reports is closely related to the existence of individuals as sexed bodies, where the fiction of sex is assumed to have a binary and trans-historical materiality (see *inter alia* Butler 2004; 1999; 1993), and

⁶² However, this construction is (re)produced through other UN agencies in statements, Reports and press statements, in which “peace is inextricably linked to equality. Conflicts of all forms continue to cause serious obstacles to the advancement of women. If there is no security, women as well as men are unable to fully participate in the political, economic and social development at the family, community and national levels” (UNESCO 2004).

furthermore to the concept of violence as violence towards and experienced by 'women'. However, in representing security in this way, the Reports delegitimise claims made by those who wish to unsettle the constructions of gender and violence that the Reports articulate.

There is a discursive link between the "participation of women, the incorporation of gender perspectives and the protection of civilians" (UNSC 2004a: 8), suggesting that security can only be achieved with "the full and equal participation of women and men" (UNSC 2002a: 68). However, it is possible to recognise the strategic gains made over recent years with the articulation of gendered violence as a security issue, and still be sceptical of the ways in which issues of central importance to the 'international' at this particular historical moment are articulated as 'security' issues. As McDonald argues, security "involves a freedom from danger or harm, although what constitutes danger or harm, which actors can protect against danger or harm, and the entity whose protection is sought is ... constantly changing" (2002: 288). This research seeks to problematise the associations made within UNSCR 1325 regarding security as freedom from violence, sought for women by the international (community) and the ways in which these conceptualisations have been (re)produced in the Reports of the Secretary-General. Theorists of inter-national relations need to give due consideration to the kinds of political orders that are constructed through these discourses of security. Without this consideration, 'security' as a concept becomes theoretically and analytically bankrupt, a term employed to justify any action, any policy or practice. Without this consideration, the theorists and politicians who invoke the concept of 'security' are reproducing a political order that manifestly does not provide security for the individuals at the sharp end of these actions, policies or practices, the very 'women and girls' to whom these Reports purport to speak.

Challenging the Reports: The Implementation of UNSCR 1325

This research is concerned with a reconceptualisation of international security and gender violence, which proceeds from an investigation into the ways in which security and violence become international-ised and gender-ed. This

chapter is central to this project, providing as it does an insight into the (re)production of these concepts through documentation associated with UNSCR 1325. The Reports refer explicitly to UNSCR 1325 in the context of establishing their authenticity and author-ity; before beginning analysis of the Resolution itself and seeking to explain its failure with regard to the concepts of security, violence, the international and gender that it both constitutes and is constituted through, the explanations given for its failure by the institution that claims ownership of the Resolution should be investigated.

The explanatory factors offered by the Reports are, as mentioned above, assumed to be objectively identifiable. The 2004 Report notes that “[i]n the four years since the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), there has been a positive shift in international understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls ... Member States, United Nations entities and civil society actors have made significant strides in implementing the resolution” (UNSC 2004a: 118). Despite these ‘significant strides’, however, “political will, concerted action and accountability on the part of the entire international community are required” (ibid.: 121). Therefore, it is assumed that the lack of ‘political will, concerted action and accountability’ explains the failures to implement UNSCR 1325 successfully. As the Report articulates, “important gaps and challenges remain” (UNSC 2004a: 4).

However, through the DTA of the Reports conducted in this chapter, it has been possible to identify the concepts of gender, violence, the international and security around which the Reports are organised and from there to suggest that it is precisely this discursive organisation that has undermined the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The reports evaluate UNSCR 1325 according to the standards and concepts represented in the Resolution itself. They offer an opportunity to problematise these concepts, and, when read against the dominant explanation for the failures of UNSCR 1325, the critical interjections regarding the (re)production of gender violence and international security in the Reports indicate that it is both possible and necessary to challenge the representations in these documents.

Regarding ‘political will [and] concerted action’, the Reports (re)produce a construction of the international (community) that is reified and valorised as the

provider of ‘peace and security’. Discursive disciplining of the boundaries of behaviours appropriate to members of this ‘community’ further strengthens this construction, without problematising the ways in which these claims impinge on the legitimacy of actors who transgress the boundaries – either of behaviour or of the community itself. The question of ‘accountability’ can be read as a discursive mechanism to counter this disciplining tendency, but it can also be read as affirming it, through the association of ‘the international’ with a domain organised around a reified notion of the state. The issues raised above in relation to the organisation of the Reports around concepts of gender, violence and security that fix bodies in relation to a biologically determined narrative of sex difference, universally subordinate the feminine and require that female is equal to weak and therefore need to be secured against the violences they will experience by virtue of their femininity render the question of accountability thinkable only in relation to these concepts. That is, these discursive practices preclude the notion that the Reports, and UNSCR 1325 itself, are accountable for the violent reproduction of gender through discursive violence and the international through evocation of discourses of security.

The 2004 Report assures its readers that “[i]n the first six months of 2004, a trend of improved reporting was noted, with 23.5 per cent of reports having multiple reference to gender issues” (UNSC 2004a: 112). I am not so encouraged by this given the concept of gender that informs the Reports with which this chapter is concerned. This research project aims to demonstrate that discursive construction of concepts of gender, violence, security and the international in the particular contexts of the Secretary-General’s Reports, Resolution 1325 itself and, ultimately, the discursive terrain of the institutions that claim author-ity over the Resolution, mandated the failure of UNSCR 1325. In this context, this chapter has illustrated the ways in which the Resolution’s failure is documented and explained in the Secretary-General’s Reports, but also the ways in which the explanatory factors offered in the Reports are challenged by discourse-theoretic analysis. The following chapter considers the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325 and the possibilities for its implementation constructed within it, an implementation, it is argued above, which is highly problematic.

Chapter Four: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

The preceding chapter illustrates the ways in which concepts of the international, security, gender and violence have become sedimented into the evaluative frame used to appraise the efficacy of UNSCR 1325 as a tool for improving the situation of women in armed conflict. The analysis of the Secretary-General's reports of 2002 and 2004 shows how the reports work with the concepts around which UNSCR 1325 is organised and therefore offers a useful insight into the ways in which these concepts function to (re)produce particular social realities. This chapter seeks to problematise these organising concepts further through a discourse theoretical analysis of UNSCR 1325, which will in turn lead to an analysis of the competing narratives concerning the production of the Resolution in Chapter Five.

I use UNSCR 1325 as a vehicle for analysis because the Resolution is a site at which discourses of gender violence and international security come into contact. This chapter will explore these moments of contact more fully and investigate the ways in which the Resolution is produced through and is productive of these discourses. Through the descriptive reading I offer, I explore the meaning of UNSCR 1325 according to the "heroic practice" (Ashley 1988: 232) to which the reader must submit to make sense of the document. That is to say, the descriptive reading offers an interpretation of UNSCR 1325 as if the meanings of the concepts it employs (and (re)produces) are stable. The discourse-theoretic reading that follows offers a reconceptualisation of these concepts and the discourses into which they are interpellated drawing on evidence from the document itself. Finally, I argue that the continuities and ruptures in the organisational logics of the document are best illuminated through the discourse-theoretical reading that I offer. The conclusions that I draw from this analysis can then be considered in the context of the reconceptualisation of security and violence that this project seeks to offer.

About UNSCR 1325

When reading UNSCR 1325, it is evident that the Resolution appeals to existing documentation to provide the foundations for the actions it mandates.

The first three paragraphs of the Resolution outline the previous Security Council Resolutions, UN Declarations and Reports that are presented as instrumental to UNSCR 1325 (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). Furthermore, the Preamble and Articles 9 and 12 also mention “the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action” (ibid.), various international conventions (ibid.: Article 9) and previous UNSC Resolutions (ibid.: Article 12). The documentary heritage claimed by UNSCR 1325 is therefore represented as central to the Resolution in the text of the Resolution itself, and provides useful insights into the ways in which UNSCR 1325 draws together disparate documentation in an effort to provide a systematic overview of the issue of ‘women, peace and security’. For the purposes of this section, the documentation on which UNSCR 1325 draws is divided into three groups: UNSC Resolutions; international conventions and declarations; and statements, statutes and Reports.

The UNSC Resolutions referred to in UNSCR 1325 include “resolutions 1261 (1999) ... 1265 (1999) ... 1296 (2000) ... and 1314 (2000)” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), as well as UNSCR 1208 (1998) (UNSC 2000a: Article 12). These Resolutions relate, respectively, to children and armed conflict, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, children in armed conflict and the need to assist African states in maintaining the peace and security of refugee camps with particular reference to the “security needs of women, children and the elderly, who are the most vulnerable groups” (UNSC 1998: Preamble). Claiming these Resolutions as the foundations on which to build UNSCR 1325 “make it clear that the Council considers the protection of civilians, particularly women and children, to fall within its competence” (Otto 2004: 8).

UNSCR 1296, in particular, expresses “concern at the hardships borne by civilians during armed conflict, in particular as a result of acts of violence directed against them, especially women, children and other vulnerable groups” (UNSC 2000b: Preamble). In articulating a direct commitment to these previous Resolutions, UNSCR 1325 both draws on the support for the issues contained within these Resolutions and further legitimises these concerns as pertinent to “the maintenance of international peace and security” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). Diane Otto persuasively argues that “these resolutions [are] an attempt by the

Council to ... [develop] protections for some of those who have suffered as a result of the spread of militarism” (Otto 2004: 8) and it is true that UNSCR 1265 emphasises “the importance of preventing conflicts that could endanger international peace and security” in the context of a Resolution addressing ‘the protection of civilians in armed conflict’ (UNSC 1999: Preamble). However, these earlier Resolutions “seem[ed] to foreclose the possibility that the Council might recognise women’s agency in their own protection and in the resolution of armed conflict” (Otto 2004: 8-9), and it is this shortcoming that UNSCR 1325 seeks to redress.

The conventions and declarations cited in UNSCR 1325 also offer an insight into the formation of UNSCR 1325. The historic conventions to which the Resolution refers in Article 9 are “the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ... the Refugee Convention of 1951 ...the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979 ... and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989” (UNSC 2000a: Article 9). Taken together, these conventions form a strong platform from which UNSCR 1325 can challenge current provisions for ‘women, peace and security’. For example, “article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that-: ‘women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault’. The Convention contains no corresponding obligation to investigate or punish individuals in the event that women are not protected” (UNIFEM 2005). CEDAW and the Optional Protocol of 1999, however, can be seen to redress this lack, as the Convention demands that “States commit themselves ... to establish[ing] tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women” (UN Division for the Advancement of Women 2005).

The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, “consensus documents that governments negotiated and agreed to at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in 1995” (UNIFEM 2005), are mentioned in the second paragraph of the Preamble of UNSCR 1325, following on from the listings of the UNSC Resolutions upon which UNSCR 1325 builds. The Declaration explicitly commits to “enhancing further the advancement and empowerment of women all over the world, and agree[s] that this requires urgent action” (UN Division for

the Advancement of Women 2005), and the Platform for Action lists six strategic objectives in relation to women and armed conflict.⁶³ The objectives relate closely to the actions mandated in UNSCR 1325, which are discussed further below, focussing on representation of women at decision making levels in post-conflict reconstruction, participation of women in conflict resolution and the protection of women during periods of armed conflict (ibid.). From investigating the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, albeit briefly, the reasons for giving these documents textual priority in UNSCR 1325 are clear – both documents connect very well with the recommendations of the Resolution.

A further set of documents that UNSCR 1325 mentions is the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). The Windhoek Declaration states that “[i]n order to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations, the principles of gender equality must permeate the entire mission ... from peacekeeping, reconciliation and peace-building, towards a situation of political stability” (United Nations General Assembly 2000), and the Plan for Action addresses ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’.⁶⁴ The “useful, concrete recommendations” (UNIFEM 2005) made in the Plan of Action clearly relate to the mandate of UNSCR 1325 and the stated importance of “mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble).

Two remaining documents to which UNSCR 1325 refers are the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (UNSC 2000a: Article 9) and Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations (ibid.: Article 14). According to UNIFEM, “[t]he Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is historic with respect to violence against women in armed conflict as well as during peacetime in that it includes a series of core crimes of sexual and gender violence” (2005).⁶⁵ Including reference to the Rome Statute in UNSCR 1325 indicates the recognition that crimes of “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual

⁶³ The full text of the Beijing Platform for Action can be accessed at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/index.html>.

⁶⁴ The full text of the Namibia Plan of Action can be accessed at <http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/Windhoek%20Declaration.htm>.

⁶⁵ The full text of the relevant Articles of the Rome Statute can be accessed at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm.

violence of comparable gravity” (International Criminal Court 1999) impact negatively on efforts to provide for ‘women, peace and security’ and must therefore be addressed. UNSCR 1325 also appeals to the President of the Security Council as well as the Charter of the United Nations for institutional legitimacy, recalling the statement “on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women’s Rights and International Peace (International Women’s Day) of 8 March 2000” in which the President emphasises “the importance of promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes while addressing armed or other conflicts” (UNSC 2000c).

As is evident from this exploration, UNSCR 1325 recognises an influential documentary heritage and also enjoys a significant degree of legitimacy conferred through reference to the historic documents mentioned above. The ways in which the documents mentioned in this section have been drawn together to provide the foundation for a UN Security Council Resolution that addresses ‘women, peace and security’ is the focus of the following section. I provide a descriptive reading before proceeding to conduct an alternative discourse-theoretical reading in the third section. Further analysis of the ways in which UNSCR 1325 got to be written in the way that it was, including analysis of the discursive terrains of the institutions that claim influence over the Resolution, is the focus of Chapter Five.

Understanding UNSCR 1325: A Descriptive Reading

UNSCR 1325 is available in 65 different languages (PeaceWomen 2005) and is acknowledged as “a historic statement, with significant implications” (Naraghi-Anderlini 2000). The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) published a document entitled ‘Security Council Resolution 1325 Annotated and Explained’⁶⁶ to assist with the reading of the Resolution and its uses as an advocacy and policy tool. The Preamble to UNSCR 1325 is extensive, not only detailing the documentary heritage of the Resolution, but also contextualising the Resolution and providing a strong foundation for the mandates contained within it. The Preamble outlines a commitment to

⁶⁶ Available at http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/Annotated_1325.pdf.

“Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble, emphasis in original), which Otto argues “has provided important new leverage for local women’s groups to claim a role in peace negotiations and post-conflict decision-making” (Otto 2004: 1). Paying particular attention to the need to “mainstream a gender perspective” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) into peacekeeping and conflict resolutions, the text of the Resolution makes an explicit statement about the importance of putting in place “effective institutional arrangements to guarantee [the] protection and full participation in ... peace processes” of women and girls (ibid.).

In addition to the information contained in the Preamble, UNSCR 1325 mandates certain actions to be undertaken by “Member States” (UNSC 2000a: Article 1) that are deemed necessary in order to address the issues raised when the question of ‘Women and peace and security’ is considered.⁶⁷ The first recommendation in 1325 relates directly to the issue of representation, stating that there is a need “to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions” (ibid.: Article 1). The actions mandated in Articles 1 and 3 relate to the representation of women, suggesting that this is a priority of UNSCR 1325. This emphasis is in keeping with the Resolution claiming the Beijing Platform for Action as part of its heritage, as “the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the Beijing +5 virtual conference in 2000 made women’s political representation a priority” (Jaquette 2003: 332).

It is, however, recognised that sufficient representation will be severely impeded by a lack of institutional support for women’s access to decision-making mechanisms, as the Resolution calls for an increase in “voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts” (ibid.: Article 7). The call for institutional support mirrors a concern in UNSCR 1325 about the structural issues of gendered discrimination and oppression that “impact ... on durable peace and reconciliation” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), although the emphasis in the Resolution is on achieving representation,

⁶⁷ This is the title of UNSCR 1325 as detailed on the UN website. See <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>.

presumably with a view to achieving a ‘critical mass’ and thus transforming the institutional structures. “Generally, the figure set for critical mass of women is about 30% of a legislature; ... that was the threshold set by the United Nations in 1995 as the necessary minimum of women representatives needed for women to be fairly represented” (Lovenduski 2001: 744).

The focus of Articles 2 and 4 is participation of women, differentiated from representation by the emphasis on “role and contribution” (UNSC 2000a: Article 4). The importance of gender mainstreaming – or “incorporat[ing] a gender perspective” (ibid.: Article 5) is also mentioned; it is suggested that providing “training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women” (ibid.: Article 6) will help facilitate both representation and participation. Recent research suggests that this assumption is sustainable, as “a critical mass of women in peacekeeping missions fosters confidence in local populations, enhances peace negotiations and breaks down traditional views of women in local communities, thus affecting the participation of local women in decision-making positions in the post-conflict phase” (United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations cited in True 2003: 373; see also Bhatta 2001: 22-25).

UNSCR 1325 also focuses on issues of protection (UNSC 2000a: Articles 8-10), both in terms of human rights and in terms of “[t]he special needs of women and girls” (UNSC 2000a: Article 8a). In situations of armed conflict, UNSCR 1325 “[c]alls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence” (ibid.: Article 10), and, in doing so, builds on the mandates concerning gendered violence laid out in the Resolutions claimed as its documentary heritage, as described above. These recommendations draw on a particular vision of security that negotiates “the Hobbesian premise that security and human rights must be traded off against each other” (Bahdi 2003: 44), and specifically implicate states in the provision of security for women. Furthermore, UNSCR 1325 discusses the need for “States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes ... including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls” (UNSC 2000a: Article 11), as well as the need for gender-sensitive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Concluding with the invitation to the Secretary-General to organise the Reports analysed in the preceding chapter, UNSCR 1325 offers a coherent and convincing account of actions that both can and should be undertaken by the member states of the United Nations in order to ameliorate “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (UNSC 2000a: Article 16). Article 18 states that the Security Council “[d]ecides to remain actively seized of the matter” (ibid.: Article 18), which, according to UNIFEM, “indicates that the Security Council has recognised or elaborated the relevance of the issue to its particular mandate and responsibilities, and it remains on the agenda” (2005). Given that the issue ‘remains on the agenda’, it is necessary to interrogate the concepts around which it is organised, as these concepts will have further implications for the lived experiences of individuals affected by these issues. Therefore, in the next section of this chapter, I offer a discourse-theoretical reading that explores alternative ways in which to examine UNSCR 1325, taking into consideration the organisational concepts of gender, violence, security and the international.

Problematising UNSCR 1325: A Discourse-Theoretical Reading

As mentioned above, given my analytical strategies and theoretical framework, there are problems inherent in fixing the ‘meaning’ of UNSCR 1325 and assuming that this meaning is stable either historically or culturally. The politics of a United Nations organisation such as UNIFEM effectively translating the Resolution and thereby attempting to assert author-ity over its meaning is problematic for the purposes of a discourse-theoretical analysis. It assumed transparency of meaning and fixity of intention in a manner that is unsustainable, but for the purposes of establishing a descriptive reading, it proved useful as a way of illustrating what the Resolution ‘means’ if the readership is prepared to submit to the “heroic practice” mentioned above.

This is not to suggest that either the Resolution or the annotations and explanations offered by UNIFEM are deliberately misleading. Rather, it is to draw attention to the ways in which the Resolution is organised around particular discourses of international security and gender violence. Therefore, this section proceeds with a discourse-theoretical analysis that seeks to examine the ways in

which UNSCR 1325 is organised around particular conceptualisations of gender, violence, the international and security, in much the same way as the analysis of the Secretary-General's Reports proceeded in Chapter Three. These concepts are organised into intelligible discourses of gender violence and international security, as explained in Chapter Two, and these discourses are (re)produced in the Resolution. The organisation logics of these discourses contributes to the violent reproduction of both gender and the international as a spatial and conceptual domain, a claim that is explored more fully in the final section of this chapter.

Gender

I begin this analysis with a discussion of the ways in which 'women' are represented in UNSCR 1325, rather than exploring articulations of 'gender'. 'Gender' does not feature in the text until the end of the Preamble, and the implications of this will be discussed further below. In the Preamble of UNSCR 1325, "women and children" are positioned as "the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict" (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). In addition to the problematic representation of women as inherently associated with children,⁶⁸ this predication draws authority from the implication, evidenced in the phrase 'the vast majority', that this articulation is based on empirical research. Given the dominance of positivist, scientific accounts of social reality within both academia and policy-making, the claim to legitimacy on these grounds is understandable, but it is nonetheless difficult to sustain. For all the reasons that post-positivist researchers have detailed, the assumptions inherent in this type of research, appealing to a legitimacy founded on a truth-claim based in the 'value-neutral facts' of numbers, are problematic.

Moreover, researchers such as Adam Jones (2000) have argued that it is also empirically verifiable that "non-combatant men have been and continue to be the most frequent target of mass killing and genocidal slaughter, as well as a host of lesser atrocities and abuses" (2000: 186). Drawing on examples from Kosovo, Kashmir, Colombia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, Jones constructs an

⁶⁸ The discursive function and ramifications of this subject-positioning are explored in Chapter Two.

argument contrary to that presented in UNSCR 1325: “the most vulnerable and consistently targeted population group, through time and around the world today, is non-combatant men” (ibid.: 191). Ultimately, it should not be the case that ‘women’ or ‘men’ have their needs met because they suffer, quantifiably, more; to be forced to live at risk of violence is wrong.

While not disputing the harsh realities of the lived experiences of all of the individuals world-wide who are ‘adversely affected by armed conflict’, there are problems inherent in basing these demands on a sliding scale of suffering. If women are ‘the vast majority of those affected by armed conflict’, this invites a “serious attempt to evaluate their suffering by comparison with men” (Jones 2002: 75). This is untenable and, in my view, counterproductive. Primarily, the idea that careful research on gendered violence could degenerate into point-scoring over whether women or men suffer more is positively worrying. My research joins in the demands for considered policy formulation and implementation that would ameliorate the situations of individuals and communities, whether they are identified as, or comprised of, men or women or somewhere in between. It is, however, premised on the assumption that it is necessary to pay attention to the ways in which “[t]he imagery through which the protection of civilians has manifested on the U.N. agenda remains profoundly gendered” (Carpenter 2005: 327). Thus, this research investigates the ways in which violence reproduces gender, not just as an organising conceptual category, but also as a lived identity – something that affects both ‘men’ and ‘women’.

The positioning of women in the text of UNSCR 1325 following that discussed above allows me to identify three constructions, each of which position the subject slightly differently. These constructions are, in the order in which they are represented in the document: women in need of protection (submission); women as informal political organisers (participation); and women as formal political actors (representation) (UNSC 2000a: Preamble).⁶⁹ Each of these articulations will be discussed below, in reverse order. Importantly, however, despite textual representation of ‘gender’, there is no explicit positioning of men

⁶⁹ These distinctions are analytical, in that representation entails participation and vice versa. I disaggregate the two in order to draw attention to the different spatial and political environs assumed appropriate for each activity, and to avoid repeating ‘informal representation and participation’ and ‘formal representation and participation’ throughout.

in UNSCR 1325 – that is, the word ‘men’ is not used in the document. This follows what Robert Connell suggests about “discussions of women’s exclusions from power and decision making [where] men are *implicitly* present as the power holders” (2005: 1806, emphasis added). There are constructions of masculinity, both represented and absented, which structure the conceptual organisation of gender within UNSCR 1325 to which I return below.

As mentioned in the previous section, Articles 1 and 3 address issues of representation (UNSC 2000a). The issue of representation is articulated as presence: “representation of women at all decision-making levels” (UNSC 2000a: Article 1). And in this context, the more representation, the better: the Secretary-General is thus urged “to appoint more women as special representatives” (ibid.: Article 3). Rwanda is an example of a ‘post-conflict’ area mentioned in the Reports analysed in the previous chapter (UNSC 2004a: 55-56) that are offered as examples of good practice. In a country “where females constitute more than 60 per cent of the post-genocide population, women won 49 per cent of parliamentary seats in the election of late 2003” (Zuckerman and Greenberg 2005: 71). However, as other scholars have noted, despite the institution of legal measures aimed at reducing the levels of sexual violence, “data show that violence of a sexual nature in Rwanda is far from decreasing ... [and] ... access to resources remains a vital challenge ... and a real source of tension between men and women” (Gervais 2004: 307-312; see also El-Bushra 2000).

Achieving a critical mass of women as a percentage of their male counterparts in decision-making positions does not necessarily lead to manifest improvements in the lived experiences of other individuals in that context. There is a substantial body of academic literature that discusses the concept of ‘critical mass’ in relation to the representation of women in formal political arenas. As Sarah Childs and Mona-Lena Krook note, “growing ranks of critics ... suggest that the time has come to examine the usefulness of this concept for understanding women’s legislative impact, as higher proportions of women do not always translate into gains for women as a group” (2006: 21, see also Squires 1999: 204-216; F. Mackay 2004; Mansbridge 2003). In UNSCR 1235, the complexity of these debates is glossed over, with the Resolution subscribing to a

somewhat simplistic notion of representation that sustains an essentialist reading of political agenda from biological sex.

The notion, “given the current mechanisms of political representation, that representatives who happen to be women will be able to represent women” is by no means universally accepted (Squires 1999: 205). UNSCR 1325 proceeds as if such a fixing of interests to identities is not only possible but a reasonable basis for peace negotiations and policy making. This assumption is based on an elision of descriptive and substantive representation (see Squires 2005). That is, UNSCR 1325 assumes that these two dominant constructions of representation that the feminist literature in this field addresses can be unproblematically equated. Whereas descriptive representation merely “denotes presence” (F. Mackay 2004: 100), substantive representation refers “to the congruence between representatives’ actions and the interests of the represented” (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005: 408; see also Mansbridge 2003, 1999). The two constructions are analytically and practically separable, and recognising this leads to the understanding that a purely quantitative increase in women’s representation will not necessary effect political change in formal institutions. “[I]t is necessary to understand under what conditions change can be expected to occur” (Lovenduski and Norris 2003: 89).

For the purposes of this analysis, I have made a distinction between representations of participation and representation in UNSCR 1325. Preceding Articles 1-4, women are represented in the document as having an “important role ... in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble); this articulation is textually prior to the positioning of women as political actors and the need for their “full involvement” (ibid.). This construction of participation is organised around the notion of women acting as women – that is, there are objectively identifiable women who can be classified on the grounds of their shared characteristics and whose behaviour will be conditioned in accordance with these characteristics. In contrast to the feminist insight that “gender-atypical work” may lead to gender-transgressive behaviours (F. Mackay 2004: 111), UNSCR 1325 perpetuates a representation of women that inscribes an essential link between womanhood and “the prevention and resolution of conflicts and ... peacebuilding” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). Such a

construction relies on the recognition of women as nurturers (read: mothers) and supporters of peace, inherently pacifist. Sara Ruddick calls this construction the iconic figure of the *mater dolorosa*, described as “[t]he representative heroine of maternal peacefulness ... [who] as she grieves for her particular loss ... mourns war itself” (1989: 142).

One of the most famous representations of women organising as mothers was during the reign of General Jorge Rafael Videla’s military junta in Argentina from 1976 onwards. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo maintained a conservative representation of motherhood, restricting their protest to the recovery of the disappeared children, *el niños desaparecidos*, and denouncing the authority of the military regime. “In articulating priorities and demands within the context of motherhood, the Madres [Mothers] reproduced discourses of femininity and female activity which resonated through Argentine history” (Radcliffe 1993: 110). Their collective identity even resonated with the junta’s glorification of family values and the corollary idealisation of the figure of the mother, making it difficult for the junta to use myths about motherhood to discipline the women. However, it also prevented the Mothers from challenging the dominant gender order in Argentina as it would have undermined the foundations of their representation.

A discourse that positions women as agential in the way described above could be considered to be in tension with the third representation of women in UNSCR 1325, as in need of protection. In the context of political participation and representation, women are positioned as agents, capable of protecting others through female empowerment and maternal sacrifice. Such agency would seem to slip from the articulation of “the protection, rights and the particular needs of women” (UNSC 2000a: Article 6). “One of the main problems in associating women and children in international relations is that it feeds the nationalist discourse that defines women mainly as the cultural bearers of society” (Puechguirbal 2004: 11). This perspective is closely related to the maternalist discourses that see ‘women’, by virtue of their association with motherhood, as ‘naturally’ more nurturing, peaceful and protective – not, in this instance, of the body, but of the body politic. In addition to fixing ‘womenandchildren’ as the eternally protected, this representation also functions to define “men ... [as]

responsible for protecting women and children, as well as the motherland” (ibid., emphasis in original).

However, UNSCR 1325, through its articulation of ‘women and peace and security’ and its claiming a heritage in the UNSC Resolutions that affect civilians and children, as discussed above, positions this latter conceptualisation of women as the centralised signifier in its discourses of gender. Women are part of “women and children” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), “are targeted by combatants” and therefore implicitly not combatants (ibid.), women have “special needs” (ibid.) and require “protection” (ibid.), particularly “from gender-based violence ... rape and other forms of sexual abuse” (UNSC 2000a: Article 10). Overall, women are “linked by their gender through their vulnerability to violence” in this representation (Bahdi 2003: 46) and therefore fixed as vulnerable.

The failure to disaggregate different performances of femininity that are represented in UNSCR 1325 and the corollary differential impact on the lived experiences of various subjects diminishes the potential of the Resolution to address the issues of ‘women and peace and security’ to which it pertains. Woman-in-need-of-protection is the centralised signifier around which other articulations of femininity are articulated. Thus, women-as-informal-organisers and women-as-formal-actors are still, primarily, essentially women-in-need-of-protection. While sensitive research can be conducted on the basis of recognising “a subjectivity that gives agency to the individual while at the same time placing her within “particular discursive configurations”” (de Lauretis cited in Alcoff 1988: 425), reproducing these essentialising gender stereotypes is counterproductive and counterintuitive. As Caroline Sweetman notes, “[t]his is controversial for proponents of women’s rights, since it is tempting to believe that women are intrinsically more likely than men to find non-violent means of conflict resolution” (2005: 3), but courting such controversy is necessary if it is the processes that reproduce gender difference that are under critical scrutiny, rather than proceeding with a critique that takes difference as a priori.

‘Gender’ is articulated in UNSCR 1325 as a “perspective” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) and also as a prefix to “-sensitive training efforts” (ibid.: Article 7) and “-based violence” (ibid.: Article 10). Furthermore, there are “gender

considerations” (ibid.: Article 15) and “gender dimensions” (ibid.: Article 16). These constructions articulate gender as a variable, as opposed to a power relation or a discursive performance. Treating gender as a variable is premised on the assumption that gender can be treated as an analytical device that can be measured, controlled or manipulated in social science research. For example, taking gender as a variable in the study of the impact of armed conflict would rely upon gathering data on the experiences of armed conflict and disaggregating this data by gender identity in order to allow for the construction of statements such as “women ... account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). Associating ‘gender’ with ‘women’ in UNSC 1325, as discussed in Chapter Three, further entrenches a concept of gender as a ‘women’s issue’.

Articulating gender as relational has proved problematic in policy discourse. “Although many institutions have renamed projects by changing the word ‘women’ to ‘gender’, their actions do not uniformly demonstrate a corresponding shift in behaviour or gender equality outcomes” (Staudt 2003: 49). Gender mainstreaming is seen as a mechanism for achieving this shift, “the multi-faceted project of using gender analysis in addressing the mainstream agenda” (Ackerley 2001: 317; see also Pankhurst 2004: 33-38). This is not to assume that ‘the mainstream agenda’ is not already gendered but to investigate the ways in which policies have differential impacts on women and men and the relations between them. Given this acknowledgement, it is surprising that UNSCR 1325 does not mention men while addressing the issue of ‘women and peace and security’ – ‘man’ is very much the absent presence. ‘He’, however, is represented, embodying the subject of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSC 2000a: Articles 2-5, 16, 17). UNSCR 1325 thus articulates a narrative of masculinity in which the Secretary-General – ‘he’ – is “urge[d] ... encourage[d] ... invite[d] ... request[ed]” (ibid.) to protect the ‘women’ with whom the document is concerned, from the violence that is discussed in the following section.

Violence

In much the same way as the articulation of gender in UNSCR 1325 relies on a discursive link to ‘women’, textual priority is given to the representation of violence as conflict. Conflict is differentiated in UNSCR 1325 as “armed conflict” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), which suggests that there may be types of conflict that are unarmed. These latter forms of conflict are predicated as outside of the remit of the Resolution, although the notion of violence as structural is represented, an issue to which I will return below. Initially, however, it is important to problematise the concept of violence constructed as ‘armed conflict’, as representing violence *as* conflict severs the signifying links to pain, physicality and specificity of experience that ‘violence’ can sustain. Donna Pankhurst notes that “no straightforward technical definition ... is likely to encapsulate the complexities of contemporary conflicts in much of the world today” (2004: 9). Even with the discursive modifier ‘armed’, representing violence as conflict “entails a lack of clarity about what exactly is being discussed” (ibid.).⁷⁰ My research suggests that what ‘is being discussed’ is violence, as explicated in Chapter Two. Retaining the terminology of violence allows for the positioning of subjects and objects within discursive contexts that in turn allows for the investigation of the specificities of those contexts in relation to violence.

Conflict is seen in UNSCR 1325 to create “refugees and internally displaced persons” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) and targeting of civilians by “combatants and armed elements” (ibid.) is seen as a barrier to “durable peace and reconciliation” (ibid.). The agents of conflict are therefore ‘combatants and armed elements’, articulated in opposition to “civilians, particularly women and children” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). This functions to deny the possibility that civilians can be agents of ‘armed conflict’, and is in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. As Dörmann states, “under customary international law, civilians are entitled to general protection against the dangers arising from military operations; in particular they may not be made the object of an attack” (2003: 46). UNSCR 1325 acknowledges that conflict does not

⁷⁰ It is, however, common in literature on political violence to use ‘violence’ and ‘conflict’ interchangeably. See, for example, Jabri 1996; Burton 1997.

necessarily respect the rule of law in its treatment of targeting of civilians (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) but also reproduces the division between civilian and combatant, which functions to remove civilians from the agency of conflict: “civilians do not have the right to participate directly in hostilities” (Dörmann 2003: 46). Civilians, therefore, are the broader group in need of protection, of which women are a ‘particular’ part. In this construction, violence is still something that happens to women, as discussed in Chapter Three.

Using ‘conflict’ to represent violence, as mentioned above, is problematic. Not only does the language of conflict act to position the materiality of violence assumed by UNSCR 1325 at one remove, “there is very little discussion in much of the writing on ‘conflict analysis’ or ‘conflict resolution’ on the impact of certain types of social relations on the specific forms of violence” (Pankhurst 2004: 10). Furthermore, “the question hardly arises as to how or why this ‘conflict’ situation is different from what is normal” (ibid.). As Kurtz and Turpin eloquently argue, “[t]he tendency to see violence as the consequence of aberrant behaviour committed by deviant individuals at the margins of society obscures the central roles violence plays at the very foundations of the social order” (cited in McIlwhaine 1999: 460). From a slightly different perspective, it can be argued that “assumptions about the nature of internal conflict – as systemic failure and as defying rational explanation – ignore the considerable objective (and subjective) rationality of employing political violence” (Jackson 2001: 66). This is an issue to which I will return in the section focussing on the international.

Those that put forward arguments concerning the centrality of violence as an organising concept in society often “draw on Johan Galtung’s work on ‘structural’ violence, extending the understanding of violence from physical to psychological hurt, which in turn includes alienation, repression and deprivation” (cited in McIlwhaine 1999: 455). It is evident that this conceptualisation of violence also structures UNSCR 1325; the attention paid to the issues of participation and representation of women discussed above draws attention to the ways in which ‘women’ as a group may be alienated or deprived as well as suffering physical violence (see also Bahdi 2003: 54). However, while the Secretary-General’s reports discussed in the previous chapter explicitly articulate

“cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls” (UNSC 2002a: 5), in UNSCR 1325 these ‘cultures of violence’ are implicit, constructed through the discourse of gender violence articulated in the Resolution. Many of the critiques levelled at the Reports in Chapter Three, however, are relevant to the discussion of the representation of violence in UNSCR 1325.

As mentioned above, violence as represented in UNSCR 1325, in particular gendered violence, happens to women: “all parties to armed conflict [are called on] to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse” (UNSC 2000a: Article 10). While this is unsurprising given the elision of women and gender, it remains problematic. Fixing women as victims of violence and making women the referent object of discourses of ‘gender violence’ functions to reproduce a conceptualisation of both gender and violence that is theoretically and practically dangerous. Furthermore, giving textual priority to the articulation of violence as ‘gender-based’ not only obscures the possibility that all forms of violence may contribute to the violent reproduction of gender, but also relegates “all other forms of violence” (UNSC 2000a: Article 10) to a vague catch-all term that cannot adequately capture “the great hardships, deprivation of adequate food, shelter, health care and education” and danger of imminent fatality experienced in situations of violence (McKay 2005: 22).

In the context of prevention of and retribution for violences experienced in ‘armed conflict’, UNSCR 1325 equates peace with a lack of armed conflict (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). This construction is discussed further in the section addressing the predication of security in the Resolution. “Durable peace and reconciliation” (ibid.) will prevent violence, and the responsibility for achieving this peace is allocated to the United Nations Security Council (ibid.). It is therefore necessary to investigate how violence is constructed in conjunction with the international as a concept in UNSCR 1325, particularly in relation to the “maintenance of international peace and security” (ibid.) and “the responsibility of all States” (UNSC 2000a: Article 11) to address the issue of violence, gendered or otherwise, as experienced by women in armed conflict.

International

In the first paragraph of UNSCR 1325, there is mention of “the United Nations Day for Women’s Rights and International Peace” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble). The discursive link between women’s rights and peace is (re)produced through the articulations of gender and violence discussed above, and the conceptualisation of security in the Resolution that I discuss below. In this section, however, I explore the implications of forging a discursive link between the international and ‘peace’, as well as investigating the ways in which the conceptualisation of gender evidenced in UNSCR 1325 is articulated in conjunction with a particular conceptualisation of the ‘international’. In the second paragraph of the Resolution, UNSCR 1325 draws on “the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled ‘Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century’” (ibid.). Colliding these two representations of the international constructs the international as a domain in which securing women’s rights can secure peace and the United Nations, as an international institution, as being concerned with ‘gender equality’. This functions to position the international as a subject in opposition to the conflict zones of the implicitly domestic sphere. The politics in maintaining a conceptualisation of violence that is somehow spatially bounded is extremely problematic.

While the “increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions” is called for (UNSC 2000a: Article 1), the issues of informal and formal participation and representation of women discussed above are predominantly articulated through association with the realm of the domestic, as opposed to the international. “[P]revention and resolution of conflicts and ... peace-building” happens in conflict zones (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), as distinct from the domain of the international. In calling for women’s “equal participation and full involvement” (ibid.) in these processes, women are tied to the domestic. Women are expected to organise as women in the processes of nation-building, securing the boundaries of the state and sedimenting national loyalties, a conceptualisation

that has been thoroughly problematised by feminist scholars of women in nationalist movements.⁷¹

The uneasy theorising of feminist and nationalist discourses in the context of conflict and post-conflict situations is not represented in UNSCR 1325, although it is mentioned briefly above. It is assumed that women have an “important role” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) to play in the construction of nationhood post-conflict and that this will somehow lead to higher valorisation of women’s rights in ‘peacetime’. However, “[a]ll nationalist ideologies are gendered: most commonly, women are the symbol of the nation, men its agents” (Whitehead et al. 1993: 1). The responsibility of women in nationalist discourse is primarily as mothers, with a duty not only physically to reproduce the nation, but also to reproduce national ideals and values. “It is through your voice that the child first hears of the world around him or her. It is through your eyes that the child first sees the world around them, and it is the values in your hearts which are first conveyed to the child” (Buthelezi speaking to the Inkatha Women’s Brigade in 1983, cited in Hassim 1993: 16).

Furthermore, in terms of retribution and reconciliation, the international (community) allows Member States – or rather, the elites in power in these states – to perpetuate the (re)production of unequal gendered relations of power. Through the articulation of circumstances where it may not be “appropriate” to “include a gender component” in peacekeeping operations (UNSC 2000a: Article 5) and may not be “feasible” to exclude crimes of “sexual and other violence against women and girls” from amnesty provisions (ibid.: Article 11), UNSCR 1325 constructs a concept of the international that is the negotiator of gender equality, in opposition to the conflict-torn domestic domains that may have more pressing agenda. This concept of the international is thoroughly gendered, assuming that the power relations between individuals are so naturalised that it is possible to somehow separate gender from the bodies of the peacekeepers or the institutions of amnesty provision. Not only does this lead to the words “‘Not now, later’ ... ring[ing] in the ears of many nationalist women” (Enloe 2000: 62)

⁷¹ For feminist discussion of nations and nationalism, see, *inter alia*, Parker (ed.) 1992; Thapar 1993; Elshtain 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997; Cockburn 1998; Pettman 1999; Cockburn 2000; Cusack 2000.

but it also supports a conventional narrative of sovereignty that itself naturalises the gendered reproduction of the international/domestic divide.

This narrative of sovereignty has been thoroughly problematised by scholars of International Relations (see, *inter alia*, Weber 1995; Paul 1999; Walker 1991), in much the same way as the international/domestic divide has been challenged. Youngs, for example, writes that

[t]he series of concepts, state-as-actor, sovereignty and anarchy, which provide the conceptual architecture for mainstream state-centric thought, affirm the importance of boundaries, but because of the *given* nature of the state they do not explore the full implications of those boundaries (1999: 25-26, emphasis in original).

UNSCR 1325 appeals to a host of international provisions and conventions, as discussed in the section that contextualises the Resolution, to construct a sense of legitimacy for the international (community) represented in the Resolution and the boundaries that this community inscribes onto the social world (UNSC 2000a: Preamble; Articles 9, 12). In the context of theorising intervention, Cynthia Weber has convincingly argued that “it is the international community that clarifies difficult interpretive questions about where the boundary of sovereign authority lies, [and] where sovereign authority resides” (1995: 16), an argument that is easily sustainable in the context of analysing UNSCR 1325.

While both ‘States’ and the ‘Security Council’ – an international institution – have responsibilities, according to UNSCR 1325 (UNSC 2000a: Preamble; Article 11), ultimate authority over “the maintenance of international peace and security” (*ibid.*: Preamble) resides in the Security Council, and therefore, in the international sphere. As mentioned in Chapter Three, and discussed in the context of the discourse of ‘international security’ in Chapter Two, this assertion of the international (community) as somehow removed from conflict and occupying a morally privileged position is inherently problematic in terms of the reproduction of gendered state identities and the international as a conceptual domain that functions to provide security. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of security (re)produced in UNSCR 1325 should be investigated, to fully explore the types of security, from what and for whom, being provided.

Security

Security is initially articulated in UNSCR 1325 in the context of the United Nations Security Council. Given the conceptualisation of the international discussed above, and its discursive fidelity to the discourse of ‘international security’, positioning security in this way suggests that security is indeed something that can be achieved, rather than a discourse. Security is associated with ‘peace’ in the title of the Resolution and continues to be constructed in this way throughout the document (UNSC 2000a: *passim*). Meanwhile, the antithesis of security is represented as “armed conflict”, so security is marked by the absence of such conflict (*ibid.*: Preamble). This is inevitably problematic, as conflict resolution in the context of the conceptualisations of gender, violence and the international explored above can only ever provide a partial peace, a “peace that neglects ... a large part of the community, or that supports, reconstructs, and in some cases strengthens the inequalities in the power structures” that (re)produce community (A. Mackay 2004: 107).

In addition to the inadequacy – and theoretical tautology – of defining conflict as the absence of security and security as the absence of conflict,⁷² this conceptualisation fails completely to address the issues of structural violence discussed above. Over two decades ago, Enloe explored the issue of militarisation and the various impacts of militarism, arguing that scholars and activists must “put militarisation into a larger socio-economic context, rather than thinking within the conventionally narrow frameworks of foreign policy or ‘national security’” (1983: 207). UNSCR 1325, in addressing the “special needs” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) “of women and girls during and after conflicts” (*ibid.*, *emphasis added*), precludes consideration of the ways in which the international system of states, according to the logic of the conventional narrative of sovereignty, allows for multiple forms of violence to structure and (re)produce the lived experiences of individuals the world over.

Furthermore, ‘women’ are invited to be complicit in the construction of this world order through their efforts in nation-building and conflict resolution.

⁷² More sophisticated theorising of violence and conflict is offered in Jabri 1996; Schmidt and Schröder (eds) 2002; Giles and Hyndman 2004.

What Alexander Murphy refers to as “the sovereign territorial ideal” (1996: 83) has functioned to displace questions of identity, context and the disaggregation of security discourses from studies of security, meaning that “the manner in which the identities of nation-states themselves are (re)constituted by these processes” are absented from conventional analysis of security, sovereignty and nation-building (Varadarajan 2004: 322).⁷³ Peacekeeping, which UNSCR 1325 articulates as being of central significance to peace negotiations (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), has received sustained critical scrutiny on precisely these grounds: “peacekeeping shares with colonialism the capacity to reconstruct identities. Peacekeeping not only ‘keeps the peace’ – that is, ensures the containment of conflict – but it also configures race, gender, class and culture” (Agathangelou and Ling 2003: 141). In the context of this research, it is not even entirely appropriate to suggest that peacekeeping ‘keeps the peace’, subscribing as this does to a notion that peace is the absence of conflict not violence.

Conceptualising the state as the provider of security in UNSCR 1325 reproduces these tensions, as well as reproducing “the gendered logic of the masculine role of protector” that constructs “a security state that wages war abroad and expects obedience and loyalty at home” (Young 2003: 2). ‘Member States’ are exhorted to “ensure increased representation of women” (UNSC 2000a: Article 1), “provide candidates to the Secretary-General” in order that ‘he’ might appoint more women to office (ibid.: Article 3), “train ... on the protection, rights and particular needs of women” and “increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts” (ibid.: Articles 6-7, emphasis added). Women are expected to participate. Drawing attention to the voluntary nature of support for ‘gender-sensitive’ initiative further entrenches a narrative of sovereignty in which “a government ... exercises substantial authority within its own territory” (Murphy 1996: 81) and this is taken to be unproblematic – both the assumption that it occurs, and the further assumption that this is a valid mode of political organisation. But as Weber asks, “how can this community be said to exist, and how can the state be said to speak on its behalf?” (1995: 6).

⁷³ Latha Varadarajan’s analysis focuses on the ways in which mainstream discourses of security fail to centralise the investigation of neoliberal economic processes, and offers a convincing account of the partiality of such approaches.

Moreover, the question of what the state is assumed to provide must also be considered. Security, drawing on particular conceptualisations of gender, violence and the international represented in UNSCR 1325, is conceptualised as the absence of conflict. In the context of ‘women and peace and security’, security is articulated as protection. The “rights of women and girls” need protecting (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), it is necessary to “guarantee their [women and girls] protection” (ibid.), and ‘Member States’ need “guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and particular needs of women” (ibid.: Article 6). Parties to conflict need “to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence” (ibid.: Article 10) Quite apart from the construction of women as eternal victim of violence that is by definition gender-ed in this articulation, the discourse of protection reaffirms a crude rendering of the state as “man writ large and therefore implicitly endowed, conceptually at least, with the capacities of decision-making” (Youngs 1999: 25). In a hierarchical organisation of ‘sovereign’ states, through a reworking of the discourse of ‘national security’ that captures this vision of state-as-man-as-actor, the discourse of ‘international security’ articulates a vision of security through cooperation and thus secures through this discourse of security an international system in which inequality is entrenched.

The processes of nation building, evoked in UNSCR 1325 through the predication of “peace-building”, “reconciliation” and “conflict prevention and resolution” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) as central to issues of ‘women and peace and security’, cannot be taken as unproblematic. Rather, it is often the case that such processes, as mentioned above, rely on and thus function to (re)produce inequality and difference, not least in the context of gender. Furthermore, “regimes ... promote exclusionary rather than inclusionary nation building projects ... and ... some violence inevitably accompanies early stages of state making” (Ayoob 2002: 38). The point has been well made by Anna Agathangelou and Lily Ling that the security offered within a neoliberal world order by a system of nation states is by definition a situated one: “Left unheeded are those transgressions usually characterized in terms of ‘third world’ anger and frustration, desperation and despair ... that transpire inside the patriarchal household ... or outside the public sector” (2003: 134).

The representations of security evidenced in UNSCR 1325 contribute to the conceptual organisation of the document around discourses of ‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’. As I have argued above, it is my contention that these discourses, rather than ‘describing’ gender, violence, security and the international, function to reproduce identity – individual identity is (re)produced through the violence reproduction of gender, and the identities of states are (re)produced through the violent reproduction of the international. There are obvious moments of contact between these discourses, as their conceptual organisation relies on understandings and interpretive contexts that make meaning of the discourses through frameworks that are situated in particular spatial and conceptual locations. That is, state identities are gendered, and gendered identities are positioned within discourses of the international. The final section of this chapter draws together the two readings of UNSCR 1325 and reflects on the investigation of the discursive organisation of the Resolution, with a view to contextualising the analysis of the narratives of production in the following chapter.

Challenging UNSCR 1325: Conclusions

In Chapter Three, I investigated the ways in which the successes and failures of UNSCR 1325 have been evaluated by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Reports of 2002 and 2004, the first of which was mandated in the Resolution itself (UNSC 2000a: Articles 16-17). This chapter has explored the discursive construction of UNSCR 1325 using a discourse-theoretical analysis. The strategy of double-reading allows for the positing of critical interjections into the dominant narrative of UNSCR 1325 and the investigation of the ways in which the document (re)produces the concepts around which it is organised. In this section I argue that it is most fruitful to consider the discourses of ‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’ that are articulated through UNSCR 1325 as discourses that permit the violent reproduction of gender and the violent reproduction of the international, both respectively and simultaneously.

UNSCR 1325 expresses the willingness of the Security Council “to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations

and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups" (UNSC 2000a: Article 15). In the context of the first section above, in which I detail the ways in which UNSCR 1325 speaks to issues of 'women and peace and security', the articulation of such 'willingness' can be considered a nodal point where these issues come into contact. Identifying Article 15 as the articulation of a nodal point recognises that UNSCR 1325 is organised around discourses of 'gender violence' and 'international security', into which particular conceptualisations of gender, violence, the international and security are interpellated and that exploring the (re)production of these concepts is central to the understanding of the Resolution.

"It is amazing that the world's largest international security institution has now publicly declared that attention to gender is integral to 'doing security'" (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004: 139, emphasis added). My research is not aimed at discrediting the efforts made by the United Nations Security Council to ameliorate the lived experiences of 'women and girls' in conflict and post-conflict situations. Many human rights activists, feminist organisers and academics have positively received the measures called for in UNSCR 1325 (see, *inter alia*, Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Bahdi 2003). The descriptive reading in the first section of this chapter explores the ways in which UNSCR 1325 can be considered a "watershed political framework" (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 3). However, taken in conjunction with the discourse-theoretic reading in the second section of this chapter, the pursuit of gender equality is problematised precisely because of what it represents: not the question of whether women should enjoy equal privilege with men – of course they should – but the question of how these differences are (re)produced and entrenched through even the most well-intentioned policy. This results from acknowledging that "[a]s scholars, we need to become more knowledgeable about the worlds of advocacy and policy, and position ourselves to forge mutually advantageous relationships with feminist researchers, activists and policymakers" (True 2003: 387).⁷⁴

⁷⁴ I have included this quotation as I endorse the sentiment, despite being troubled by the way that True articulates this sentiment as an exhortation to an assumed 'we'. I am lucky enough to be part of a network of scholars (<http://www.bisa.ac.uk/groups/gendering.htm>) who negotiate this terrain in their work with skill and humility.

‘Gender equality’ is conceptualised as the advancement of women, paying scant attention to the situations in which women are active in the oppression of other women and men are similarly disadvantaged. Furthermore, ‘gender equality’ assumes difference, thereby obscuring the discursive mechanisms through which this difference is reproduced. One of these discursive mechanisms is violence, but this is similarly obscured through the discursive articulation of violence in UNSCR 1325 as either ‘conflict’ or as ‘gender-based’, both textually and conceptually putting the gender first. Meanwhile, the list of documents claimed as ancestry to UNSCR 1325 speaks to the conceptualisation of the international represented in the Resolution. Compatible with the discourse of ‘international security’, the international (community) is responsible for the provision of security, which can be achieved through the elimination of violence. The tension becomes apparent when the ways in which violences, often undertaken in the name of security, function to underpin the international as a spatial and conceptual domain, are investigated.

UNSCR 1325 is a product of its discursive domain. In the previous chapter, I explored the sedimenting of the concepts around which the Resolution is organised into a frame that is then used to critique the document, and the constitution of these concepts in a particular text. This chapter has investigated the discursive construction of the Resolution itself, and the ways in which gender violence and international security are constructed. This has allowed for an exploration of the theoretical potential of the reconceptualisations of these concepts that I offer in relations to Resolution 1325. However, to complete the analysis, it is necessary to examine the discursive terrain that UNSCR 1325 inhabits.

As mentioned above, the Resolution refers to a range of policy documents and declarations issuing from various institutions that are represented as having influenced the Resolution. In addition to these documents, there are narratives of production issuing from two distinct organisations: the United Nations system and the Non-Governmental Organisation Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. The following chapter investigates the claims made by these two groups concerning the authorship of and influence over UNSCR 1325, not to establish how it ‘really’ got written in the way that it did, but to trace the

discourses of ‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’ through their institutional contexts in an effort to establish that the Resolution could not have been written any other way.

Chapter Five: Exploring the Narratives of Production of UNSCR 1325

The previous two chapters have investigated the ways in which the conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security that are (re)produced in UNSCR 1325 impact both on the textual organisation of the Resolution itself, and on the implementation of the Resolution in conflict and post-conflict situations. In this chapter, the analytical focus is broader, as I explore the competing narratives of production, relating different histories of UNSCR 1325, which issue from the two sites of discursive power that have influenced the construction of the Resolution. The two sites of power with which I am concerned in this chapter are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Non-Governmental Organisation Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG). Both institutions claim author-ity over the Resolution and are therefore appropriate foci of analysis (see UNSC 2000a; NGO WG 2005).⁷⁵ Neither of these institutions, which for the purposes of analysis will be treated as loosely bounded entities with particular discursive terrains, is monolithic or internally consistent. However, both have distinct narratives of the history of UNSCR 1325 that will be explored in this chapter.

This chapter aims to draw out the discursive conditions of possibility for the construction of UNSCR 1325 through investigation of the discursive terrains of the two institutions that claim a degree of author-ity over the Resolution. By doing so, I illustrate the ways in which particular conceptualisations of gender, violence, the international and security organised and structured discussions of ‘the impact of armed conflict on women and girls’ previous to the production of UNSCR 1325, thus having a clear impact on the Resolution itself. Furthermore, exploring the discourses of ‘gender violence’ and ‘international security’ that were centralised in the construction of UNSCR 1325 simultaneously allows me to identify discourses that were marginalised. The next and final chapter returns to the question of the conditions of possibility constructed by UNSCR 1325 in

⁷⁵ In this chapter, I use ‘institutions’ as synonymous with ‘sites of power’. The power I refer to in the latter construction is discursive, and relates to influence and author-ity over UNSCR 1325. I do not intend to signify through the use of the word ‘institution’ that I conceive of either the UNSC or the NGO WG as coherent or singular entities. This will be expanded on as I explore the discursive terrain of the two institutions and investigate the groups and organisations that comprise them.

the context of the treatment of gender violence as an issue of international security.

The analysis in this chapter is both similar to and differs from the analysis in the preceding chapters. As before, I proceed with a descriptive reading of the first site of power under investigation, the NGO WG, detailing the aims and objectives of the institution, their vision and purpose and their membership. This leads to a discourse-theoretic reading of three key texts produced by the NGO WG in relation to UNSCR 1325. In the third section, I offer a descriptive reading of the UNSC and similarly follow this with a discourse-theoretic reading of three texts produced by the UNSC. In the case of the NGO WG, the texts are a letter to the UNSC from October 23rd 2000 (NGO WG 2000a), the statement that was produced for the Arria formula meeting to discuss the possibility of a UNSC Resolution addressing 'the impact of armed conflict on women and girls' (NGO WG 2000b), and a statement made to the assembled press following the Arria formula meeting (NGO WG 2000c).⁷⁶ The key texts of the UNSC include Chapters II-VII of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945), the statement of the UN concerning the provisional rules that govern the actions of the UNSC (United Nations 1983) and a statement from the President of the Security Council on March 8th 2000 (UNSC 2000c), which was International Women's Day. I have not attempted to produce a sampling method to identify the documents I have chosen to analyse. These documents have been chosen as they are given textual priority in UNSCR 1325, as discussed in Chapter Four, and also because the institutions themselves cite them as fundamental to the production of UNSCR 1325.

I have chosen to analyse the institutions through the texts they produce for three reasons. First, it allows me to treat the websites of the institutions, where it is possible to glean a great deal of information regarding the ways in which the institutions view themselves, as texts, and allows me to follow the links through the webpages to the documents that the institutions themselves cite as important. Second, and relatedly, the representational practices in which the

⁷⁶ An 'Arria formula' meeting, named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, refers to the informal meeting of Security Council members, with or without other parties involved, to discuss issues of interest that are not deemed appropriate as agenda items for the official sessions of the Council.

institutions are engaged not only represent their visions of themselves, but also, through presence or absence, the dominant conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security that organise their respective discursive terrains. Finally, given that the UNSC is self-consciously concerned with issues of security and the international, and that the NGO WG prioritises Women, Peace and Security, following the structure of the previous two chapters and analysing both sites of power for representations of gender, violence, the international and security might obscure some interesting insights regarding the contestation over these concepts between the two institutions.

Contextualising the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security

In order to explore the discursive terrain of the NGO WG that claims author-ity over UNSCR 1325, it is first necessary to contextualise the Working Group as itself a product of a wider discursive terrain. The engagement of NGOs with the United Nations system has a long and complex history, and so too does the framing of particular issues that have informed the construction of UNSCR 1325. The constitution of an NGO is not under consideration here, nor will this section attempt to provide a detailed exploration of all of the issues raised in the investigation of the NGO WG. However, it is important to trace the development of the NGO WG back to the involvement of transnational NGOs in prioritising certain issues on multiple UN agendas over the past few decades. Beginning with a discussion of the impact of NGOs on the UN system, this section will go on to explore the successes of various NGOs in pushing forward an agenda of gender mainstreaming through various mechanisms. This in turn will lead to a discussion of the watershed conference in Vienna in 1993 where violence against women was “formally recognised by the international community as a human rights issue after unprecedented lobbying by women’s groups” (O’Hare 1999: 365). These advances played a part in constructing a policy environment in which gendered violence could be considered an international issue, and, with the shift in focus to issues of human security by the UN system at the end of the Cold War (Bunch cited in Joachim 2003: 260), the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was consolidated.

As Otto notes, the UN Charter “reveal[s] the defensive position of states towards NGOs and their insistence that the status of an NGO is peripheral to that of a state” (1996: 110). In 1968, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed Resolution 1296⁷⁷ that addressed the “arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations” (ECOSOC 1968). Almost thirty years later, these arrangements were reviewed at the recommendation of a working group established by ECOSOC, leading to the approval of Resolution 1996/31⁷⁸ in 1996. Marking what Tony Hill has termed a “second generation” of NGO-UN relations (2004), this Resolution codified a new set of arrangements between NGOs and the UN system. This led to the current situation in which “NGOs are omnipresent in the policy and administrative process of UN organisations” and the recognition that “the extent of their participation has progressively deepened” since the end of the Cold War (Gordenker and Weiss 1996: 43).

One of the issue areas pertinent to this investigation that was pushed to the forefront of negotiations between NGOs and the UN was the issue of gender mainstreaming. “Delegates at the 1975 UN International Women’s Year conference in Mexico City declared that all governments should establish agencies dedicated to promoting gender equality and improving the status and conditions of women” (True and Mintrom 2001: 30). This not only built on existing institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women’s issues, such as the UN Division for the Advancement of Women,⁷⁹ but also represented “the influence of transnational networks and linkages between women’s organisations and states” (ibid.). As Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom argue, “[t]he mobilization of networks of women’s organisations located across domestic and international settings has made gender inequality a salient issue and placed remedial strategies on the policy agendas of international organisations and national governments” (2001: 37-38).

⁷⁷ The full text of this Resolution is available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/info/res-1296.htm>

⁷⁸ The full text of this Resolution is available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/775/21/IMG/N9777521.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷⁹ UNDAW was established in 1946 and “advocates the improvement of the status of women of the world and the achievement of their equality with men” (UNDAW 2005). For further information, see their website at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/index.html>.

In response to achievements of activists involved in the push for gender mainstreaming (see, *inter alia*, Ackerley 2001; Staudt 2003) and the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by the UN General Assembly in 1979, which was lauded as “an international bill of rights for women” (UNDAW 2005), the arguments concerning the global subordination of women were used to frame interventions into the UN discourse on human rights. Drawing links between the freedoms that women should enjoy as equal citizens and the limits posed to these freedoms by the myriad forms of violence against women that occur globally, “[t]he issue of domestic violence soon became a focus point for feminist scholars” (O’Hare 1999: 364).

The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), adopted in 1993, not only represented “the culmination of a political process begun two decades earlier” (Joachim 2003: 247), but was also a pivotal document in its own right.⁸⁰ DEVAW was adopted shortly after the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna, which was also held in 1993. Jennifer Chan-Tiberghien has argued that “[t]he World Conference ... marked a paradigmatic shift ... Feminists launched a global violence against women campaign prior to the Vienna conference and managed to insert considerable gender language into its Declaration” (2004: 461). The measures contained within DEVAW build on these achievements and aim to “ensure the elimination of violence against women in all its forms, a commitment by states in respect of their responsibilities, and a commitment by the international community at large to the elimination of violence against women” (UN 1993: Preamble).⁸¹

Despite a commitment to eradicating ‘violence against women’, the dominant conceptualisation of gendered violence in the UN system is, as previously discussed, ‘gender violence’. This conceptualisation affected subsequent policy in such a way as to frame the issues related to ‘gender

⁸⁰ DEVAW preceded the appointment of the first UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in 1994 and is recognised as foundational to contemporary theorising and policy-making that seeks to articulate gendered violence as an issue of security (Winter, Thompson and Jeffreys 2002: 72). For a critical review of DEVAW see my ‘Loud Voices Behind the Wall: Gender Violence and the Violent Reproduction of the International’ (2006).

⁸¹ The full text of the Declaration can be viewed at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm>.

violence' in terms of gender mainstreaming, such that "[i]n addressing armed or other conflicts, an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes should be promoted so that before decisions are taken an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively" (UNFCWC 1995: E.1). Drawing on the successes of CEDAW and DEVAW, and the ever-strengthening linkages between feminist theorists/activists and the UN system, the UN World Conferences on Women every five years from 1975 were increasingly well attended, leading to the 1995 Conference in Beijing which "was the largest UN conference up to that time. More NGOs than ever before were affiliated to the intergovernmental conference, while some 30,000 people participated in the NGO forum" (Steans 2003b: 134). The outcome document, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) as mentioned in the previous chapter, is hailed as a watershed document for the securing of women's rights. As Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini and Judy El-Bushra argue,

[t]he BPFA is not only comprehensive but has also set clear benchmarks and a vision for improving women's lives. With 188 states as signatories, it is an influential international document on women's rights. At Beijing, the impact of armed conflict on women was noted as a specific emerging issue requiring attention. Its inclusion in the Platform for Action spurred the growth of a global women's peace movement (2004: 13).

Thus it is possible to trace the roots of the NGO WG back through decades of feminist theorizing and activism. Following the conference in Beijing, it was argued that "realization of the potential we viewed ... requires vigorous leadership and a willingness to engage in open and often difficult political dialogue across many differences that tend to divide women" (Bunch and Fried 1996: 204). This project details the ways in which the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security responded to that challenge and were instrumental in the production of UNSCR 1325. During the period in which Bangladesh held the Security Council Presidency, which will be discussed in more detail below, the Women and Armed Conflict caucus liaised with the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) regarding "obstacles to implementing the chapter of the Beijing Platform for Action ... devoted to women and armed conflict" (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003: 1256). The caucus made a series of

recommendations to the Security Council under the auspices of a Special Session on women, and once the negotiations with the CSW came to an end, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was formed from the group of NGOs who were involved in the caucus (ibid.: 1257-1258).

The NGO WG, in their own words, “was formed in May 2000 to successfully advocate for a UN Security Council Resolution on women, peace and security” (NGO WG 2005). They agreed “to pursue two recommendations – to encourage women’s participation in peace agreements and to push for the convening of a special session of the Security Council” that would eventually lead to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Hill, Aboitiz and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003: 1258). The strategies of the NGO WG were many and various

Members of the coalition lobbied and debated with every Security Council member. They created a list of experts and NGOs that would speak to the issues in the Security Council. They compiled packets of relevant documents with summaries and hand-delivered them to all Security Council members, and undertook media strategy to maximise attention on this issue (Poehlman-Doumbouya and Hill 2001).

The NGOs involved in the NGO WG were the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Amnesty International (AI), International Alert (IA), the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), and the Hague Appeal for Peace (HAP). More detailed discussion of the membership of the NGO WG, and the productive power of the discursive terrain of the institution, is undertaken in the following section.

Analysing the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security

Since October 2000, the membership of the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security has increased enormously. However, for the purposes of this investigation, ‘the membership’ includes only those NGOs involved with the Working Group at the time that UNSCR 1325 was produced – those listed at the end of the previous section. Given that my research into the production of UNSCR 1325 is taking place some years after the Resolution was passed, and that information, for example on the webpages of the two institutions under investigation in this chapter, has been retrospectively updated, it is important to

maintain some degree of temporal specificity. It is not possible to access the NGO WG website as it was previous to the production of UNSCR 1325. Thus the texts that I analyse in this section are the texts to which there are links provided on the website, under the section header ‘NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security’, all from 2000.

A brief investigation of the five founding members of the NGO WG illustrates the priority afforded by all five organisations to peacebuilding and the protection of human rights. The HAP explicitly links these two issue-areas, stating that the organisation is “dedicated to the abolition of war and making peace a human right” (2005), as does IA, arguing that “the denial of human rights often [leads] to internal armed conflicts which in turn undermine[s] efforts to protect individual and collective human rights and to promote sustainable development” (2005). IA was founded “in 1985 by a group of human rights advocates led by the former Secretary-General of Amnesty International ... in response to growing concerns expressed by those working in international development agencies, human rights organisations and those involved in the issues of ethnic conflict and genocide” (ibid.), so the continuity demonstrated between IA and AI is not entirely unexpected.

As part of its mandates, the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children states that the organisation campaigns with and on behalf of displaced ‘women and children’, arguing that “their empowerment is the surest route to the greater well-being of all forcibly displaced people” (2005). This links with the emphasis put on ‘sustainable human development’ by IA, and also with the WILPF’s goal of “enhanc[ing] environmentally sustainable development” (2005). The performative function of organising discourse on peace and security around the signifier of ‘development’ is explored more comprehensively in the final section of this chapter.⁸² For the current purposes, it illustrates the comparable values propounded by each of the founding members of the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security. Another key value is the potential of civil society activism to effect change at the state and supra-state level, suggested by Amnesty International’s declaration of independence from “any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion” (2005), WCRWC’s

⁸² See, *inter alia*, Sen 1998; Uvin 1998: 141-160; Mohanty 2002.

commitment to facilitating communications “from the community level to the highest councils of governments and international organizations” (2005) and WILPF’s aim of “support[ing] the civil society to democratise the United Nations system” (2005). Again, the implications of this are discussed further below.

The first text I analyse in this section is the letter from the NGO WG to UN Security Council members dated 23rd October 2000. In brief, the letter outlines the hopes of the NGO WG, celebrates the forthcoming Arria formula meeting and offers to the Security Council a “comprehensive pack of materials” (NGO WG 2000a) relating to the issue of women, peace and security. The Open Session is lauded as a “historic event and a significant opportunity to move the agenda forward” (ibid.), suggesting that there was a pre-existing agenda and that the actions of the Namibian Presidency offered an opportunity to move the agenda in ways that the NGO WG would find acceptable. The pre-existing agenda is attested to not only by the body of theory and activism cited in the section above, but also in the section that follows, in which I contextualise the efforts of the UN Security Council relating to the issue of women, peace and security.

The language of the letter is appropriately formal and courteous, given that the NGO WG does not enjoy any official powers of consultation with the Security Council. Furthermore, the NGO WG states their requests in terms of quiescence: “The NGO Working Group ... is hoping that the Open Session results in” certain measures and “would like to see a commitment to follow up the outcomes of the Open Session” (NGO WG 2000a). In conclusion, the letter states that the Group is “very much looking forward ... [to] establishing a dialogue with you [the Security Council] on this matter” (ibid.). Phrasing the requests in this way is testament not only to a recognition that, in the context of a discussion about issues of security, the UN Security Council enjoys a degree of institutional power and privilege that the NGO WG does not, but also that, even if the Open Session yields spectacular results, the issue of women, peace and security will be ongoing.

The first of the NGO WG’s hopes is that “gender issues” will be “fully mainstreamed into the actions and operations resulting from the Council’s

decisions” (NGO WG 2000a). While the language of ‘mainstreaming’ is discussed more fully in Chapter Four, the significance of asking that ‘the actions and operations’ of the UN Security Council be undertaken with a gendered sensitivity is great. Previous to the historic moment documented in the texts under analysis here, the UNSC “remained tenaciously state-centred, militaristic and male-dominated” (Otto 2004: 1). Therefore, the NGO WG requesting that the Council approach issues of peace and security with an awareness of gendered differences and experiences can be read as a potentially radical demand.

The two further suggestions that the NGO WG details in its letter represent much more conventional conceptualisations of gender. The Security Council is asked “to ensure that women play a greater role, at all levels, in peace support operations, conflict prevention and peace building” and to “afford women and girls greater protection and assistance in situations of armed conflict” (NGO WG 2000a). These constructions relate directly to the representations of gender in UNSCR 1325, discussed in Chapter Four, where ‘women’ are (re)produced through the text as able to participate and represent in peace-building and conflict resolution, but also needing protection during conflict (UNSC 2000a: Preamble, Articles 1-5, 8, 10).

Considering the three results that the NGO WG hoped to achieve as a package of reform, it is clear from the analysis in the previous two chapters of this project that its hopes were, to an extent, realised. One of the Working Group’s recommendations was that the Open Session be followed up “with a report on a) women’s role in peace building and b) humanitarian issues and protection of women during peacekeeping and post conflict peace support operations” (NGO WG 2000a). As is clear from my research, which began with an analysis of the Reports of the UN Secretary-General (2004; 2002), these follow up reports were indeed undertaken – in fact, mandated in the UNSC Resolution that resulted from the Open Session and other negotiations. Furthermore, the Security Council was offered “the opportunity to enter into dialogue with NGOs who are working directly with women and girls affected by armed conflict” (NGO WG 2000a), and the institution seems to have availed itself of this opportunity (Pietilä 2002: 96-98; Hill 2002: 29-30).

However, given that the heading of the letter reads ‘United Nations Security Council Open Session on Women, Peace and Security’, it is not entirely surprising that the subject of the discussion is women rather than gender. The reforms, with the exception of the attention called to the mainstreaming of “gender issues” (NGO WG 2000a), focus on “women and girls” (ibid.) and the gendered issues are represented as women’s issues: “women’s role in peace building”, the “protection of women” and “women and girls affected by armed conflict” (ibid.). This assumed translatability of women to gender is not theorised or explained within the document, and reflects a concern on behalf of the NGO WG both to demand the recognition of the “positive role of women” as well as the need for their protection (ibid.)

The statement read out by representatives of the NGO WG at the Arria formula meeting is faithful to these constructions of gender. The statement notes that “women are neither simply victims, nor are they passive in the face of war. Even in the worst and most dangerous of circumstances, women have shown their courage and leadership” (NGO WG 2000b: 2). Neither the statement nor the letter discussed above represent women as perpetrators of violence. Women’s agency, counterposed to the assumption of passivity that the NGO statement argues against, is fixed in these documents as benign, a construction that is highly problematic (Moser and Clark 2001; El Jack 2003).

In the statement produced for the Arria formula meeting, the link between conflict and violence is made explicit: “women” are represented as “women victims of violent conflict” (NGO WG 2000b: 1). Moreover, “violence against women” is articulated as “a strategic weapon of war ... a method of ethnic cleansing and an element of genocide” (ibid.). While the construction of ‘violence against women’ reproduced in this document goes beyond that discussed in Chapter Two, women are still fixed in this narrative as eternal victims of violence. Even the agency discussed above is not secure. Forms of discursive and physical violence contribute to “women’s voices and their experiences [being] excluded and marginalized” from “peace deals and high level negotiations” (NGO WG 2000b: 3). While these violences may be empirically verifiable, their reproduction in the NGO statement assigns women “a certain type of agency and identity, namely, women are the objects of

protective action and they occupy mainly the civilian space” (Väyrynen 2004: 137).

The positioning of “women and civil society”, run together in the text to form a discursive linkage, is articulated as a locus of benevolent agency (NGO WG 2000b: 4). This not only draws on the constructions of gender discussed above, but also on theorising of state/civil society negotiations that situate civil society as a domain apart from the state and therefore unimpeded by (state) political considerations (see, *inter alia*, Lipschutz 1992; Baker 2000). Within this discourse, ‘civil society’ represents “a bottom-up vision of civilising world order. It represents a normative theory of ‘human governance’ which is grounded in the existence of a multiplicity of ‘communities of fate’ and social movements, as opposed to the individualism and appeals to rational self-interest of neo-liberalism” (Held and McGrew 1998: 241).

The concept of civil society is ideologically and normatively loaded with implications of its civilised nature and its social form, and, as Jan Aart Scholte argues, “carries connotations of civility and virtue” (2001: 19) that function to secure a place from which to speak that is located firmly on the moral high ground. Stephen Hopgood, for example, is openly sceptical concerning the emergence of ‘global civil society’, perceiving this theoretical construct to be, *contra* David Held and Anthony McGrew, intimately related to the triumph of a neoliberal world order (2000: 25). These contestations over the construction of civil society draw attention to just how important it is to question the representation of ‘women and civil society’ in the NGO statement, not least because running the two together doubles the impact of the absencing of a formal political domain.

The press statement that was released following the Arria formula meeting in part reproduces the statement made at the meeting itself (NGO WG 2000c). However, as it is a public document presented to world media, it is worthy of analytical attention in its own right. In the statement, the NGO representative describes “women’s groups and *local* organisations that *struggle* every day to prevent war” (NGO WG 2000c, emphasis added). This construction functions not only to reproduce a distinction between the international as a zone of peace and the domestic as a zone of conflict (Väyrynen 2004: 130-131), but

also to reaffirm the construction of women's agency articulated in the two documents discussed previously, as connoted by the description of ongoing 'struggle'.

The direct and indirect violences against women presented in the statement to the Arria formula meeting are reproduced in the press statement, and the NGO WG condemns those who act as "silent witnesses to these abuses", arguing that "[a] culture of silence and impunity prevails" (NGO WG 2000c). This representation draws heavily on the spatial metaphors employed in theory and activism challenging the problem of domestic violence; part of the framing of domestic violence as a public policy issue was to challenge the notion that such violence is legitimate because it occurs behind the closed doors of the private household (see, *inter alia*, Moore 2003; Youngs 2003). It also serves as an indictment of the 'international community', which had, thus far, not acted as vocal witness to the abuses through their failure to put the issue of women, peace and security on the agenda of the UN Security Council.

"[T]he culture of impunity" is stressed in the press statement (NGO WG 2000c) and functions to remind the audience that the crimes and abuses documented in the statement need not occur. If only there was an internationally binding UNSC Resolution preventing such abuses, "the plight of women in war zones" would be ameliorated (NGO WG 2000c) and the women would have "the protection they need" (*ibid.*). The efforts of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security are not adequately represented in this construction. The NGO WG reports that they "asked the Security Council to ensure women have equal representation ... [and] that they consider the plight of women" (*ibid.*). These tentative terms do not adequately describe what was an historic and transformative campaign on the behalf of the NGO WG.

As evidenced in this section, the NGO WG has a strong claim to authority over the Resolution, and, through its continued political presence,⁸³ the Working Group has been able to transform decades of theorising and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace and security.

⁸³ See www.peacewomen.org for an indication of the ways in which the NGO Working Group has both expanded in membership and continued to lobby for the rights of women in armed conflict from 2000 to the present day.

However, the United Nations maintains a degree of institutional control over the Resolution, and the Security Council, as the organisation through which the Resolution became binding international law, must be investigated. In the following sections I offer a contextualising analysis of the UN Security Council, going on to read three key texts that are cited in UNSCR 1325 as foundational to the United Nations' narrative of production of the Resolution.

Contextualising the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations is unique among international organisations, given that it has near-universal membership and a wide remit of concerns and functioning bodies. Founded in San Francisco in October 1945 with 51 original members, the membership of the UN increased over the years to reach 191 members-states in 2005 (UN 2005a). Aiming “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, among other equally worthy goals, the United Nations was fundamentally an institution that embodied the ideals of the member-states at that time. “When the United Nations Charter was drafted ... [it] incorporated collective security, peaceful settlement and disarmament/arms control” (Alger 1999: 20). From the ashes of the Covenant of the League of Nations,⁸⁴ founded to “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security” (League of Nations 1924), it was hoped that the United Nations would rise to succeed where the League had failed. The United Nations has indeed realised some remarkable goals. Adjusting the negotiation process and adhering as far as possible to a regulative democratic ideal in order to include the 140 new member-states that have joined the organisation over the past decades has doubtless not been easy. As the Commission on Global Governance (CoGG) notes, “[g]iven that the United Nations system was so hobbled from the outset, it is remarkable that it accomplished so much in so many areas of international co-operation” (CoGG 1995: 231).

Exploring the ways in which the United Nations system was ‘hobbled from the outset’ is not the aim of this section. Rather, this section explores the construction, role and conduct of the UN Security Council as one element of the

⁸⁴ The full text of the Covenant is reproduced at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm>.

UN system. Writing as early as 1966, Inis Claude commented that “[w]hile the voice of the United Nations may not be the authentic voice of mankind [sic], it is clearly the best available facsimile thereof” (Claude 1966: 372). Part of the legitimacy afforded to the United Nations system that Claude explores in his work draws on the performances of the UNSC. The Security Council has come to be seen as one of the most high-functioning bodies of the United Nations system and, since the endings of the Cold War in particular, has “fundamentally altered the ways in which many of us see the relationship between state and citizen the world over” (Malone 2000: 21).

As mentioned above, it is not analytically tenable to treat the United Nations as a monolithic organisation. However, the foundational principles laid down in the Charter in 1945 have undoubtedly impacted on the processes and practices of organisations within the system. For example, in Article 24.1 of the Charter, “Members [of the United Nations] confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (UN 1945: Article 24.1). Signatories of the Charter agree to be bound by the principles and procedures therein, and Resolutions passed by the UNSC have the status of international law. The Security Council, therefore, enjoys considerable institutional and legislative powers.

Since the endings of the Cold War, “the role of the Security Council not only in conferring legitimacy on certain forms of international intervention, but also in providing a mechanism for burden-sharing of expenses and risk, in an era averse to both, [has] once again prov[ed] indispensable” (Malone 2000: 40). The veto power of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation [formerly USSR], UK, USA) apparently deadlocked voting during the Cold War, effectively rendering the Security Council powerless in the face of threats to the international peace and security that it was charged with protecting (ibid.: 22-23). However, there was a “noticeable improvement” in relations among the P5 as the 1980s drew to a close and a new decade began (ibid.: 21).

The 1990s saw a series of changes in the performance of the UNSC, not only in the number of Resolutions tabled and passed but also in the issue-areas

with which the UNSC concerned itself (Malone 2000: 22-23; Golberg and Hubert 2001: 223-224). The issue of human rights was given textual priority in the UN Charter in 1945: “the second sentence of the Preamble ... announces determination ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’” (cited in Alger 1999: 20). However, the 1990s was the decade in which the issue of human rights became central to the activities and decision-making of the UNSC (Malone 2000: 28). “Already in 1992, the council recognised that ‘nonmilitary sources of instability in economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security’ and were, therefore, directly relevant to the council’s core mandate” (cited in Golberg and Hubert 2001: 223).

“The image of international regulation projected by the Charter ... was one of ‘states still jealously sovereign’, but linked together now in a ‘myriad of relations’” (Cassese cited in Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999: 63). However, various Resolutions adopted by the UNSC⁸⁵ mandating UN action in conflicts throughout the 1990s drew attention to the negotiability of sovereignty on the grounds of “responsibility as a necessary additional component ... in addition to the three traditional characteristics of statehood (territory, people and authority)” (Weiss 2000: 800). This ‘responsibility’ was conceived of largely as a responsibility to protect the citizens of a given state, and the performance of the UNSC in the 1990s seemed to suggest that the ‘international community’ was willing to intervene in sovereign states when the states themselves were failing to provide adequate protection. In this way, “[t]he Council’s decisions in the 1990s proved highly innovative in shaping the normative framework for international relations and stimulated several radical legal developments at the international level” (Malone 2000: 22-23).

By the time that Canada held the presidency of the UNSC in 1999, the discursive terrain of the Security Council as an institution was such that it was able to combine “a case-by-case approach with a thematic one” (Golberg and Hubert 2001: 224) and focus on “how best to incorporate human security into the

⁸⁵ See *inter alia* Resolutions pertaining to the conflicts in Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda (Golberg and Hubert 2001: 223).

council's program of work" (ibid.). As discussed in the section that contextualises the NGO WG, framing policy issues as human security issues, blending as it does the ideological weight of human rights discourse with the strategic implications of security discourse, allowed for alternative performances of security by the UNSC. In addition, it was during the 1990s that NGO involvement with the Security Council became commonplace. "Council members increasingly met with NGOs on their own and in groups, not only to brief them on recent developments ... but also to seek their input" (Malone 2000: 33).

Resolutions 1265 and 1296, as discussed in Chapter Four, were central to the foundations of UNSCR 1325. "There is now general agreement among members that the safety of civilians in times of war is a central, rather than tangential, concern of the UN Security Council" (Golberg and Hubert 2001: 228). The UN Secretary-General produced Reports in 2000 addressing not only the issue of children and armed conflict (UNSC 2000d) but also the role of the UN during periods of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (UNSC 2000e). Both of these Reports focus in part on the importance of displaying a gendered sensitivity to the issues of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction (UNSC 2000d: Articles 34-37; UNSC 2000e: Articles 7, 22, 53, 77, 93-94).

At the 4100th meeting of the UNSC in March 2000, the President of the UNSC stated that

the Security Council recognises the importance of the humanitarian dimension of international peace and security and to its consideration of humanitarian issues relating to the protection of all civilians and other non-combatants in situations of armed conflict ... the Council stresses the importance of providing attention to all those in need, *with particular emphasis on women* and children and other vulnerable groups (UNSC 2000f, emphasis added).

Later in 2000, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a statement to the Security Council at the opening of a meeting on women, peace and security, arguing that the contribution of women to conflict resolution processes and peace-building was "severely under-valued" and that women are "often better equipped than men to prevent or resolve" conflict (UN 2000). This meeting took place in October 2000. UNSC Resolution 1325 was adopted on October 31st

2000. In the following section I proceed to analyse the ways in which the discursive terrain of the UNSC, as charted here, contributed to the Resolution being written in the way that it was.

Analysing the United Nations Security Council

As discussed above, the UN Security Council enjoys considerable institutional privilege within the United Nations system. In part due to the historic foundations of the United Nations, “[t]he Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organised as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at United Nations headquarters” (UN 2005b). As the Charter is cited not only in UNSCR 1325 (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) but also in the ways in which the Security Council represents itself on its homepages, the appropriate section of the Charter, Chapters II-VII, is the first of the texts I analyse in this section.

Membership of the United Nations since 1945, when the UN Charter was signed, has been dependent on recommendation from the Security Council. While the General Assembly, a nominally democratic forum in which member states each have a vote and recommendations require a two-thirds majority (UN 1945: Articles 18.1-18.2), decides on the result of an application, the application is only brought forward “upon the recommendation of the Security Council” (UN 1945: Article 4.1). Similarly, membership privileges may be suspended or member states expelled according to the directives of the UNSC (ibid.: Articles 5-6). Thus, although the Security Council is one of six principle organs of the United Nations systems established at its inception, the institutional power it wields is considerable.⁸⁶

The use of the modal verb ‘shall’ throughout the Charter is suggestive of the purpose of the document: while it forms binding international law upon signing and ratification (UN 1945: Article 110), the terms of this law are expressed in the future tense. Interestingly, the functions and powers of the

⁸⁶ Article 7 of the UN Charter lists the principal organs of the United Nations: “a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat” (UN 1945: Article 7.1).

General Assembly (UN 1945: Articles 10-17) are predominantly articulated using the modal verb ‘may’, for example, “[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter” (UN 1945: Article 10).⁸⁷ This is contrary to the explication of the functions and powers of the Security Council (UN 1945: Articles 24-26) which insist that “the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (ibid.: Article 24.2). Furthermore, and most indicative of the privilege of the Security Council is Article 25, which states that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (UN 1945: Article 25).

The powers of the Security Council are wide ranging. The implications for the ‘international community’ of signing and ratifying a Charter that provides for the Security Council to “adopt its own rules of procedure” (UN 1945: Article 30) and for member states to be consulted “whenever the latter [the UNSC] considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected” (ibid.: Article 31) are huge. The extreme centralisation of such a variety of powers is in part what has lead to the continued vocalisation of calls for Security Council reform (Sutterlin 2003: 5-10).⁸⁸ As Ted Galen Carpenter argues, “throughout the history of the UN, the preference has clearly been for stability even when the results have been manifestly unjust. ... The veto power exercised by the five permanent members of the Security Council ensures ... that they will never be subject to UN-sanctioned coercive measures” (1997: 20).

The phraseology of the UN Charter, particularly the Articles that dictate the conduct of the Security Council, demonstrates just how remarkable an achievement it was to successfully frame gendered violence as an issue of international security. According to the Charter, there are “parties to any dispute” (UN 1945: Article 33) and “[a]ny Member of the United Nations ... *or any state*”

⁸⁷ Modal verbs indicate the ‘mood’ of the action, indicating the level of necessity or urgency. Therefore, it is interesting that the Charter uses two different modal verbs to articulate the responsibilities of the two different institutions discussed above.

⁸⁸ Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns cite a relatively comprehensive list of actors involved in the process of UN reform, ranging from the “the Group of Eighteen High-Level Intergovernmental Experts ... established in 1985 by the General Assembly under Japanese impetus”, through the Nordic UN Project, including actors from within the UN itself such as Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan to “[a]d-hoc nongovernmental initiatives” such as the Commission on Global Governance mentioned above (2000: 200-201).

may be “party to a dispute” (ibid.: Article 32, emphasis added). This demonstrates a state-centric conceptualisation not only of conflict but also of security, and puts the problem-solving power firmly in the hands of the UN Security Council:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (UN 1945: Article 34).

With this in mind, investigating the procedural rules of the UNSC is necessary to evaluate just how it became possible for the Security Council to recognise the claims made by the NGO WG as valid.

The Rules of Procedure (UN 1983), most recently amended in December 1982, provide the UNSC with guidance concerning all aspects of its functioning as a UN organisation. Again, the Rules are articulated in the future tense, predominantly using the modal verb ‘shall’. The UNSC is required to meet at least once every fourteen days, and meetings can be called by the President or “at the request of any member of the Security Council” (UN 1983: Rules 1-2). Again, this demonstrates how much institutional capacity the Security Council has to determine the agenda of issues of international peace and security. Matters for discussion are filtered through the Secretary-General but “approved by the President of the Security Council” (UN 1983: Rule 7) and, in conjunction with the permanent status on the Council of the P5, this effectively ensures that six individuals, five of whom are unchanging, have enormous control over the agenda.

Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, the gendered pronoun ‘he’ is mentioned in the section of the Rules governing representation and credentials:

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative ... shall be communicated to the Secretary-General ... before he takes his seat on the Security Council (UN 1983: Rule 13).

Furthermore, the President of the Security Council is articulated as male in the document (UN 1983: Rule 20), and expected to absent himself from any discussions in which he might have a conflict of interest (ibid.). The UN

Secretary-General is expected to act in the capacity of Secretariat for the UNSC, although *he* too may “authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council” (UN 1983: Rule 21). Although such close attention to the representation of gendered subjects in the Rules may seem unwarranted, it is precisely the focus of this investigation: the representations of subjects and objects enable certain ways of thinking about and acting on these constructions.

As discussed above, membership of the United Nations organisation is dependent on the recommendation of the UNSC. The recommendation is further dependent on “the applicant [being] a peace-loving State” (UN 1983: Rule 60). Given what I have outlined above regarding the centralisation of power in the Security Council, this Rule effectively means that the UNSC has veto power over the possibility of expanding membership of the United Nations organisation. Potentially, then, the General Assembly, functioning on a one-nation one-vote remit, could be constructed according to the whims of the Security Council. This has important implications for the democratic credentials of the United Nations and its ability to represent ‘we, the people’.

Consultation with ‘the people’, or, more specifically, with “private individuals and non-governmental bodies” (UN 1983: Appendix), is also governed by the Rules. However, Appendix A addresses only the circulation of communications to members of the Security Council (*ibid.*). There is no provision in the Rules that governs the decision of the Security Council regarding which ‘individuals and non-governmental bodies’ could or should be consulted. Despite this lack of formal provision, since the ends of the Cold War and subsequent shifts in the organising discourses of the UNSC as discussed above, consultation with NGOs became increasingly common. “NGOs ... increasingly appeared as actors in the policy process that could not be ignored and whose goodwill and support was useful, and at times even essential, to the success of government policies and Council initiatives” (Paul 2004). Eventually, in 1995, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council was founded, and it has “has become an influential forum at the United Nations” (Paul 2001).

Despite strong P5 objections, the Arria formula for meetings between the UNSC and the NGO Working Group was utilised to great effect in April 2000 when, under Canadian Presidency, “Ambassador Peter van Walsum of the

Netherlands convened an Arria briefing on ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ ... Five days later, the Council debated the same subject ... and eventually the related Resolution 1296 was adopted” (Paul 2004). As discussed in the preceding section, UNSCR 1296 is closely related to UNSCR 1325, and the successes of the NGO Working Group on Security evidenced in the production of Resolution 1296 opened the Arria formula to NGOs and other issue areas – notably, in this instance, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.

However, previous even to the Arria meeting in April, the UNSC, under the Presidency of Bangladesh, made an historic statement on the occasion of International Women’s Day (UNSC 2000g). In this statement to the attendant media, “members of the Security Council recognize[d] that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men” (ibid.). NGO involvement with issues under the remit of the Security Council was also celebrated in the statement, as “members welcome[d] the review of the Fourth World Conference on Women as an essential element in achieving this goal” (ibid.). As discussed previously, the conference at Beijing involved more NGOs than any other World Conference, and was instrumental in forging the agenda for the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security.

The conceptualisation of gender in the press statement is a liberal one. The key articulations include “equality”, adequate representation, “equal access and full participation” and political and economic empowerment (UN 2000). Underpinning these constructions is a commitment to a liberal democratic ideal, and this conceptualisation of gender is not incompatible with either a discourse of security that focuses on ‘international’ or ‘human’ security, nor is it incompatible with research on ‘gender violence’. Both of these discourses construct a liberal individual as their subject. Although the press statement represents gendered violence as “violence against women” (ibid.), this is represented as corollary to “violation of the human rights of women” (ibid.), where human rights are themselves an articulation of liberal values.

The obligations of the ‘international community’ are documented in the press statement: “all concerned” must “refrain from human rights abuses in conflict situations” and those responsible must be prosecuted (UN 2000).

Although the statement constructs the subject of women as what is by now a familiar profile of peace-maker/victim, and implicit in the statement is the notion that the UNSC can and should *help* women to fulfil their potential: “the important of promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes while addressing armed or other conflicts” is stressed (ibid.). The disparity between the ‘women’ and the ‘gender perspective’ is never clearly articulated, indeed, it is a function of the liberal framework that gender is synonymous with sex difference.

It is the final sentence however, referring to ‘a gender perspective’, which allows the greatest potential for radical reform. In the following section I draw together the arguments I have outlined in this chapter, reflecting on the implications of these arguments for the construction of UNSCR 1325 and analysing further the potentialities offered by the narratives of production explored here. The intention of this chapter is not to evaluate ‘the truth’ of the production of UNSCR 1325, but rather to explore the ways in which the two institutions represent their involvement with the process of production. However, as the following section indicates, the potentialities enabled by the discursive terrains of the institutions not only enabled the production of the Resolution, but also limited it in several important ways.

Challenging the Narratives of Production: Conclusions

Reading the two narratives of production in tandem, it is possible to identify some organisational logics common to both narratives. Both narratives construct particular representations of governance, peacebuilding and development, and these representations are explored in turn below. In addition, I argue in this section that both narratives function to (re)produce a conventional, liberal ‘Westphalian’ narrative of sovereignty, largely by its representation as an absent presence. In short, by drawing out the commonalities and differences in the two narratives of production, I aim to demonstrate that, despite significant differences in institutional power and internal organisation between the two sites of power under consideration, the dominant logics in the discourses of gender violence and international security issuing from these sites are compatible. It is

these compatibilities that lead to both the successes and shortcomings of UNSCR 1325 by delimiting the boundaries of possibility of the Resolution and its implementation.

In the past decades, International Relations scholarship has focused on the complex concept of ‘global governance’ as a way of understanding the various ways in which the international system can be ordered. Moving beyond a traditional state-centric view of the actors in the political arena, Fred Halliday notes that the concept of global governance “covers the activities of states, but also those of inter-governmental organisations, most notably the UN, and the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trans-national movements” (2000: 431). Devoting attention to the ways in which these organs of global governance are fulfilling, or failing to fulfil, their role in contemporary times is necessary to the understanding of IR both as an academic discipline and as policy practice. The NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security is explicit, by virtue of its naming as well as its activities, about the need to engage with institutions of governance even without the institutional backing of a state.

Theorising global governance entails the rigorous consideration of core concepts of IR, including sovereignty, interdependence and democracy, to which I return below. An orthodoxy rooted in the theoretical synthesis of neo-realism and neoliberalism still exists in international relations, both as academic discipline and policy practice,⁸⁹ and, in this context, global governance can be seen as the construction of international institutions that would further the efforts of powerful states to pursue their interests (see, *inter alia*, Mearsheimer 1995; Keohane and Martin 1995). A normatively preferable alternative is provided by James Rosenau’s conception of global governance, where he suggests that “governance refers to activities backed by shared goals ... [and] ... is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority” (1992: 4), and it is this conceptualisation of global governance represented in the narrative issuing from the NGO WG. The emphasis put on collective goals and inclusivity, discussed above, by the NGO WG suggests that it seeks to intervene in mechanisms of

⁸⁹ For a cogent and sophisticated discussion of the dominance of rationalist approaches in the discipline of International Relations, see Marysia Zalewski’s (1996) ‘All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up’: Theories, Theorists, Theorising’.

‘global governance’ – in this case, the United Nations – on behalf of a constituency that is currently un(der)represented.

However, this is by no means an unproblematic goal. Keohane suggests that the benefits of effective organs of global governance “will accrue not only to governments but to trans-national corporations and professional societies, and to some workers as well” (1995: 183). I find this view extremely difficult for many reasons, not least because it re-inscribes an unsustainable division between the “rich democracies” that are constructed as peaceful and interdependent and the “zones of conflict” that are seen as their implicit corollary (ibid.: 180), which is discussed further below, but also because it seems to suggest that constructing effective governance for the benefit of these privileged few is both politically desirable and ethically unproblematic. Although the NGO WG fosters an image of collective action that is opposed to the notion that the existence of a democratic deficit at either the state or supra-state level is in any way tenable, through its emphasis on participation and representation, the very simple question of ‘Who speaks?’ in this situation is an important one.⁹⁰ Deniz Kandiyoti points out that “[a]s donors, UN agencies and NGOs compete for their share in the ‘gender’ market, often draining limited local capacity to staff their own projects in the process, there is a risk that local voices (especially non-English speaking ones) may be drowned out” (2004: 135). This is in part due to the fact that “[m]ost NGO activity at the global level is dominated by representatives from the industrialised countries” (Williams 2003: 85).

In addition to the question of ‘Who speaks?’, the question of what they are speaking to remains. The two different conceptualisations of global governance outlined above suggest that it is a complicated terrain to negotiate. The narratives issuing from the NGO WG and the UNSC seem to suggest that they share a conceptualisation of ‘global governance’, and that the involvement of ‘global civil society’ in these mechanisms of governance is seen as fundamentally benign by both parties. Recognising the NGO WG as an effective agent in the construction of world politics articulated by the United Nations Security Council legitimises the activities of the NGO WG and also functions to

⁹⁰ On the issue of ‘democratic deficit’, see Gill 1996; Murphy 2002; Moravcsik 2004; Cox and Jacobson 2005. On the issues of participation, representation and the potential for the formulation of a ‘global polity’, see Ougaard and Higgott (eds) 2002; Wilkinson 2002.

cast the issues of women, peace and security in the light of ‘the global’ – that is, “it is now increasingly recognised that ... processes of restructuring have a transnational dimension and that their effects on democracy ... *need to be analysed as part of the wider globalisation phenomenon*” (Eschle 2002: 320, emphasis added). However, labelling phenomena as part of an inexorable push towards globality “may serve to summon precisely the effects that such a discourse attributes to globalisation itself” (Hay and Marsh 1999: 9), if ‘globalisation’ is conceived of as a discourse with a particular politics.

If this is the case, then the particular discourse of globality, or globalisation, that is (re)produced by the two institutions in question must be analysed. I argue that the discourse of globalisation in this case constructs a concept of ‘development’ as a central signifier, and is best characterised as strongly neoliberal. Craig Murphy expresses this view succinctly: “If there is a global polity, then certainly its dominant ideology, now, is liberalism, both economic and political” (2000: 792). This is relevant to the constitution of the concepts of gender violence and international security in this discursive context as the concepts are brought together in these contexts such that they construct a particular notion of statebuilding and peacemaking – otherwise known as ‘development’. Mark Rupert argues that the unproblematic reproduction of this globalisation discourse underpins and therefore makes possible a “hegemonic project of liberal globalisation” (2000: 42). This is closely tied to the concept of ‘global governance’, particularly by scholars such as Stephen Gill, who argues that “[d]isciplinary neoliberalism is institutionalised at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms ... [which] can be defined as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism ... the sole model for future development” (1995: 412).

At the Beijing conference, the outcome document of which was the Beijing Platform for Action, cited in UNSCR 1325 as part of its documentary heritage, “there was no alternative voice offered in opposition to the benefits of market policies; the goal was to ensure women’s participation in, and access to, the dominant structures of the market” (Chinkin 2000: 247). The participation of women in development – or ‘reconstruction’ – is prioritised by both institutions (NGO WG 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; UNSC 2000c). However, “the type of social

transformation agenda implicit in global neo-liberal governance, as applied to state-building, has to be interrogated from a gender perspective” (Kandiyoti 2004: 135). The image in which societies torn by conflict are to be rebuilt is decidedly conservative, drawing on concepts of state and sovereignty from the narrative issuing from the UN Security Council (UNSC 1945; 1983), despite the emphasis put on the participation, representation and protection of women (UNSC 2000c).

Problematising the concept of development that is reproduced through the narratives of production of UNSCR 1325, and also in the Resolution itself, is necessary, particularly given that so much feminist work over recent decades has critiqued the imposition of top-down development and reconstruction programmes, citing their deleterious effects on marginalised sectors of society (see, *inter alia*, Runyan 2003; Marchand and Runyan 2000). The ‘sustainability’ of development is centralised in both narratives, but the latter is not opened to critical scrutiny. This in itself is problematic, as development signifies development (read: progression) from an undesirable starting point to a more desirable end point. ‘Development’, then, is thoroughly bound up with narratives of modernity and civilisation:

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, development was equated with ‘civilisation’, which was measured by the adoption of institutions and culture ... As Western society became increasingly secular and technical, the notion of Christian ‘civilisation’ was replaced by a belief in modernity, particularly economic and political development (Parpart 1995: 224).

Unquestioningly reproducing a dominant discourse of development that has its antecedents in such a belief system, and draws discursive power from the seemingly inevitable logic of neoliberal globalisation discourse, effectively proscribes the possibility of reimagining development and prescribes its unproblematised undertaking.

“International peace and security” (UNSC 2000a: Preamble), on this view, can be achieved by appropriate reconstruction and peace(state)building. This policy prescription echoes theorising in the discipline of International Relations that argues that “certain forms of economic and political organisation are more conducive than others to peace and stability within communities; that

conflict within states has an impact on the international system ... that threatens security” (Newman 2001: 248). Proponents of this thesis, often labelled a ‘democratic peace thesis’ (see, *inter alia*, Oneal et al. 1996; Russett 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Starr 1992), unreflectively “presuppose the territorial state – ‘democracy’ refers to a particular set of electoral institutions and political and civil rights within the boundaries of a sovereign state and ‘war’ [the antonym of ‘peace’] refers to interstate relations” (Barkawi and Laffey 1999: 412). However, even in a piece of international legislation such as UNSCR 1325 that pays due attention to conflict at the intra-state level, the implicit assumption seems to be that resolving the conflict and implementing adequate post-conflict reconstruction programmes will benefit the ‘international community’, thus (re)producing both the ‘community’ and ‘the international’ as a functional spatial and conceptual domain.

Returning to a point raised at the beginning of this section, then, UNSCR 1325 begins to take shape not only as an important outcome document of concerted efforts on behalf of the NGO WG and prolonged discussions of the UN Security Council, but also as the discursive reproduction of discourses of (gendered) violence and (international) security, which in turn function to create and perpetuate the divide between “rich democracies” and “zones of conflict” (Keohane 1995: 180). Following a conventional narrative of development, the motif of peace(state)building is visible as a process of maturation, where ‘zones of conflict’ are assisted by the ‘international community’ to integrate into global mechanisms of production and consumption thereby securing not only the conflicts in question but also the reproduction of a neoliberal world order. Sovereignty is a key organising logic in these discursive processes, and again is tied to the notion that conflict ‘zones’, or ‘undeveloped’ countries are not sufficiently able to function as full members of the ‘international community’ – a kind of ‘sovereignty by numbers’ approach, where the numbers in question are the indices used to measure a state’s incorporation into global political economic processes.⁹¹

⁹¹ This echoes the critical interjections made by, *inter alia*, Cammack 2002; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002; Fraser 2003; Cammack 2004.

The concluding chapter of my research project reflects on these issues more fully. Among other concerns, I argue that, from the poststructuralist perspective that informs this research, it is important to recognise that the ‘global polity’ – or ‘international community’, of which the NGO WG is a part – and the globalised subject are constructed in part through the discourses under investigation here. These discourses function to (re)produce these subjects and also construct the interests of these subjects, and therefore constitute social/political order in a certain way, through the processes of predication, subject positioning and articulation that I have identified. Thus, the discourses that this project has interrogated are produced by the institutions discussed in this chapter, but are also productive of them – and, importantly, productive of a particular configuration of social/political ‘reality’.

Conclusions

At the outset of this project, I sought to explore the ways in which discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence were constituted, and with what effect, through the analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. After mapping the contours of competing discourses of security and violence in Chapter Two, I turned to Resolution 1325 and related documentation to identify the conceptualisations of security and violence that are produced by and productive of the Resolution and have become sedimented in the evaluative framework that the United Nations uses to measure the efficacy of the implementation of the Resolution. An exploration of the discursive terrain of the institutions that claim author-ity over the Resolution highlighted particular configurations of sovereignty, community, development and subjectivity that organised the production of the Resolution.

In this concluding chapter, I seek to draw together the strands of argument developed in the chapters above, and also to reflect on the implications of the research I have undertaken for future policy on ‘women and peace and security’ and future academic research on security and violence more broadly. In the first section, I contextualise my findings from the previous chapters through a short analysis of other relevant documentation relating to Resolution 1325, including the most recent Secretary-General’s Report of October 2005, which details a “system-wide action plan on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325” (UNSC 2005: 3). Through this analysis, I detail the policy implications of the research I have undertaken here. The theoretical and conceptual implications are detailed in sections two and three of this chapter, in which I draw conclusions about the constitution of political community and political subjectivity about which focusing on the violent reproduction of the international and of gender allows an insight. The final section returns to the question of UNSCR 1325 and the ways in which the document is inherently binding, both legally and philosophically, and the implications of this for the construction of social/political reality.

‘How Does a Policy Mean?’⁹²

The documents that I discuss in this section are intended to give a temporal context to the conclusions I offer regarding the constitution of violence and security in Resolution 1325. Published in the years following the unanimous adoption of the Resolution, the document set comprises three statements by the President of the Security Council (UNSC 2001; UNSC 2002b; UNSC 2004b) and the 2005 Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security. As discussed in Chapters Three, Four and Five, Resolution 1325 and associated documents are both produced by and productive of particular conceptualisations of (international) security and (gender) violence. It is therefore somewhat unsurprising that the documents under analysis here evidence the same concepts organised in much the same way.

Over the four-year period in question, 2000-2004, the conceptual constitution of security and violence in the documents issuing from the United Nations Security Council is organised around the themes of participation, representation and integration. The Presidential statements, in particular, evidence consistent articulation of the primary issue concerning ‘women and peace and security’ as one of “the role of women in decision-making with regard to conflict” (UNSC 2001), “the appointment of women as special representatives and envoys” (UNSC 2002b) and “the equal participation of women in efforts to build sustainable peace and security” (UNSC 2004b). The concept of representation articulated in these statements, similar to that discussed in Chapter Four with reference to Resolution 1325, relies on the notion that increasing numbers of women in decision-making roles in formal political arenas will have a positive impact on peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

However, this liberal notion (re)produces the subject of ‘women’ as an homogenous group whose interests are *essentially* peaceful and socially beneficial. There is mention of “the vital role of women in promoting peace, particularly in preserving social order and educating for peace” (UNSC 2002b), suggesting that there is something about ‘womanhood’ that is intrinsically related to peace and preservation of the ‘social order’. As discussed previously, this is

⁹² This subtitle is taken from Yanow 1996.

neither empirically verifiable nor is it an unproblematic way in which to represent ‘women’ in such an important set of policy documents. This representation, however, is reproduced in the Presidential statement of 2004, in which “[t]he Security Council reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention of conflict” (UNSC 2004b). Furthermore, in this later statement, the “full participation of women” is linked to “the incorporation of a gender perspective” (ibid.), demonstrating an elision of ‘women’ and ‘gender’ that I have problematised more fully in the preceding chapters.

The key theme of integration is the central way in which the document set (re)produces the concept of gender as “lazily synonymous with ‘women’” (Carver 1996: 18). That is, in all four documents under consideration here, mention is made of ‘integration’ and ‘inclusion’ of both ‘gender’ and ‘women’, where the two nouns are often used interchangeably. In 2001, the President of the Security Council affirmed a commitment to “gender mainstreaming through the United Nations peacekeeping missions and on other aspects relating to women and girls”, as well as the “inclu[sion of] women in the negotiations and implementation of peace accords” (UNSC 2001). Similarly, in 2002, the statement notes that the Security Council “undertakes to integrate gender perspectives into all standard operating procedures, manuals and other guidance materials” (UNSC 2002b). By 2004, ‘mainstreaming’, ‘integration’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘incorporation’ are mentioned no fewer than seven times in four paragraphs (UNSC 2004b). One of the most noteworthy aspects of these representations is the way in which participation and representation of *women* is assumed to naturally precede attention to *gender*.

“[T]he incorporation of a gender perspective in all conflict prevention work” (UNSC 2004b) and the preparation of “a framework for the system-wide cooperation ... for the full implementation of resolution 1325” (UNSC 2005) are, indisputably, more beneficial to the constitution of social/political order than is assuming that feminist analyses have nothing to say about conflict prevention. However, for the reasons discussed in the previous chapters, I do not believe that policy organised around the articulation of concepts of gender violence and international security can ever effect the radical reforms of which it speaks. The discourses of international security and gender violence (re)present and

(re)produce liberal, modernist configurations of political community and subjectivity. The ‘integration’ of gender is represented as synonymous with the ‘integration’ of women, and, furthermore, endorsing the ‘integration’ of gender suggests that conflict prevention policy, DDR⁹³ programmes, peacekeeping operations and peace(state)building processes are not always already gendered.

The 2005 Secretary-General’s Report outlines twelve areas of action that structure the ‘system-wide’ plan (UNSC 2005: 10). Of these twelve, one refers to “preventing and responding to gender-based violence in armed conflict” (ibid.) and another simply to “gender balance” (ibid.). This signifier of balance, tied as it is to the issues of participation and representation discussed above, equates the recognition of gendered politics and organisational logics with numerical equality (see Section I.1 of the Annex to the Report). In turn, the Report concludes with a demand for “*measurable* improvement in the United Nations system’s contributions to the empowerment of women in conflict areas” (UNSC 2005: 19, emphasis added). Throughout this research, I have argued that quantifiable indicators may be useful at times, but conceptual organisation and the implications of that organisation for the constitution of a particular social/political order cannot be so measured.

Furthermore, the conceptual organisation of the Resolution and related documents has become sedimented into the evaluative framework for the implementation of the Resolution: “Resolution 1325 (2000) and the three subsequent presidential statements on women, peace and security constitute important landmarks and provide a framework for action” (UNSC 2005: 5). This effectively leaves the United Nations system trapped within the discursive limitations of its own construction, and precludes the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325. Fidelity to the constitution of heteronormative subjectivities and neoliberal political communities, as discussed below, means that the United Nations system cannot but fail to achieve the transformations of subjectivity and community that is sought in Resolution 1325.

There is more to the state, and the corollary international domain, than security of the sovereign territory. Similarly, there is more to security than can be

⁹³ Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

bound to either that which can be contained within sovereign borders or that which constitutes the 'outside'. There is more to gender than equal participation of 'men' and 'women' in formal and informal political forums. 'Integrating' gender allows for a narrative premised on the notion that gender is not inherent in the organisational logics of the discursive terrain that constitutes social/political reality, and it does violence to the meanings that can be made of 'gender' in policy documents to bind the concept to bodies. With this in mind, I do not agree that "ensuring that commitments to gender mainstreaming are actually implemented remains one of the most significant challenges in this area" (Bond and Sherret 2006: 2). My research has endeavoured to demonstrate that understanding the ways in which the conceptual organisation of policy documents pre-/proscribe effective policy practice is a significant, and under-theorised, challenge.

In the following two sections, I expand on the analytical innovations underpinning this project, considering the ways in which theorising the 'violent reproduction of gender' and the 'violent reproduction of the international' can allow for interventions in policy debates but also developments in academic conceptualisations of security and violence. As I have argued above, the dominant conceptualisations of 'gender violence' and 'international security' are an integral part of the problems the United Nations has identified regarding the implementation of UNSCR1325. Part of what I seek to do here is offer different concepts with which to think effective policy, and I offer the results of my reconceptualisation of (international) security and (gender) violence below.

The Violent Reproduction of the International

One of the questions that has guided my research queried the ways in which literature on security situated within the discipline of IR conceives of its referent object. Consequently, it is interesting to explore the forms of political authority that are recognised as legitimate both by the literature on security and in the documents related to UNSCR 1325. As I have argued above, the constitution of political authority evidenced in Resolution 1325 (re)produces the international as a cooperative and influential domain, positioned above the

‘states’ in which conflict occurs. I bracket ‘state’ as this is a form of political authority valorised by the Resolution through its insistence on appropriate peace-building and decision-making processes in the aftermath of armed conflict (UNSC 2000a: Preamble) but the meaning of ‘state’ is differentiated through the various spatial tropes deployed in the Resolution. That is, ‘states’ in which conflict occurs (and therefore ‘states’ to which the Resolution speaks) are articulated in association with predicates such as ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’ (ibid.: Article 8, 15), whereas ‘Member States’ are called upon for “financial, technical and logistical support” and the development of sensitive training programmes (ibid.: Article 7, 6). The Security Council itself maintains “primary responsibility” for peace and security in the international domain (ibid.: Preamble).

With these concerns in mind, it is necessary to question the modalities of state-building approved in documentation associated with Resolution 1325, as this research has indicated that only peace(state)building programmes aimed at producing *appropriate* states will be discursively sanctioned. For example, the 2005 Report of the Secretary-General on Women and Peace and Security details twelve specific areas of action, of which two address peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (UNSC 2005: 10). The image in which states are ‘reconstructed’, according to the Annex to the Report, again fixes the division between the international as a spatial and conceptual domain and the national level, at which “local women’s groups and civil society organisations” function (UNSC 2005: Annex B.3). The emphasis is on “capacity-building” and the implementation of plans that facilitate “economic and social recovery and sustainable development with particular attention to the needs of war-affected groups who are especially vulnerable” (ibid.: Annex E.1). Throughout the Annex to the 2005 Report, all branches of the United Nations system, along with the World Bank and other development organisations, are tasked with ‘integrating’ gender into the blueprints for a successful (read: economically productive) state.

The productive power of UNSCR 1325 and associated frameworks for action to discipline political authority (re)produces the international as a domain of peace that owns the necessary knowledge to ‘develop’ domestic societies

bounded within the confines of the territorial state. Timothy Mitchell refers to these technologies as ‘disciplinary’, arguing that they

work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, *increasing their efficiency and precision*, and reassembling them into *more productive* and powerful combinations (1991: 93, emphasis added).

Within the binary logics that organise IR as a discipline, and the practices of relations international, this (re)production of the international constitutes the ‘national’ as a spatial domain in keeping with the accepted form of political authority recognised by IR as its object of study – the sovereign state, or at the very least, the state that strives to be sovereign.

Fetishising the state as a form of political authority in this way precludes the conceptualisation of alternative forms of political authority that might deliver the radical reforms of social/political order that the Resolution and associated documents purport to seek. Compatible with a liberal narrative of (international) community and a neoliberal emphasis on bounded individuality and the productivity of so constituted individuals, this configuration of political authority functions as what Matthew Sparke refers to as “a hidden handcuffing of democracy: hidden in part because ... the disciplinary effect is market mediated; but also because the reforms ... slowly clos[e] down the possibilities for democratic governance” (2005: 151).⁹⁴ The state is constituted as the legitimate form of political authority, but the international is the repository of knowledge concerning the procedures and practices necessary to achieve and consolidate this authority. This is compatible with Spivak’s comment that there exists an “unspoken assumption [at] the UN that the South is not capable of governing itself” (cited in Bergeron 2001: 1000).

These concerns, regarding the ways in which social/political order is (re)produced through UNSCR 1325, lead to further questions about the centrality of the concept of sovereignty within the discipline of International Relations. Suzanne Bergeron argues that “the abandonment of state-led national development policies and the adoption of a neoliberal, export-oriented approach

⁹⁴ It should be noted that Sparke theorises this notion in relation to the effects of free-trade agreements, although his concepts are equally applicable to the processes of peace(state)building that Resolution 1325 calls for.

... often marks the decline of national sovereignty” (2001: 987). However, whether or not sovereignty is ‘declining’ or debates over what sovereignty *means* are of less interest in the context of this project (and for future research) than the ways in which sovereignty *functions* in relations international. That is, when do exercises of sovereign power constitute social/political actions that function to decrease rather than increase violence? Why is it that the myth of the sovereign state continues to hold such sway in the discipline of IR, and why are alternatives forms of political authority not recognised in the international domain? These questions are beyond the scope of this project, but are central to the context within which the violent reproduction of the international makes sense within contemporary global politics.

Furthermore, while the form of the ‘state’ is predetermined by the ways in which the international is (re)produced through UNSCR 1325, the inhabitants of the state are similarly constituted as productive individuals. On this view, ‘integrating’ gender and ‘empowering’ women occurs within a discursive terrain bounded, in the last instance, by a discourse of neoliberal development and liberal social/political order. In an analysis of World Bank policy on ‘women in development’, Bergeron argues that

feminists should recognise and seize the opportunities for challenging the neoliberal and colonial logic of the World Bank opened up by its recent social turn, working within these spaces where appropriate toward the construction of their own alternative agendas (2003: 415).

In critically engaging with the violent reproduction of the international as enabled in UNSCR 1325 and related documentation, it was never my intention to dismiss entirely the strategic gains achieved through the plans for action and implemented policies. However, it is vital to remember that the logics that organise the United Nations system and related development institutions (re)produce a social/political order that could benefit from sustained critique, for the amelioration of the lives of the “isolated, disciplined, receptive and industrious political subject[s]” (Mitchell 1991: 93) constituted as inhabitants of the spaces I discuss here.

In short, the subjects discussed in the section below are constituted such that they inhabit state-bound spaces within an international system. The

‘international’ is conceived as corollary to the sovereign state, according to conventional narratives of sovereignty. Through the dominant discourse of security I discuss in this project, the international is (re)produced as the space of author-ity over the recognition and configuration of political community. In turn, the discursive horizons of possibility prescribed in UNSCR 1325 limit the appropriate form of political community to the liberal, democratic state, which functions to (re)produce the discourses of (international) security and (gender) violence under discussion here by institutionalising efficiency, equality and empowerment.

The Violent Reproduction of Gender

One of the major issues raised by the ‘seizing of opportunity’ that Bergeron endorses, as noted above, is the way in which critical discourse can be co-opted by the institution(s) under investigation. Protest rhetoric can be incorporated, bounded and made meaningful within the existing discursive terrain of the institution such that it loses the radical signification and impetus for systemic change (see, *inter alia*, Tétreault and Lipschutz 2005: 169-185; O’Brien et al. 2000: 51-66). In Chapters Four and Five of this project, I problematised the notion of ‘gender mainstreaming’, a lynchpin of UN policy on gendering armed conflict. As with any political issue, feminist theorising is divided over gender mainstreaming, as theorists and activists question whether the strategic gains made are worth the conceptual straight-jacketing in policy that elides gender mainstreaming with the incorporation of women.⁹⁵

Throughout this research, I have been deeply critical of the notion that gender mainstreaming is necessarily revolutionary, and in this section I argue that the emphasis put on gender mainstreaming in UNSCR 1325 is in part productive of the failure to successfully implement the Resolution since its adoption in October 2000. Emilie Hafner-Burton and Mark Pollack list six specific tools for facilitating gender mainstreaming in policy documents, arguing that “[c]eteris paribus, each of these tools should be employed as far ‘upstream’ in the policy process as possible, so that gender issues are incorporated into the

⁹⁵ For further discussion of these debates, see Baden and Goetz 1997; United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues 2002; Moser and Moser 2005; Walby 2005.

planning of policies, and not simply added on as an afterthought” (2002: 353).

As I have argued in Chapter Two, ‘ceteris’ is rarely if ever ‘paribus’ in life, and this is particularly true of policy that attempts to address ‘gender’ issues. As gender is assumed to be synonymous with women, and women are in need of specific programmes to integrate them into the political sphere as a result of their lack of previous formal political activity, funds and support for gender mainstreaming are likely to be limited. Furthermore, the very notion of ‘integrating’ gender precludes the recognition that the policies and action plans are inherently gendered.

I have found the Resolution’s emphasis on gender mainstreaming problematic for three reasons. Primarily, the idea that gender can be ‘mainstreamed’ suggests an inherent teleology of approach: the language of mainstreaming, while insistent on the need for adequate monitoring and evaluation, implies that the process can be finite, that is, it is possible to achieve, completely, the incorporation of “basic gender concerns” (Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002: 353). This in turn requires that attention is paid to the meaning of ‘gender’ within mainstreaming programmes, as it is likely that gender will be used interchangeably with ‘sex’ and/or ‘women’. What occurs as the outcome of teleological gender mainstreaming programmes, then, is the fixing of gender as ‘meaning’ women and the fixing of the notion that any and all policy can be made attentive to ‘gender concerns’ without questioning the organisational logics of the policies that may preclude such reform.

Second, gender mainstreaming, as represented in UNSCR 1325 and subsequent action plans, is predicated on a liberal notion of equality of individuals while bracketing open political debate over what this might mean. As Mary Daly argues, “the debate about gender inequality in society is one that took place much earlier in most countries and has not been updated or revisited in a fundamental way in the service of introducing gender mainstreaming” (2005: 440). In the context of the concerns expressed above regarding the form of political authority legitimised through UNSCR1325, the constitution of political subjectivity along these liberal lines is also worrisome. As with much critical literature on the ways in which international organisations construct concepts

such as ‘good governance’ and ‘participatory reform’,⁹⁶ in this project I have argued that the spread of liberalism, through the imposition of values taken to be unproblematic by the organisations that espouse them, evidences a particular construction of the way in which it is legitimate to live.

Finally, though relatedly, is my concern with the articulation of gender mainstreaming in policy discourse and academic writings as an implicit “symbol of modernity” (Daly 2005: 441). “[G]ender mainstreaming has become part of the accepted wisdom about what modern gender equality architecture should look like ... [which] serves to shift the orientation of and impetus for policy change away from gender inequality as a policy problem and toward the modernity of policies” (ibid.). While I disagree with Daly regarding the ways in which ‘gender inequality’ constitutes a policy problem,⁹⁷ the development of ‘states’ as articulated in UNSCR 1325 and the Annex to the 2005 Report of the Secretary-General is very much premised on an accepted (neoliberal) vision of a modern state.

As discussed in the preceding section, the (re)production of the international as a spatial and conceptual domain constitutes the modern state as the sole form of legitimate political authority at the national level, and conceives of the most privileged of these states interacting to bring zones of conflict into line with the social/political order propagated by those states inhabiting zones of peace. These processes, and the outcome of these processes, require modern individuals to inhabit the states, which is in part the performative function of gender mainstreaming. Mainstreaming gender ensures that notional equality structures economic, social and political institutions and thereby renders all members of society able, if not willing, to participate in economic, social and political activity. The violence in this account is discursive, in the ways in which gender is articulated in UNSCR 1325, but the appropriate political subject is also constituted by violence, as violence serves an ordering function to maintain a particular conceptualisation of gender. This is not to argue that gendered violence

⁹⁶ See, *inter alia*, Murphy 2001; Gill 2003: 120-138; McGrew 2002.

⁹⁷ Daly argues that one of the root causes of failures to successfully mainstream gender in various policy circles is “the malleability of gender mainstreaming as a concept” and a lack of conceptual clarity (2005: 448). Given the theoretical framework that underpins my research, and that I seek to open up possibilities to think gender (and security, violence, and the international) differently, thereby contributing to such malleability, I cannot sustain this argument.

is consciously or even necessarily linked to the constitution of a neoliberal political order: rather, neoliberalism requires ordered gendered subjects and therefore benefits from the violent reproduction of gender.

Thus, gendered subjects inhabit certain spaces in the social/political order as configured by the violent reproduction of the international. These subjects are gendered not only by the violences of conflict and post-conflict peace(state)building, but also by the violences inherent in policy that seeks to differentiate subjects along gender lines, thereby constituting the differences to which it claims to attend. The violent reproduction of the international, in both a theoretical and practical context, is dependent on the violent reproduction of gender, however these violences are manifested. Given the obsession within the discipline of International Relations with theorising the identity of the sovereign and the practices through which the territorial integrity of the state can be defended, it is surprising that IR was so late to recognise that, “[i]f all experience is gendered, *analysis of gender identities is an imperative starting point in the study of political identities and practice*” (Peterson 1999: 37, emphasis added). Then again, International Relations fetishises its own sovereignty as a discipline concerned with the state, and seeks to defend its borders with a vigour equal to that which it demands from its object of analysis, so the failure to take seriously feminist analysis is perhaps unsurprising after all.

The violent reproduction of the international and the violent reproduction of gender, while constituted through different, though overlapping, discourses, share common elements across the conceptualisations of international security and gender violence that I discuss here. These elements are in turn organised around specifically liberal, teleological logics of both the configuration of political community and the constitution of political subjectivity. That is, in both instances the (re)productive practices, seeking improvement on the status quo they characterise, pursue an end-state of fixed duality: in the case of the international, a domestic/international divide, and in the case of gender, differentiated but equal individuals.

Throughout this project, I have consistently problematised the assumption that gender is synonymous with women, and, moreover, that gender signifies need/want/lack. I have argued that ‘mainstreaming’ such a notion of gender

institutionalises this synonymity and, furthermore, reinforces liberal ideals, premised as it is on the notion that no form of discrimination should inhibit the freedom of the individual to fully inhabit the social/political sphere. The relationship between the concept of gender and the concept of the international domain and the ‘modern’ state is such that the configurations of community rely on the constitution of subjectivity as detailed above, through the discourses of violence and security I have analysed here.

I have attempted to offer new ways in which to think about the concepts of security and violence that order policy documents referring to gender and conflict such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. While the project title refers to a ‘reconceptualisation’, it is only a very tentative offering with which I conclude. I emphatically do not wish to inscribe a ‘reconceptualisation’ that will simply reproduce the problems inherent in the concepts as they are currently configured. Any attempt at defining a concept necessarily ‘fixes’ that concept, at least temporarily, and in the section below I argue that it is precisely this ‘fixing’ that is part of the problem. However, there are several insights, in addition to those discussed above, that I expand upon in the final paragraphs.

Towards a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence

As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True comment, “our sense of self-identity and security may seem disproportionately threatened by societal challenge to gender ordering” (1998: 17). That is, the performance of gender is immanent in the performance of security and vice versa: both concern issues of ontological cohesion. Taking this on board leads me to the conclusion that perhaps security is best conceived of as referring to ontological rather than existential identity effects. Security, if seen as performative of particular configurations of social/political order, is inherently gendered and inherently related to violence. Violence, on this view, performs an ordering function – not only in the theory/practice of security and the reproduction of the international, but also in the reproduction of gendered subjects.

Butler acknowledges that “violence is done in the name of preserving western values” (2004: 231); that is, the ordering function that is performed through the violences investigated here, as discussed above, organises political authority and subjectivity in an image that is in keeping with the values of the powerful, often at the expense of the marginalised. “Clearly, the west does not author all violence, but it does, upon suffering or anticipating injury, marshal violence to preserve its borders, real or imaginary” (ibid.). While Butler refers to the violences undertaken in the protection of the sovereign state – violence in the name of security – the preservation of borders is also recognisable in the conceptual domain of the international and in the adherence to a binary materiality of gender.

This adherence is evidenced in the desire to fix the meaning of concepts in ways that are not challenging to the current configuration of social/political order and subjectivity, and is product/productive of “the exclusionary presuppositions and foundations that shore up discursive practices insofar as those foreclose the heterogeneity, gender, class or race of the subject” (Hanssen 2000: 215). However, the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined. They could “remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage and in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes” (Butler 1993: 228). The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognizing that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state. This is, in short, an appeal to a politics of both/and rather than either/or.

Writing policy is reliant on the temporal and spatial fixing of identities, however briefly, and in UNSCR 1325 the identities in question were fixed in keeping with the dominant conceptualisations of (gender) violence and (international) security. The academic and non-academic understandings of these concepts were productive of, and continue to be produced by, the Resolution, and in this project I have attempted to articulate a way in which these concepts could be thought through differently. Both the state (produced through representations of security and violence) and the subject (produced through representations of gender

and violence) rely on a logic of sovereignty and ontological cohesion that must be problematised if alternative visions of authority and subjectivity are to become imaginable.

International Relations as a discipline could seek to embrace the investigation of the multiple modalities of power, from the economic to the bureaucratic, from neoliberal capitalism to the juridical. Rather than defending the sovereign boundaries of the discipline from the unruly outside constituted by studies of development, political structures, economy and law, not to mention the analysis of social/political life undertaken by always-already interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, IR could refuse to fix its own boundaries, and refuse to exercise sovereign power, in terms of author-ity, over the meanings of its objects of analysis. Future research on global politics could look very different if it weren't for the inscription of ultimately arbitrary disciplinary borderlines that function to constrain rather than facilitate understanding.

Appendix One: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

United Nations
Security Council

S/RES/1325 (2000)

Distr.: General
31 October 2000
00-72018 (E)

Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;
2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decisionmaking levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;
4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;
5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;
8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:
 - (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;
 - (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;
 - (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;
9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;
11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;
12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;
13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;
14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41

of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Appendix Two: Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and
Security (2002)**

United Nations
Security Council

S/2002/1154

Distr.: General
16 October 2002
Original: English
02-63468 (E) 181002

Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 16 of its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, invited me to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution and to submit a report to the Council on the results of that study. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. The study on women, peace and security builds on existing research and inputs of the United Nations, its programmes, funds and specialized agencies, Member States, scholars and local and international non-governmental organizations. The preparation of the study was overseen by my Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women in close cooperation with the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security.

3. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) marks a landmark in the recognition of women's contribution to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and their specific needs and concerns in armed conflict and its aftermath, as well as the responsibilities of the international community to provide effective responses, building on the Council's interest in the situation of children in armed conflict, the protection of civilians and the prevention of armed conflict.¹ In requesting the study and the report, the Council has created an opportunity to further highlight the roles and experiences of women and girls in armed conflict and its immediate aftermath.

4. The present report highlights the major findings and conclusions of the study on women, peace and security. It focuses on the challenges that must be addressed if progress is to be made in the achievement of the goal of gender equality in relation to peace and security. It includes recommendations for action (points 1-21), which the Security Council may wish to consider in order to strengthen and accelerate implementation of the objectives and recommendations already contained in resolution 1325 (2000).

II. Impact of armed conflict on women and girls

5. Women do not enjoy equal status with men in any society. Where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls exist prior to conflict, they

will be exacerbated during conflict. If women do not participate in the decision-making structures of a society, they are unlikely to become involved in decisions about the conflict or the peace process that follows.

6. Women and children are disproportionately targeted in contemporary armed conflicts and constitute the majority of all victims. Women and children also constitute the majority of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons.

7. Civilian women and girls, like men and boys, die during armed conflict, are forcibly displaced, are injured by landmines and other weapons and lose their livelihoods, although there are important differences in the experience of women and girls. During conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation, including torture, rape, mass rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and trafficking. These acts of violence have a political and symbolic significance and are often endorsed at the highest levels of leadership. Torture is also used against women and girls to violate their sense of self and as an attack on their communities and the men to whom they are related. A proliferation of small arms increases the risk of interpersonal violence, including domestic violence, which often continues after the conflict.

8. In addition to the gender-based and sexual violence women and girls experience during armed conflict, the impact of armed conflict on their physical and mental health is incalculable, especially the consequences of violence. They face numerous health threats grounded in biological differences. The use of sexual violence as a strategic and tactical weapon of war places women and girls at increased threat of contracting sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS. This is heightened by systematic genderbased discrimination, which reduces their potential to protect themselves from such infections. The high rate of infection and death increases women's workload in maintaining their households and communities and providing care to orphaned children.

9. With the loss of men and boys from households and communities through participation in armed forces, detention or disappearance, women and girls are forced to take on more responsibility for family security and well-being, often without the necessary resources or social support. Lack of land and property rights and lack of access to, or control over, resources threaten women's livelihoods. Women's daily tasks as providers and caregivers become increasingly dangerous and difficult, especially as the availability of and access to public services and household goods shrink. The role of women in relation to ensuring food security, the provision of water and energy for household use and their responsibility for health care — in both urban and rural contexts — may also put them at risk of being injured by landmines, in cross-fire and by sexual abuse. As women become the main or only source of income for their families, they often pursue new or non-traditional occupations. Forced out of the formal sector, and facing increased competition in the informal sector, they may also be pushed into illegal activities, such as trafficking in drugs. Often controlled by organized criminal groups, these activities carry a high risk of violence.

10. Armed conflict also changes social structures and relationships. The number of child-headed households increases during conflict. Within those circumstances, girls heading households face particular marginalization owing to their low status as female adolescents and their lack of protection. Girls may also be forced into early marriages as a coping strategy in economically desperate households.

11. The differential impact of armed conflict and the specific vulnerabilities of women and girls can be seen in all phases of displacement, including initial displacement, flight, protection and assistance in refugee and displaced persons camps and resettlement and reintegration. Women encounter discrimination and human rights abuses, sexual violence and exploitation, including domestic violence, and are disadvantaged by laws, policies and programming that do not take their concerns into consideration. For example, procedures for the determination of asylum status may not take gender-based persecution into consideration. Weakened or lost social support structures lead to reduced security for women and girls, who are at risk of harassment or abuse, and to problems in accessing the assistance necessary for survival.

12. Women are also victims of detention or “disappearance”. The disappearance” of male relatives affects women, in particular in societies where their status is directly linked to their relationships with men. Women are traumatized and cannot find closure as long as they still hope for the return of their relatives. They also face additional responsibilities for the well-being of their families.

13. Women and girls are not only victims in armed conflict: they are also active agents. Driven by commitment to the political, religious or economic goals of the conflict, some women become armed combatants or collude in acts of violence. Women and girls may also be forced to follow camps of armed forces, providing domestic services and/or being used as sexual slaves. Women play an active role in informal peace processes, serving as peace activists, including by organizing and lobbying for disarmament and striving to bring about reconciliation and security before, during and after conflicts.

14. The differential impact of conflict on women and girls calls for specific responses from the international community. While the knowledge about these genderbased differences and inequalities is increasing rapidly, it is still far from comprehensive. Of much greater concern, however, is the failure to incorporate existing knowledge on the subject into policies, planning and implementation processes in all peace operations, humanitarian activities and reconstruction efforts.

15. I submit the following for the attention of the Security Council:

Action 1

Recognize the extent of the violations of the human rights of women and girls during armed conflict and ensure that awareness of these violations is a factor in planning and implementation of all peace support operations.

Action 2

Identify and utilize local sources of information on the impact of armed conflict, the impact of interventions of peace operations on women and girls

and the roles and contributions of women and girls in conflict situations, including through the establishment of regular contacts with women's groups and networks.

III. International legal framework

16. International law provides a framework of protection for individuals affected by armed conflict. International humanitarian law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of victims of war and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, is the area of law of primary relevance to the protection of women and girls during armed conflict. International human rights law is also applicable in times of armed conflict. International refugee law offers protection to women and girls prior to, during and in the aftermath of armed conflict. International criminal law has come to assume increasing significance in relation to crimes against women and girls during armed conflict, in particular crimes of sexual violence.

17. The protections of international humanitarian law and human rights law apply on the basis of nondiscrimination. In addition, some of the provisions of international humanitarian law are of particular relevance to women, such as those seeking to reduce women's vulnerability to sexual violence. Other provisions are only applicable to women, for example, those requiring treatment of women with all consideration due to their sex. Additional protection is provided to pregnant women and mothers of young children.

18. The protections available under international human rights law apply to women and girls on the basis of non-discrimination. Key human rights instruments include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which specifically addresses traffic in, and the exploitation of prostitution of, women, a frequent occurrence in situations of conflict and their aftermath. Trafficking is comprehensively covered by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its supplementary protocols, which have not yet entered into force. Girls benefit from the specific protections for children set out in instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography and on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

19. During the last decade, the international legal framework has expanded to address some of the particular crimes experienced by women in armed conflict. The statutes of the two International Tribunals created by the Security Council to address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone all include gender-based violence, such as rape, enforced prostitution and trafficking during armed conflict, as well as torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and enslavement, within the definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity and as components of the crime of genocide. Other extra-legal mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation processes, also provide avenues of redress.

20. The International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda have issued several indictments relating to sexual violence. Sexual violence has been charged as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War before the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has convicted a defendant of crimes against humanity and genocide, inter alia, through acts of sexual violence.

21. The constituent documents of the two International Tribunals, the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone include provisions to ensure the delivery of gender-sensitive justice, including victim and witness protection measures. The Rome Statute has provisions for achieving fair representation of male and female judges and for ensuring the availability of legal expertise on specific issues such as violence against women and children.

22. Protection for refugee and displaced women offered by the international legal framework is supplemented by policy directives and guidelines, which, for the most part, have been formulated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) over the past 15 years. The gender-sensitive interpretation of the definition of refugee contained in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 allows for women and girls to seek refugee status on the basis of gender-based persecution, including sexual violence. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement also pay particular attention to the rights and needs of women and children.

23. This comprehensive international legal framework has been increasingly responsive to the experiences of women and girls, particularly where sexual violence is concerned. It is critical that these achievements are built upon by any future ad hoc tribunals that the Security Council might create. The determination of individual command responsibility for many of the offences involving sexual violence against women and girls in armed conflict has been a major advance and has undermined the culture of impunity that previously pervaded discussion in this context.

24. These advances must be maintained and further expanded. Other forms of violence affecting women and girls must also be recognized and adequately acknowledged in the legal regime. Compliance with international norms must be improved and preventive measures must be implemented, especially in light of the changed nature of conflict where combatants include non-State actors, including private militias and children, who pay little attention to the rules of international law that provide protection for women and girls in conflict, and frequently target women and girls in gender-specific ways. Women and girl victims of gender-based and other forms of violence should have the opportunity to pursue claims for compensation for injuries and other damage incurred during armed conflict.

25. I submit the following for the attention of the Security Council:

Action 3

Condemn all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict; take all necessary measures to bring to an end such

violations; and call upon all parties involved in conflict to adhere at all times to their obligations under applicable principles of international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law as they pertain to women and girls.

Action 4

Ensure that amnesty provisions included in conflict settlement agreements reached under the auspices of the Security Council exclude impunity from all war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, including genderbased crimes.

Action 5

Monitor the extent to which judicial or quasijudicial mechanisms that are established by the Security Council as part of conflict settlement arrangements interpret and apply the international legal framework pertaining to armed conflict and its aftermath in a gender-sensitive, consistent and systematic manner.

Action 6

Ensure that future ad hoc tribunals created by the Security Council build on existing statutes and include judges and advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, such as violations of the rights of women and girls, including gender-based and sexual violence; ensure that prosecutors of such ad hoc international tribunals respect the interests and personal circumstances of women and girls victims and witnesses and take into account the nature of crimes involving gender-based violence, sexual violence and violence against children.

IV. Peace processes

26. The participation of women and girls and the inclusion of gender perspectives in both formal and informal peace processes are critical to ensuring that political structures, economic and social institutions and security sectors negotiated through peace talks facilitate the achievement of greater equality between women and men.

27. There are many positive examples of women making a critical difference in the promotion of peace, particularly in preserving social order and educating for peace. Women's grass-roots organizations have sponsored peace education in many countries, including by encouraging child soldiers and others to lay down their arms. They have organized groups across party and ethnic lines, advocating for peace, and have been active in reconciliation efforts, often with the support of regional and international networks. They have advocated for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, campaigned against small arms, participated in weapons collection programmes and disseminated information on landmines. Because of their active interest in and support of disarmament processes, consultations with women's groups and networks can provide important information regarding perceptions of the dangers posed by the number or types of weapons, the identification of weapons caches and the transborder weapons trade. The role of women's groups and networks in informal peace processes has, however, not always been sufficiently recognized and supported.

28. The lack of access to mechanisms or channels for bringing the priorities and recommendations of women's informal groups and networks into more formal

processes remains a particular constraint. Although the understanding of the contributions women can and do make to peace-building through informal processes is increasing, women, with few exceptions, are not present at formal peace negotiations. Often women are excluded because they are not military leaders or political decision-makers or because they did not participate in the conflict as combatants. Women are assumed to lack the appropriate expertise to negotiate, or they are left out owing to discrimination and stereotypical thinking. They may also be excluded from peace negotiations because their interests are viewed as broader than those of the men involved in the negotiations.

29. Peace negotiations and peace accords lay the foundation for rebuilding societies after conflict. They commonly determine the political, civil, economic and social structures in post-conflict situations. Concerns specific to women do not always reach the negotiating table. This is particularly so in the absence of women's participation. It has been observed that women's political mobilization prior to and their participation in negotiations make a difference in the degree of attention given to gender equality issues and the pursuit of gender-sensitive approaches in a wide range of issues, including the drafting of constitutions, implementation of land reform, access to economic opportunities and development of social policies. However, the presence of women does not guarantee attention to gender issues. All actors in peace processes have the responsibility and capacity to ensure attention to gender equality concerns in peace agreements.

30. There are a number of positive examples where the Security Council has recognized and supported the informal peace initiatives of women's groups and networks, including its meetings with women's groups and networks during its missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Since the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), Arria formula meetings with women representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also contributed to Council debates on peace processes.

31. The Secretariat and other United Nations entities have also supported the informal peace activities of women's organizations as well as their efforts to participate in formal peace processes and to contribute to the development of new political structures in postconflict situations. However, further systematic efforts need to be made to fully involve women at all stages of consolidating peace.

32. All international actors involved in peace processes should be familiar with the extent of women's peace-related activism at grass-roots level. Efforts are needed to achieve greater representation of women in formal peace negotiations. Women's capacities as participants and leaders in peace negotiations need to be further enhanced, including through training and participation in Track II negotiations. Information collection processes, especially those that target civil society and research institutes, must also identify and involve women's groups and networks. Ongoing United Nations cooperation with women's groups and networks during peace processes should be more fully documented, including in my reports to the Council.

33. To facilitate greater contact with women's groups and networks, I intend to establish a database of gender specialists as well as women's groups and networks in countries and regions in conflict. I also encourage Member States, donors and civil society to provide financial, political and technical support for women's peace-building initiatives and networks.

34. The effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and fact-finding could be enhanced by soliciting the opinions of local women's groups. Greater attention to the gender norms and customs of a society can also provide useful insights in refining early warning indicators and strengthening conflict prevention mechanisms. I have observed elsewhere that strengthening of the rule of law is an essential element of conflict prevention and, within that, the protection of women's human rights through a focus on gender equality in constitutional, legislative, judicial and electoral reform. I will also call for a review of the gender perspectives in conflict prevention, early warning systems and preventive diplomacy.

35. Attention to gender-specific consequences of sanctions, based on collection and use of data disaggregated by sex and age, would allow the Council to fine-tune sanctions so as to minimize negative consequences for all civilians.

36. I submit the following for the attention of the Security Council:

Action 7

Explicitly integrate gender perspectives into the terms of reference of Security Council missions to countries and regions in conflict; request briefings for the Security Council members on the situation of women and girls in conflicts; include gender specialists in the teams wherever possible; and ensure consultation with women's groups and networks.

Action 8

Ensure that all peace accords brokered by the United Nations systematically and explicitly address the consequences of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, their contributions to the peace processes and their needs and priorities in the post-conflict context.

Action 9

Ensure full involvement of women in negotiations of peace agreements at national and international levels, including through provision of training for women and women's organizations on formal peace processes.

V. Peacekeeping operations

37. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations may include mandates to assist in elections, monitor human rights and carry out police functions. Mandates may encompass the development of institutions to support the rule of law, the creation of State administrative structures, the establishment of mine action programmes, the repatriation of refugees and the delivery of humanitarian aid. There is great potential in multidimensional peacekeeping operations for addressing gender perspectives, especially in areas such as human rights monitoring, establishment or restructuring of institutions and police training.

38. Clear reference to gender equality issues in mandates for missions and adequate budgetary provisions can facilitate the integration of gender

perspectives in all substantive activities and provide criteria to measure performance. Few mandates of peacekeeping missions make explicit reference to women and girls, or to the different impact of armed conflict or post-conflict recovery on women and girls. None have included a commitment to gender equality as part of a mission's mandate.

39. A fundamental aspect of peacekeeping operations is to establish security. Differences in men's and women's security priorities and needs, both in the home and in the public sphere, need to be identified when working to establish a safe environment. Civilian police components, in their work with new or reconstructed police forces, as well as in human rights monitoring, need to be able to address crimes committed against women and girls in a gendersensitive manner. Public information activities of a mission should ensure that both women and men have access to information. Peacekeeping missions benefit from contacts with and access to the knowledge and expertise of local women's organizations.

40. A number of ways to enhance attention to gender perspectives in peace operations need to be addressed. A clear commitment to the promotion of gender equality throughout the entire mission is required, from the inception of its mandate to its end. This commitment must be translated into concrete actions in all areas of the mission and should be the responsibility of all mission staff, particularly senior managers. Many managers and professional staff are still uncertain about the relevant gender perspectives in their areas of work and as to how they can integrate these perspectives in different areas of peacekeeping. More systematic training of all staff on gender perspectives before and after their deployment is necessary. Gender perspectives have to be integrated into all standard operating procedures, manuals, instructions and other instruments offering guidance to peacekeeping operations.

41. Lack of appropriate tools such as guidelines and training programmes, as well as lack of financial resources, hamper attention to gender perspectives. The concrete tools being developed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to help mainstream gender perspectives into the daily work of all mission components should help to meet these needs.

42. Gender expertise at both Headquarters and mission levels is necessary to support top management in carrying out their responsibility for gender mainstreaming. The experience of gender units and gender advisers in missions such as the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (now the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)), as well as the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), should provide useful insights on the mandates, location, reporting lines and resources of such units or advisers for maximum effectiveness. Gender specialists in the field do require backstopping from Headquarters. In June 2001, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations recognized the need for gender expertise at Headquarters and recommended the establishment of a

dedicated gender capacity for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for which resources have not yet been approved.

43. A number of important efforts have been made, and some successes achieved, in incorporating gender perspectives into peacekeeping operations. These include measures taken by UNMIBH, UNMIK and UNTAET to promote gender balance in the local police forces and to work with new or restructured police forces on issues related to domestic violence and trafficking in women and girls. The missions in Kosovo and East Timor also actively supported the increased participation of women in governmental and administrative structures through training and capacitybuilding workshops. The Gender Affairs Unit of UNTAET facilitated the integration of gender perspectives into its programmes and policies, building capacity both within the Mission and in East Timorese society.

44. The need to increase the participation of women in all aspects of peace operations, among international and local staff, and particularly at the highest levels of decision-making, has been raised as a priority concern. I have taken a number of steps to increase the number of female staff in peace operations, although we are as yet far from the goal of 50-50 gender balance. The first female Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed in 1992. Now, 10 years later, there is still only one female Special Representative. There are three female Deputy Special Representatives. The Secretariat will make more determined efforts to increase the appointment of women at the Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative levels. In addition, I reiterate my appeal to Member States to provide names of qualified women candidates to serve in high-level positions. I will set concrete targets for the appointment of women as my Special Representatives and Special Envoys in order to reach the overall target of 50 per cent by 2015. I also call on Member States to act in a proactive manner by identifying women to serve in senior decision-making positions and increasing the recruitment of women as military observers, peacekeeping troops and civilian police. It should be noted, however, that promoting gender equality is not women's responsibility alone, nor will women's participation automatically lead to greater attention to women's needs and priorities in peacekeeping activities.

45. Codes of conduct establish expected standards of behaviour from United Nations staff. Because it is evident that prostitution, often combined with trafficking, increases in the context of international interventions, further measures are needed to prevent trafficking and the sexual exploitation of women in the context of international peace operations. Violence against women and girls and trafficking cannot be tolerated. All missions have clear instructions to thoroughly investigate any allegations of sexual exploitation or assault by any peacekeeping personnel and to ensure that offenders are duly disciplined. In addition, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is reviewing and improving its procedures on disciplinary matters and has requested missions to improve monitoring mechanisms to ensure appropriate action. I call on troop-contributing States to enhance their own efforts to ensure that such violations do not occur, to investigate and prosecute effectively cases of alleged misconduct and to set up adequate accountability mechanisms and disciplinary measures.

46. I submit the following for the attention of the Security Council:

Action 10

Incorporate gender perspectives explicitly into mandates of all peacekeeping missions, including provisions to systematically address this issue in all reports to the Security Council.

Action 11

Require that data collected in research, assessments and appraisals, monitoring and evaluation and reporting on peace operations is systematically disaggregated by sex and age and that specific data on the situation of women and girls and the impact of interventions on them is provided.

Action 12

Ensure necessary financial and human resources for gender mainstreaming, including the establishment of gender advisers/units in multidimensional peacekeeping operations and capacity-building activities, as well as targeted projects for women and girls as part of approved mission budgets.

VI. Humanitarian operations

47. Today's complex humanitarian operations, which often begin even prior to the cessation of hostilities, commonly involve a large and diverse number of humanitarian and development organizations. Given the many ways in which humanitarian operations and development interventions overlap, it is critical to ensure that gender perspectives are systematically integrated into the full range of emergency operations from their initial stages.

48. Many of the experiences and needs of women and girls in armed conflict continue on during humanitarian and emergency situations. The specific protection needs of women and girls have to be identified and addressed in the delivery of humanitarian aid, including through the promotion of access to vulnerable populations and the separation of civilians and armed elements.

49. Pressure to design programmes rapidly should not lead to a neglect of gender perspectives. It is critical that the needs and priorities of women and girls are given attention in initial surveys, appraisals and assessment missions so that they are fully incorporated into the policy frameworks, strategies and programming processes that guide the choice of activities and resource allocations in humanitarian phases. Women should be actively involved in needs assessments and the distribution of aid.

50. An understanding of the vulnerability of women and girls in camps, particularly where there is a proliferation of weapons, should inform all management and operational decisions and should lead to the establishment of adequate protection mechanisms. Protection from and prevention of violence, including gender-based and sexual violence, requires practical steps. Women and girls face the risk of violence when camps are poorly designed and security inside and outside of camps is inadequate. The presence of military forces and crossfire near camps poses additional risks. Refugee and internally displaced women and girls also face the risk of violence at the hands of those who are in a position to facilitate their passage, determine their refugee status or issue their

identity cards, as well as during forced return to their homes. Women may be forced to engage in prostitution in exchange for food or other essential goods and services.

51. Effective distribution of relief and of other benefits requires awareness of the experiences and needs of women and girls in a given crisis. Women should be fully involved in the management of refugee camps, including in decision-making. Particular attention has to be paid to the manner in which refugees and displaced persons are registered so that women are not excluded from direct access to basic goods and services, from social and economic programmes or from decision-making opportunities. Gender issues in relation to livelihoods, food security and health in post-conflict situations require adequate responses. Based on the principles of non-discrimination and equality between women and men, United Nations entities and other organizations must counter any resistance to providing relief or work opportunities to women and girls.

52. Entities providing humanitarian assistance, especially those that are members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, have developed many constructive policies, strategies and guidelines to ensure that gender perspectives and the needs of women are consistently addressed by all staff involved in humanitarian operations. The challenge is to ensure that these methods and tools are fully utilized. All categories of staff require adequate and appropriate training, and the recruitment of women for humanitarian operations should be increased. Recent reports of sexual abuse of refugees by humanitarian workers in West Africa have demonstrated that more specific and more strictly enforced codes of conduct and disciplinary measures are necessary. The Office of Internal Oversight Services has conducted an investigation of these allegations and will present a report on its findings to the General Assembly. I welcome the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's plan of action on sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian crises as a positive initiative of the United Nations system and call upon all Committee members and others concerned to ensure its swift implementation.

53. I submit the following for the attention of the Security Council:

Action 13

Urge parties to conflict to ensure that agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations, regional organizations and NGOs have safe and unhindered access to populations in need, especially women and girls.

Action 14

Increase the participation of women and girls, fully utilize their capacities and give attention to their needs and priorities in the initial stages of programming and service delivery in humanitarian crises in order to optimize the benefits for women and girls.

VII. Reconstruction and rehabilitation

54. Sustainable and durable peace requires the participation of women and girls, as well as the integration of gender perspectives in all reconstruction processes to ensure the creation of more equitable and sustainable societies. Reconstruction efforts must be based on human rights principles, including nondiscrimination, to

ensure that inequalities and discrimination that existed prior to conflict, which may have deepened during conflict, are not perpetuated or exacerbated.

55. Constitutional reform processes provide opportunities for codifying principles of non-discrimination and equality on the basis of sex. Legislative reform should repeal discriminatory provisions in areas such as nationality, property rights, and inheritance, as well as address violence against women. Gender-sensitivity of courts, which is important to remove any possible bias, requires awareness-raising and training. Ensuring justice for victims of gender-based violations of international humanitarian and human rights law is a critical aspect of reconstruction. Where truth and reconciliation commissions are established, equitable access and gender-sensitive procedures must be assured.

56. The creation of electoral systems should guarantee free and fair elections and universal suffrage. Special measures, including quota and training for women as voters and candidates, may be needed to ensure that women can exercise these rights and that their equitable representation in elected office can be increased. While women may have successfully organized during conflict, additional support, including financial support, may be necessary to ensure their continuing active participation in civil society organizations and public life once conflict is ended.

57. Economic reconstruction must be informed by an understanding of the challenges women and girls face in accessing employment in both the formal and informal sectors, as well as in areas of agricultural production and food security, particularly in regions where women are the principal food producers. The needs and priorities of women as well as men should be taken into account in economic policy reform. Microcredit should not be seen as a panacea for increasing women's access to economic resources and incorporating gender perspectives in economic development. Women should be fully represented in economic decision-making.

58. Social reconstruction includes the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed social sectors, notably health care, education and social service institutions, and involves a long-term process of social healing and reintegration. The severe disruption of social networks caused by armed conflict contributes to growing numbers of marginalized groups, including war widows, child-headed households, orphans, the disabled and former child soldiers. Addressing the needs and priorities of women and girls should be an integral part in the design and implementation of social healing processes. The problems women and girls have faced in conflict and displacement, in particular with regard to human rights, reproductive health, domestic violence and trafficking, must be directly addressed.

59. Effective progress in promoting gender equality in reconstruction processes is hampered by underresourcing and marginalization of targeted interventions for women as well as by the lack of systematic attention to gender perspectives in all mainstream policies, strategies and activities. The extent to which gender perspectives are factored into the design and implementation of programmes on

the ground in all areas of reconstruction needs to be more systematically monitored, evaluated and documented.

60. Members States, United Nations entities and civil society organizations play a critical role in reconstruction processes. I call upon all actors involved in reconstruction processes to:

Action 15

Develop clear strategies and action plans (with targets and timetables) on the incorporation of gender perspectives in rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, including monitoring mechanisms, and incorporate explicit attention to the situation of women and girls in needs assessments, initial appraisals and implementation plans for all sectors; and also develop targeted activities, with adequate resources, focused on specific constraints facing women and girls.

Action 16

Ensure that, in efforts to secure local ownership for reconstruction processes, women's groups and networks are actively involved, particularly at decision-making levels.

Action 17

Identify and address social and legal barriers to education and employment for women and girls, through both mainstream and targeted interventions.

Action 18

Ensure that attention to gender perspectives in economic reconstruction entails analysis of economic policy-making and planning from a gender perspective, as well as the increased participation of women in economic decisionmaking; and incorporate gender perspectives into all support for national budget processes, in line with the outcome of the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002).

VIII. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

61. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are integral components of the peace process and post-conflict activities, which are increasingly incorporated in formal peace accords. One of the most important goals of disarmament relates to the collection, safe storage and destruction of armaments and ammunition following conflicts, along with the demobilization of combatants and their reintegration into society. In recent years, national governments and regional and international organizations have been involved in disarmament activities, some of which entail the provision of various material incentives, such as community development assistance, to encourage the surrender of weapons. Such disarmament activities are of great importance to women and girls because of the heightened threat to their personal security owing to the proliferation of weapons in post-conflict situations. For this reason, women and girls are often actively involved in weapons collections programmes.

62. Successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives are based on an understanding that combatants are not only men, but also women, girls and boys. Initiatives that target only males above the age of 18, who fit the international definition of soldiers, fail to identify the needs and priorities of

women and girl combatants. If women and girl combatants are not registered in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes they cannot access the different forms of assistance provided.

63. A limited notion of combatants also restricts the chances that those women and children who, willingly or unwillingly, supported the fighters as “campfollowers” will be able to access assistance through these programmes. The status and situation of women and girls used as domestic servants and sexual slaves needs to be explicitly addressed, including, in particular, the effects of sexual and other forms of abuse and resulting trauma.

64. Even where women and girls have not been actively involved in armed conflict it is important to take into account its disruptive impact on family structures and relations and to be aware of the problems both demobilized combatants and their families and communities may encounter in reintegration processes. The risks of increased domestic violence have to be taken into account and strategies developed to address this problem.

65. I call upon all Member States, United Nations entities and civil society organizations involved in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes to:

Action 19

Incorporate the needs and priorities of women and girls as ex-combatants, “camp-followers” and families of ex-combatants in the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the design of camps, the distribution of benefits and access to basic resources and services, such as food, water, health care and counselling, in order to ensure the success of such programmes and the participation and full access to benefits for women and girls.

Action 20

Increase the number of programmes for child soldiers, fully incorporate attention to the specific situation and needs of girl soldiers and identify means to support child soldiers, including girls, who do not enter disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

Action 21

Recognize the impact of armed conflict and displacement on family relations and develop awareness of the risk of increased domestic violence, especially in the families of excombatants; and develop programmes on the prevention of domestic violence, targeting families and communities, and especially male ex-combatants.

IX. Concluding observations

66. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) has galvanized the Member States, the United Nations system and civil society, including at the grass-roots level. The suffering of women and girls during armed conflict and its aftermath has been widely documented. Women’s contributions to peacemaking and peacebuilding are still less recognized and utilized. During the last two years, the Security Council has increasingly focused its attention on the situation of women and girls in armed conflict. However, these issues are often discussed as a separate item rather than being integrated into the Council’s deliberations. In

order to effectively respond to the needs and priorities of women and girls during armed conflict, gender perspectives have to be systematically integrated into all peace-building, peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts and during humanitarian operations and reconstruction processes.

67. International law and existing strategies and guidelines within United Nations entities provide a strong framework for addressing gender perspectives within the context of armed conflict and its aftermath. Despite positive efforts undertaken, gender perspectives are still not systematically incorporated into all activities related to peace and security. Much remains to be done to ensure that the existing frameworks and the recommendations in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) are fully implemented. Challenges to fully utilizing women's contributions across the wide range of activities relevant to peace and security persist at many levels.

68. We can no longer afford to minimize or ignore the contributions of women and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping and the reconstruction processes. Sustainable peace will not be achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men. It is my hope that the Security Council, Member States, the United Nations system, NGOs, civil society and others will take further decisive action to ensure the participation of women and girls and fully incorporate their concerns into all our efforts to promote peace and security.

**Appendix Three: Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and
Security (2004)**

United Nations

S/2004/814

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 October 2004
Original: English
04-53414 (E) 151004

**Women and peace and security
Report of the Secretary-General**

I. Introduction

1. On 31 October 2002, the Security Council adopted the statement of the President (S/PRST/2002/32), in which it requested the preparation of a follow-up report on the full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security to be presented to the Security Council in October 2004. The present report is prepared pursuant to that request.

2. Building on the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly, as well as the work of the Security Council and other legislative bodies on peace and security, resolution 1325 (2000) called for women's equal participation with men and their full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. It reaffirmed the need to fully implement international humanitarian and human rights law to protect women and girls from human rights abuses, including genderbased violence. It identified the need to mainstream gender perspectives in relation to conflict prevention, peace negotiations, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives.

3. This report provides illustrative examples of the progress achieved thus far and identifies gaps and challenges in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), as well as recommendations for further action which the Security Council and other actors may wish to consider. It is based on contributions from Member States¹ and entities of the United Nations system. It draws on the assessment of progress and recommendations made in my report of 16 October 2002 on women, peace and security, an in-depth study mandated by resolution 1325 (2000), and other studies and reports, including the assessment of an independent expert commissioned by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

II. Progress in implementation

4. Initiatives have been taken by a broad range of actors to implement resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia, by developing policies, action plans, guidelines and indicators; increasing access to gender expertise; providing training; promoting consultation with and participation of women; increasing attention to human rights; and supporting the initiative of women's groups. Resolution 1325 (2000)

has been effectively utilized by civil society organizations as an advocacy and monitoring tool. Despite significant achievements, major gaps and challenges remain in all areas, including, in particular, in relation to women's participation in conflict prevention and peace processes; the integration of gender perspectives in peace agreements; attention to the contributions and needs of women in humanitarian and reconstruction processes; and representation of women in decision-making positions. Increased incidence of sexual and gender-based violence in recent years and the failure to provide adequate protection is a critical issue and will be treated in a separate section of this report.

A. Intergovernmental processes

1. Security Council

5. The Security Council held three open debates in 2002 and 2003 at which progress and challenges in implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) were discussed. Two presidential statements⁵ were issued calling on Member States, entities of the United Nations system, civil society and other relevant actors to develop clear strategies and action plans with goals and timetables, including monitoring mechanisms on the integration of gender perspectives in peace support and humanitarian operations and in post-conflict reconstruction.

6. In recent resolutions, the Security Council reaffirmed resolution 1325 (2000) and included specific mandates⁶ for the protection of women and children in the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Overall, in 15.6 per cent of Security Council resolutions adopted from January 2000 to June 2004 attention was paid to women or to gender concerns. In addition, discussions by the Council have increasingly recognized the interrelationship between gender perspectives and other thematic issues before the Council, such as children in armed conflict, protection of civilians, conflict prevention, the rule of law and transitional justice.

7. In adopting resolution 1325 (2000), the Security Council expressed its willingness to ensure that missions mandated by the Council take into account gender considerations and the rights of women including through consultation with local and international women's groups. Members of the Council met with local women's groups during all Council missions to West Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes Region and Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004. The Council mission to West Africa in June 2004 specifically called on UNOCI to mainstream gender perspectives into its operations. As a comparison, from 2000 to 2002, the Council consulted with women's groups at 4 out of 10 missions. Briefing notes, prepared by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security since 2003 provided information on women's groups and on gender equality concerns in the countries visited.

8. Members of the Security Council also expanded their engagement with civil society through several "Arria Formula" meetings. Two round tables hosted in 2004 by the Permanent Missions of Canada, Chile, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in coordination with the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, brought together Council members,

Member States, United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)⁷ and civil society representatives to discuss linkages between the various thematic reports and resolutions, and the importance of participation of women, the incorporation of gender perspectives and the protection of civilians. These interactions resulted in a draft checklist for integrating attention to the needs, priorities and contributions of women into the work of the Council.

2. General Assembly

9. The General Assembly has considered women, peace and security issues in some of its discussions and resolutions⁸ on country and thematic issues, including on protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, human rights and mass exoduses, trafficking in women and girls and the girl child. The Assembly condemned the widespread use of sexual violence against women and children as a weapon of war. It urged all parties to conflict to meet the special needs of women and girls in postconflict reconstruction. It also urged all parties to conflict to implement all necessary measures to put an end to the widespread violations of human rights and impunity, in particular with regard to sexual violence against women and children. In 2003, the Assembly adopted a resolution on women and political participation, in which it reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflict and stressed the importance of their full and equal participation in all efforts to promote and maintain peace and security in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000) and other relevant resolutions of the Assembly.

3. The Economic and Social Council and its functional commissions

10. At its substantive session of 2004, the Economic and Social Council, following up on its agreed conclusions 1997/2 on gender mainstreaming in all programmes and policies of the United Nations, adopted resolution 2004/4, in which it requested all United Nations entities to strengthen their efforts at gender mainstreaming and to develop action plans with specific timelines for implementing the gender mainstreaming strategy. The resolution also called for measures to strengthen commitment and accountability at the highest levels within the United Nations and underscored the importance of monitoring and reporting. United Nations entities were also asked to provide effective support to gender specialists, gender focal points and gender theme groups. The resolution urged continued efforts towards full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).

11. At its forty-eighth session, the Commission on the Status of Women reviewed the thematic issue of women's equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and in post-conflict peace-building. Building on resolution 1325 (2000), the Commission, in its agreed conclusions,¹⁰ made a number of recommendations to Governments and other relevant participants on the participation of women and incorporation of gender perspectives in conflict prevention, peace processes, and post-conflict peace-building, including in elections and reconstruction and rehabilitation.

B. Conflict prevention and early warning

12. In its resolution 1325 (2000) the Security Council reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention of conflict and stressed the need to increase their

role in decision-making in conflict prevention. Women's contributions to preventing conflicts are particularly important in "people to people" diplomacy. Women can call attention to tensions before they erupt in open hostilities by collecting and analysing early warning information on potential armed conflict. Women play a critical role in building the capacity of communities to prevent new or recurrent violence. Women's organizations can often make contact with parties to conflict and interface with Governments and the United Nations.

13. Reflecting the importance of women's participation in conflict prevention, in my report on prevention of armed conflict,¹¹ I encouraged the Security Council to give greater attention to gender perspectives in its conflict prevention efforts; and in my interim report¹² I recognized the need to prioritize the proactive role women can play in peace-building.

14. At the forty-eighth session of the Commission on the Status of Women, Member States emphasized the need to: improve the collection, analysis and inclusion of information on women and gender issues as part of conflict prevention and early warning efforts; ensure better collaboration and coordination between efforts to promote gender equality and efforts aimed at conflict prevention; support capacity-building, especially for civil society and in particular for women's organizations, to increase community commitment to conflict prevention; and ensure women's participation in the elaboration and implementation of strategies for preventing conflict.

15. Member States, United Nations entities, civil society and NGOs are engaged in a constructive dialogue to support the process of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict in follow-up to the open debate on the role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflict held on 4 September 2003.¹³ The Global Partnership is organizing consultations in the lead up to an international conference planned for June 2005. Women's involvement in the Global Partnership needs to be strengthened. On a regional level, the African First Ladies Peace Mission, currently chaired by the First Lady of Burkina Faso, has worked to enhance women's role in conflict prevention.

16. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency has developed an overall strategy for conflict management and peace-building and has supported NGOs on implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), including on conflict prevention. Between 2001 and 2002, the Swiss Peace Foundation, International Alert and the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response developed a set of gender-sensitive early warning indicators, which allows for previously overlooked signs of instability to be taken into account and concentrates on early warning at the grassroots level.

17. Within the United Nations system, UNIFEM has developed a set of genderbased early warning indicators that are currently being tested in four field-based pilots in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Solomon Islands and areas of central Asia. These indicators, drawn from a wide range of women's experiences in the build-up to and during armed conflict, vary from such obvious signs as sex-specific refugee migrations and rising violence against

women to less obvious measures such as media scapegoating of women and the silencing of women leaders through intimidation.

18. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat has established a Task Force on Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Development, which is developing a work plan covering the underlying causes of conflicts such as poverty, socio-economic and gender inequalities, endemic underdevelopment, weak or non-existent institutions and the absence of effective governance. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women has compiled a list of gender contacts on peace and security, including on conflict prevention and resolution.

19. Despite these efforts, women's knowledge and experiences are underutilized in the prevention of violent conflict while gender perspectives have been neglected in early warning exercises and the development of response options. System-wide efforts, such as the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action, should draw more systematically on women's contributions to conflict prevention and fully incorporate gender perspectives into responses at Headquarters and on the ground. Special representatives and envoys, regional and country teams and other relevant actors should identify, engage and support local women and their associations in conflict prevention efforts.

20. I intend to develop a comprehensive system-wide strategy and action plan for increasing attention to gender perspectives in conflict prevention, with particular emphasis on monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

21. I urge Member States, United Nations entities, NGOs and other relevant actors to work collaboratively to ensure the full participation of women and incorporation of gender perspectives in all conflict prevention work and to strengthen interaction with women's organizations to ensure that their contributions as well as their needs and priorities are included in the collection and analysis of information to guide conflict prevention strategies and early warning efforts.

C. Peace processes and negotiations

22. Resolution 1325 (2000) calls on all actors to ensure the full participation of women in peace processes and to adopt gender perspectives when negotiating peace agreements. Various initiatives of Member States, the United Nations and civil society have focused on supporting and increasing the representation of women in peace negotiations and mainstreaming gender perspectives into peace agreements.

23. The Government of the Philippines has sought women's participation in the peace process, involving them in dialogues and workshops to integrate their experiences and perspectives. The Australian Government has provided support to organizations that promote women's participation in peace processes, including the Bougainvillean Women's Forum, which drew up recommendations to further the peace process and to identify post-conflict development priorities. The Canadian International Development Agency has supported Sudanese

women on building consensus on a platform for peace. In Sri Lanka, the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, supported by Norway, established a subcommittee on gender issues to elaborate gender-sensitive guidelines for the peace process.

24. The Division for the Advancement of Women of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs provided technical support and training to 70 African women leaders on negotiation and mediation skills from 2001 to 2003, to support their integration into formal peace negotiations. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) advocated the inclusion of gender-specific responses in the peace process in Liberia, and in particular, for the prioritization and recognition of the rights of women and girls associated with fighting forces. In Somalia, UNIFEM helped women to come together across factional lines to define a common agenda for women's role in peace and reconstruction focusing on issues of women's representation.

25. There is increasing recognition that efforts to enhance women's participation at the peace table must be complemented by steps to give systematic attention to gender issues in all aspects of peace processes. Within the United Nations system, in December 2003, the Division for the Advancement of Women, in collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, convened an expert group meeting on peace agreements as a means for promoting gender equality in preparation for the forty-eighth session of the Commission on the Status of Women. A framework of model provisions¹⁴ on promoting gender equality was developed, providing a set of standards for mediators, facilitators and funding entities involved in preparing peace agreements. It has been widely disseminated to field offices. During the annual meeting of field presences of the Department of Political Affairs in May 2004, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General held a special session on gender mainstreaming to exchange field experiences on achievements and obstacles.

26. Indigenous women play a unique role in conflict resolution as mediators and peace builders. At its third session, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues acknowledged these contributions and recommended that United Nations entities integrate the special concerns, priorities and contributions of indigenous women in all aspects of conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

27. The women's movement has made major contributions to building partnerships for peace. In Azerbaijan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes Region, Liberia, the Middle East, Nepal, Northern Ireland and Somalia, for example, women have worked collaboratively across ethnic and religious lines to make valuable contributions to peace processes. One lesson learned from the peace negotiations in Liberia is that women need to receive early support and training in order to facilitate their active participation in the negotiation of peace agreements. There are also a number of regional and international efforts to support women as peacemakers, for example the Mano River Women's Peace Network, which was awarded the United Nations Prize in

the Field of Human Rights in 2003 and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

28. While the impact of the contribution of women to informal peace processes is well known, obstacles to their participation and to the systematic incorporation of gender perspectives in formal peace processes remain. The number of women who participate in formal peace processes remains small. The leadership of parties to conflict is male-dominated and men are chosen to participate at the peace table. The desire to bring peace at any cost may result in a failure to involve women and consider their needs and concerns. In addition, women's organizations often do not have the resources needed to effectively influence lengthy peace negotiation processes.

29. I urge Member States, entities of the United Nations and civil society to develop comprehensive guidelines and training initiatives based on the framework of model provisions on promoting gender equality in peace agreements.

30. I intend to review recent peace processes and analyse the obstacles to and missed opportunities for women's full participation in peace negotiations and develop strategies accordingly.

D. Peacekeeping operations

31. The most significant progress in the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) has been made in the peacekeeping arena. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has increasingly paid attention to issues concerning women, peace and security and has called for the full implementation of the resolution. In 2000, there was minimal mention of gender issues in peacekeeping mandates and only two gender advisers were assigned to peacekeeping operations. Today, gender concerns are raised in all new peacekeeping mandates and there are 10 full-time gender adviser positions in 17 peacekeeping operations, including those in: Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste as well as in the advance mission in the Sudan. Every new multidimensional peacekeeping operation created since 2000 has included gender advisers. In 2003, Member States approved the creation of a post of gender adviser at the Headquarters level within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The gender adviser will work primarily as a catalyst in supporting the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in all offices of the Department; provide ongoing support and policy and operational guidance to gender advisers in the field; and capture and disseminate lessons learned and best practices related to gender and peacekeeping.

32. Gender units and advisers in peacekeeping operations are working to provide technical guidance to the heads of operations, to ensure increased efforts to mainstream gender perspectives into all functional areas of peacekeeping and to increase the participation of women leaders and organizations in the implementation of the mandate of the operation.

33. The incorporation of gender perspectives from the inception of a mandate has

proven to be crucial. Gender advisers participated in inter-agency assessment missions conducted prior to the establishment of the mandates of operations in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Liberia, which resulted in a better reflection of gender issues in reports submitted to the Security Council prior to the establishment of peacekeeping operations in these four countries and translated into explicit references to gender issues in the ensuing Security Council resolutions. Gender checklists for needs assessments have been developed to guide this process.

34. Training of military, civilian police and civilian peacekeeping personnel on the protection, rights and particular needs of women, as well as the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping functions, has received considerable attention from Member States, the United Nations and civil society. Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have developed a gender training initiative for military and civilian personnel involved in peace support operations that educates personnel on the topic of gender issues. Several other countries, including Argentina, Australia, Germany and Switzerland, reported on measures taken to incorporate gender perspectives in training for personnel involved in peace support operations. Within the United Nations system, the Department of Management has supported a variety of capacity-building initiatives on mainstreaming gender perspectives in peace and security, including in peacekeeping.

35. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has focused on improving the training materials and tools available to all staff on mainstreaming gender perspectives into their daily work. In 2003, the Department developed gender awareness training materials for use in pre-deployment and induction training for military and civilian police personnel. In 2004, it produced a "Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations", providing guidance on gender issues in the various functional areas covered by multidimensional peacekeeping operations. In addition, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) conducted training on women and children for civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) and Timor-Leste.

36. Training for peacekeepers on HIV/AIDS has also progressed under the guidance of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Gender-sensitive HIV/AIDS awareness training is included in induction training, and all peacekeeping operations have either an HIV/AIDS focal point or an adviser and are establishing voluntary counselling and testing facilities. In June 2004, UNAIDS and Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertook a joint mission to Haiti to establish an HIV/AIDS programme before the arrival of the main contingents, setting an important precedent for future operations. In Sierra Leone an inter-agency project on HIV/AIDS training for peacekeepers was undertaken by UNAIDS, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNIFEM.

37. An emerging problem in some peacekeeping operations is the issue of human

trafficking. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations developed a policy on human trafficking in 2004 and is producing a package of guidance for peacekeeping operations, supported by the United States of America. The package includes model legislation and awareness-raising materials. It will assist operations, including operations in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro) and Timor-Leste, which have already developed legislation on human trafficking but face challenges in implementation, as well as operations, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which support capacity-building of national actors on this issue. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) is working with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to combat trafficking through prevention and assistance to trafficked persons, including by providing shelter and assistance with voluntary return home. Up until June 2004, 430 trafficked persons had been assisted by IOM in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro).

38. A number of peacekeeping operations have established specific units in police stations to assist victims of sexual violence. For instance, at operations in Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, United Nations civilian police have created units to improve assistance in the context of specific crimes such as sexual violence, child sexual and physical abuse and domestic violence.

39. Continued attention needs to be paid to the incorporation of gender concerns into the planning of new operations. A more coherent strategy for gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is needed to increase the understanding of the relevance of gender issues to peacekeeping and to detail how to integrate gender concerns into the various pillars of an operation, including greater attention to data collection and reporting. Experience reveals that gender units in peacekeeping operations are most effective when adequately staffed at sufficiently senior levels and where they have direct access to and support of senior management.

40. I intend to develop a comprehensive strategy and action plan for mainstreaming gender perspectives into peacekeeping activities at Headquarters and in peacekeeping operations, in particular in the planning of new operations, with specific monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and urge the Security Council to monitor the implementation of the strategy and action plan.

E. Humanitarian response

41. Resolution 1325 (2000) calls on all actors to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, in particular in their design. Use of gender analysis should ensure that the different experiences and contributions of women and men are brought into the planning and implementation of emergency relief efforts. Placing refugee and displaced women in decision-making positions and involving them in camp design and management needs to be complemented with skills-building and support. There have been repeated calls for proper individual documentation and registration of women affected by conflict, including refugee women. Despite improvements made in registration, women,

including heads of households, may be without the documentation they need to access basic supplies and services.

42. A number of actors have worked to strengthen women's participation and gender mainstreaming in humanitarian situations. Member States have provided assistance in ensuring that gender perspectives are incorporated in humanitarian interventions. A strategy and action plan for promoting gender equality included in Finland's policy for development cooperation for 2003-2007 requires that humanitarian partner organizations have gender expertise and mainstream gender perspectives into their work. Similarly, when supporting humanitarian action, Norway requests implementing partners to incorporate gender perspectives in their efforts.

43. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Gender and Humanitarian Assistance has developed strategies to ensure that gender perspectives are mainstreamed into all humanitarian activities. In 2003, the Task Force commissioned an external evaluation of gender mainstreaming in the Consolidated Appeals Process. The evaluation noted that gender mainstreaming in the Process was limited, gender analysis was not systematically undertaken and data was not usually disaggregated by sex. Subsequently, the Technical Guidelines and the Needs Assessment Matrix and Framework for the Consolidated Appeals Process were revised to provide adequate direction concerning gender mainstreaming. Gender experts participated in the training of trainers for facilitators of the Process. In 2004, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee undertook an evaluation of its 1999 gender policy, in which it noted that, while some progress had been achieved in the integration of gender perspectives in all humanitarian protection and assistance activities, important gaps remained, and recommended that the policy be implemented fully.

44. The majority of United Nations agencies working in the humanitarian field have produced policies, guidelines and action plans and supported training efforts on gender mainstreaming. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has developed a policy and plan of action on gender mainstreaming in humanitarian advocacy and information management, humanitarian policy development, coordination of humanitarian response and resource mobilization. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly produced guidelines on socio-economic and gender analysis in emergency and rehabilitation programmes to assist staff at Headquarters and in the field to integrate gender perspectives into all phases of the emergency project cycle, including needs assessment, project formulation, targeting and monitoring and evaluation. Gender policies and guidelines, which have long been in place in humanitarian agencies, need to be operationalized and monitored and accountability mechanisms established or reinforced.

45. In 2002, an independent 10-year assessment of the implementation of the policy and guidelines of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on refugee women was conducted by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. UNHCR is now updating its policy and guidelines to reflect the recommendations of the assessment. A

mainstreaming methodology based on gender and age is being tested in 10 countries. This process actively engages refugees in planning, implementation, monitoring and data collection on the gender and age dimensions of displacement and the related protection risks. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also made five commitments to refugee women, principal among which is to ensure 50 per cent representation of women in refugee management committees. Field operations have reported difficulties in achieving quality participation owing to persistent gender discrimination.

46. Greater coordination among United Nations entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and refugee and displaced women's groups is needed. While the Consolidated Appeals Process has worked to improve the incorporation of gender concerns, gender mainstreaming and women-specific programmes remain underfunded.

47. I urge Member States and entities of the United Nations to:

(a) Strengthen the incorporation of gender perspectives in the Consolidated Appeals Process and ensure routine monitoring of the Process from a gender perspective, including the financial resources provided;

(b) Establish a coordinated humanitarian response monitoring system with specific indicators to determine attention to gender perspectives at field level.

F. Post-conflict reconstruction

48. In resolution 1325 (2000), the Secretary-General called on all actors to incorporate gender perspectives in post-conflict reconstruction efforts and to take into consideration the special needs of women and girls. In its presidential statement (S/PRST/2002/32), the Security Council reaffirmed the importance of gender mainstreaming in post-conflict reconstruction and encouraged the development of targeted activities, focused on the specific constraints facing women and girls in post-conflict situations, including their lack of land and property rights and access to and control over economic resources.

49. The need to include gender perspectives in the rebuilding and reforming of the judicial, legislative and electoral sectors in countries emerging from conflict has received increased attention in the last few years. In my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, I specifically recommended that the differential impact of conflict and rule of law deficits on women and children be recognized and that all initiatives ensure gender sensitivity in restoration of rule of law and transitional justice, as well as the full participation of women.

50. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides the basis for realizing equality between women and men and creates obligations for States parties to take all appropriate measures towards this end. Of the countries with United Nations peace support missions, all but Somalia and the Sudan have ratified the Convention; however, a large number of them have never reported on the implementation of the Convention or their reports are overdue. The Division for the Advancement of Women is implementing technical assistance activities with several countries emerging from conflict, including Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste with financial support from New Zealand. UNIFEM based its support for

constitutional, legal, electoral and administrative reform in Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda and Timor-Leste on the Convention.

51. A conference on gender justice in post-conflict situations, co-organized by UNIFEM and the International Legal Assistance Consortium, was held in September 2004, bringing together a wide range of women in legal and judicial positions from conflict-affected countries and representatives from Member States, the entities of the United Nations, NGOs and civil society. The conference provided a platform for views on critical gender justice concerns, best practices and actions required to ensure gender-responsive institutional and legal reforms in countries emerging from conflict.

52. While it is recognized that truth and reconciliation commissions facilitate the healing process in post-conflict societies, the involvement of women in these processes, and the degree to which the processes address the needs and concerns of women, is not well known. In Timor-Leste, the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation highlighted the impact of the conflict on women and held a public hearing dedicated to women's experiences. Concerns were raised, however, that there was insufficient time and support provided to women victims asked to provide testimony to the Commission. Fears of reprisals by victims and witnesses may hamper women from coming forward and telling their personal stories. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone is in the process of finalizing its report, which should provide greater insights on women's participation and the inclusion of their concerns, or lack thereof, in the proceedings of the Commission. More information is needed on how these commissions directly or indirectly support women as well as on other mechanisms used by women to promote healing from the suffering faced during conflict.

53. At a meeting in Skopje in January 2003, Ministers of the Council of Europe's Steering Committee for Equality between Women and Men agreed that if women were not fully involved in rebuilding democracy, efforts to create a stable society were likely to fail. Policy guidelines were drawn up for incorporating gender perspectives into all activities related to peace and security, including democracy-building and eliminating policies that marginalize women, such as family voting at elections. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Gender Equality of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held a joint workshop with the United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality entitled "Gender and post-conflict reconstruction: lessons learned from Afghanistan". The meeting identified good practices and lessons learned from promoting gender equality in post-conflict reconstruction, drawing on experiences from Afghanistan and other post-conflict contexts.

54. Women have increasingly participated in the formulation of new constitutions. In Afghanistan, women were involved in the drafting of the new constitution and held approximately 100 seats, or 20 per cent, of the 500 seats of the constitutional *Loya Jirga*, a major advance compared with the constitutional *Loya Jirgas* in 1964 and 1977 when only 4 and 12 women participated,

respectively. The Afghan constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 provides for equal rights before the law.

55. Elections can provide an opportunity for change, including for the increased participation of women and the integration of gender perspectives in democratic electoral processes in post-conflict situations. A notable example is Rwanda where the constitution set aside 24 of 80 seats for women in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Parliament. In the October 2003 elections, women won an additional 15 seats bringing the total number of women in the Chamber to 39. Women now hold nearly 49 per cent of the seats, a greater proportion than in any other parliament worldwide.

56. The United Nations assists the holding of democratic elections in countries emerging from conflict. In January 2004, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues convened an expert group meeting at which obstacles, lessons learned and good practices on women's participation in electoral processes in post-conflict countries were analysed. A set of briefing notes on ways to ensure women's participation throughout the electoral process are under preparation.

57. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has instituted a number of measures to ensure that women participate in all aspects of the electoral process, including registration. Some 4,000 single-sex voter registration sites have been set up and a public information campaign was launched including posters and leaflets that urged women to register to vote and participate in the reconstruction of the country. Nearly half of the 14,000 registration workers are women. As of September 2004, some 10.5 million voters were registered, with women accounting for approximately 41 per cent of that total. In accordance with the new constitution, on average, two seats per province will be held by women, or 68 of the total 249 seats in the lower house.

58. Beyond ensuring that women register to vote, women running for office need skills building and support. Political parties need to have internal democratic and transparent nomination procedures and adopt voluntary targets or quotas for women on their candidate lists. One area vital to women's full participation, and one often overlooked, is the involvement of women in electoral management bodies. In Iraq, the presence of women in the electoral management body has been a critical element in ensuring that women can participate and that their needs and priorities are addressed at all stages of the process.

59. Member States, United Nations entities and other actors have also made efforts to ensure that gender perspectives are incorporated in social and economic reconstruction efforts. The United Nations Development Group has been working with UNIFEM to promote the incorporation of gender issues as a cross-cutting theme in the needs assessment processes in countries emerging from conflict, including Haiti, Iraq, Liberia and the Sudan. Sector-specific gender checklists, covering areas such as health, education, shelter and employment, were developed and utilized. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has incorporated gender perspectives in policies and programmes for sustainable agriculture and rural development in post-conflict

settings. In Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro), FAO supported training of rural development officers on gender analysis with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. In Iraq, UN-Habitat delivered some 22,000 housing units to displaced populations, targeting mainly war widows, and conducted training on gender issues with local government officials. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has worked to incorporate gender perspectives in employment, income generation and skills training in postconflict situations.

60. Targeted support has also been provided for women's groups and networks in post-conflict situations by Member States, United Nations entities and NGOs. The United Nations regional commissions in Africa and Western Asia provided assistance to skills building in women's groups and networks and supported national machineries in countries emerging from conflict.

61. Member States and other actors have an important role in ensuring that funds are available for initiatives aimed at promoting gender equality. In Afghanistan, several Member States have funded projects for women and girls, including Belgian Development Cooperation, which provided funding for the strengthening of the Ministry for Women's Affairs. The United States has allocated funding for projects that assist women with democratic organization and advocacy. The World Bank has supported a number of gender initiatives through its Post Conflict Fund.

62. A majority of reconstruction efforts do not, however, systematically include gender perspectives into initial surveys, appraisals and needs assessments of programmes and projects; target initiatives for women and girls; or include a gender analysis of budgets. Without such measures, reconstruction efforts may not identify or address gender-specific problems relating to issues such as land, property and inheritance rights, health, education, employment or security concerns. Sustained attention by national and international partners is needed to ensure gender analysis is systematically utilized when developing reconstruction strategies and programmes.

63. I urge Member States, United Nations entities and civil society to:

- (a) Develop approaches and guidelines and guidelines for ensuring that all programmes and policies in support of the rule of law, including constitutional, judicial and legislative reform, promote gender equality and women's human rights;
- (b) Systematically use the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women as a guiding framework in programmes and other support in post-conflict countries;
- (c) In consultation with women and girls, plan and implement specific initiatives for women and girls and systematically incorporate gender perspectives in the planning, implementation and monitoring of all reconstruction programmes and budgets to ensure that women and girls benefit directly from resources mobilized through multilateral and bilateral sources.

64. I intend to review the extent to which women have participated and their concerns have been met in truth and reconciliation processes and make

recommendations to guide the development of future reconciliation processes.
65. I also intend to set indicators and benchmarks for women's equal participation in all aspects of elections process, based on a review of good practice.

G. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

66. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes have increasingly acknowledged and provided support to women and girls as combatants, abductees, supporters of armed groups, wives and dependants of male combatants and as community members to provide assistance both in disarming fighters and reintegrating them into families and communities, as encouraged in resolution 1325 (2000). In September 2003, in its resolution 1509 (2003) on Liberia the Security Council called, for the first time, for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme that specifically included attention to the special needs of children and women. In 2004, stronger resolutions on Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti called for the needs of women and children associated with armed groups to be comprehensively included in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

67. Some progress has been made on incorporating gender perspectives in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone and, very recently, in planning under way in the Sudan. However, in general, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes remain primarily focused on male ex-combatants even though women and girls are involved in all aspects of armed groups, either voluntarily or forcibly. The use of gender analysis is crucial to understanding the different needs, concerns and contributions of women and men, girls and boys, although it has not been consistently or effectively used in planning, implementing and evaluating disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

68. In April 2003, the Department of Disarmament Affairs prepared a gender mainstreaming action plan for the work of the Department. Its implementation will be systematically monitored and reported on. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has dedicated an issue of *Disarmament Forum* to women, men, peace and security, which provides further insight into how women and men participate in and are affected by conflict.

69. Under the auspices of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNIFEM drafted standard operating procedures on gender and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which provide field-based guidance on incorporating the needs and concerns of women and girl combatants in peace agreements and utilizing gender analysis in the planning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including in the social reintegration of combatants into communities. The United Nations Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing a guide to gender mainstreaming for mine action. UNICEF has completed the mine risk education component of the International Mine Action Standards, which includes gender-specific standards to which all United Nations entities and their operational partners should adhere. UNICEF coordinates all disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration programmes for children associated with fighting forces and armed groups. Girls remain disadvantaged both in their access to demobilization and in their reintegration into communities. Many girls who become pregnant during armed conflict face stigmatization on return.

70. In the Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has employed a gender adviser who works directly with national counterparts to ensure gender concerns are fully integrated in the planning of the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. These initiatives should be monitored closely to ascertain their effectiveness and documented, where appropriate, as good practices.

71. The involvement of women and women's groups in all aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should be strengthened, including their involvement in arms collection. Increased attention must be paid to procedures that verify eligibility of women and girls associated with fighting forces. Separate procedures should be established to ensure that women and girls who have been involved in armed conflict receive medical care and psychosocial support.

72. I call on Member States, entities of the United Nations system and NGOs to develop guidelines, based on a review of good practice, on increasing attention to the needs and contributions of women and girls in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and to monitor and report regularly on their implementation.

III. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence in armed conflict

73. In its resolution 1325 (2000), the Security Council called on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict. The resolution has contributed to increased recognition of the escalation in scope and intensity of sexual and gender-based violence as one of the most visible and insidious impacts of armed conflict on women and girls and of the need for improved prevention and protection mechanisms.

74. Faced with massive incidents of gender-based violence during armed conflicts, Member States, entities of the United Nations system and civil society have focused on addressing the consequences of violence against women and girls. Thus far, the international community has not been able to prevent acts of violence against women from occurring during armed conflict. Early warning mechanisms either do not exist, or we have not been able to respond effectively to indications of impending hostilities.

75. My reports to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,²¹ children and armed conflict²² and country-specific reports provide stark and disturbing evidence of gender-based violence and of the fact that compliance of parties to conflict with international humanitarian, human rights, refugee and criminal law remains woefully inadequate.

76. Gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits the ability of women to enjoy their rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men. The unacceptable violence against women and girls in peacetime is further exacerbated during armed conflict and in its aftermath. Both State and non-State actors are responsible for severe violations of women's human rights, including killings, abductions, rape, sexual torture and slavery, as well as denial of access to food and health care, with dramatic consequences. Although the occurrence of violence against women in armed conflict is now increasingly acknowledged and widely documented, our collective response, as measured against the magnitude of this violence, remains inadequate. The facts on the ground point to our collective failure in preventing such violence and protecting women and girls from the horrors of gender-based violence and heinous violations of international human rights, criminal and humanitarian law. Sexual and gender-based violence has been recently reported in Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Darfur, the Sudan.

77. States on whose territory conflict and its resulting evils of war crimes, genocide, sexual violence and gender-based crimes occur have the primary responsibility for the protection of women and children. Where a State is unable or unwilling to provide protection and assistance to its citizens, the United Nations system is increasingly called upon to work with Member States to develop an integrated response. In several instances, the Security Council has expanded the mandates of multidimensional peacekeeping operations to assist in carrying out protective and monitoring functions to address the security challenges and threats to women and girls. However, factors such as delay in deployment, low numbers of peacekeepers or insufficient financial resources have hampered the successful implementation of such mandates.

78. The United Nations system has established and implemented strategies and programmes to prevent, monitor and respond to gender-based violence. Human rights observers from the United Nations system, regional organizations such as the African Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NGOs and civil society are critical for ensuring women's rights violations are monitored and reported on and for investigating allegations of sexual violence. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights intensified its efforts to monitor and report on gender-based violence, and human rights officers are now a standard component in new peace operations. Within the framework of their mandates, the Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights have paid particular attention to the occurrence of gender-based violence, the special vulnerability of displaced women, the needs of women heads of household in times of war, the role of women in conflict resolution and the situation of women in countries in transition. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, has a particularly important role to play in this regard. Since 2000, an annual report²⁴ has been presented to the Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, outlining new developments in international criminal, human rights and humanitarian law on the issue of systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices in situations of armed conflict.

79. Efforts to monitor and report gender-based violence in situations of armed

conflict must be complemented by practical measures to end impunity and to bring those who are responsible for abhorrent crimes against women and girls to justice. International humanitarian, human rights and criminal law provides a solid framework of protection of individuals affected by armed conflict. More recently, this framework has been significantly strengthened to address crimes of sexual and gender-based violence experienced by women and girls. The establishment of the International Criminal Court holds promise for meaningful accountability for gender-based crimes against women in armed conflict. The formal referrals from the Governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo will provide opportunity for the Court to implement its statute, which includes provisions for improved investigation of gender-based crimes, protection of female witnesses, appointments of advisers with legal expertise on sexual and gender violence and direct participation of the victims in the proceedings of the Court.

80. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have broken new ground in the area of jurisprudence on sexual violence under international law. While both Tribunals have charged a number of individuals for crimes that involved either rape or sexual assault, progress in carrying out investigations and creating systems to protect victims and witnesses has not been commensurate with the requirements of timely justice, thus resulting in few guilty verdicts. The Special Court for Sierra Leone has included crimes of sexual violence in a number of its indictments. The Court includes two gender crimes investigators and has conducted gender sensitivity training for its investigation teams.

81. While the International Tribunals have played an important role by providing a direct form of accountability for perpetrators of gender-based crimes, it is critical that States recognize their responsibility and have the capacity to enforce law, end impunity, prosecute perpetrators of violence and provide redress and compensation to survivors of gender-based violence.

82. Many Member States, United Nations entities, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNIFEM and the World Health Organization (WHO), and international and national NGOs have conducted training programmes for their staff, partners and local populations on the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, and appropriate care for survivors. In 2003, UNHCR revised its 1995 guidelines on sexual and gender-based violence to better reflect lessons learned through field-based practice. Inter-agency task forces on gender-based violence have been established in some refugee settings to coordinate multisectoral responses and set local protocols for interventions.

83. In Rwanda, Belgium and other international donors have supported programmes for survivors of physical and sexual abuse resulting from the genocide. In Haiti, under the leadership of the Ministry for the Status of Women, United Nations entities have emphasized the need to strengthen coordinated actions on prevention and support to victims of gender-based violence. UNFPA provided Governments and implementing partners with emergency reproductive health kits in order to treat survivors for sexually transmitted infections and other

consequences of sexual violence. Health partners in some refugee situations are equipped to care for survivors of violence with HIV/AIDS, but this is not a universal practice.

84. Innovative strategies need to be developed to ensure compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law by a variety of actors, including the military and non-State armed groups. Parties to conflict must be forcefully reminded of their responsibilities to protect women and girls and to cease their attacks on civilians or face sanctions. Member States need to send stronger signals to parties to conflict that gender-based violence will be investigated and perpetrators will be prosecuted.

85. One of our key challenges is to bring perpetrators of violence against women to justice through international tribunals, mixed tribunals and national courts. To ensure effective prosecution of gender-based violence, witness and victim protection programmes need to become more effective, and judges, prosecutors and investigators need to be trained on gender issues.

86. The consistent provision of human and financial resources to deliver care to women victims of violence as well as ongoing training for all actors continues to be of critical importance. Deploying human rights and other monitors at an early stage can serve as a potential deterrent to violence. Effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms to gather timely and accurate data on gender-based violence are essential both in terms of identifying potential situations of armed conflict and providing information on the perpetrators of violence.

87. I submit the following actions for the attention of the Security Council, Member States, United Nations entities and other relevant bodies:

- (a) Apply increased pressure on parties to armed conflict, including during missions and peace negotiations, to cease all violations of the human rights of women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence;
- (b) End impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence, and ensure that international and national courts have adequate resources, access to gender expertise, gender training for all staff and gender-sensitive programmes for victim and witness protection in order to more effectively prosecute those responsible for such crimes;
- (c) Ensure that human rights and other monitors have gender expertise, conduct gender-responsive investigations and report findings systematically to the Council.

88. I call on the General Assembly to ensure adequate human and financial support to programmes that provide care and support through legal, economic, psychosocial and reproductive health services to survivors of gender-based violence.

IV. Enhancing implementation

89. The following issues need to be specifically addressed in order to further enhance the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in all areas discussed above.

A. Gender balance in recruitment

90. Increasing women's representation in decision-making and expanding the roles and contributions of women in peace and security issues was a major element of resolution 1325 (2000). Many Member States reported on national initiatives designed to improve gender balance and representation of women in civilian and uniformed services and to increase their participation in international peace operations. Denmark has developed a long-term strategy for the recruitment of women in armed forces. In France, the percentage of women in the military increased from 6.9 per cent in 1998 to 13 per cent in 2004. Germany opened all career tracks to women in the armed forces. Spain has a number of highly qualified women participating as international observers in electoral processes, and 15 per cent of its personnel serving in peace operations are women. The United Kingdom has been actively deploying female officers to peace operations, including as senior gender experts to Iraq. Several other countries, including Argentina, Australia, Malawi and Switzerland, also reported on efforts to actively recruit more women to serve in international peace operations. A senior Australian policewoman served as the United Nations Police Commissioner in Timor-Leste from June 2003 to May 2004.

91. As of June 2004, women constituted 1 per cent of military personnel and 5 per cent of civilian police personnel assigned by Member States to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. These figures remain unchanged since 2002. With regard to international civilian staff administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations,²⁶ women constituted 27.5 per cent overall, and 12 per cent at the D-1 level and above, up from 24 and 4.2 per cent respectively in 2002.

92. Resolution 1325 (2000) called for the appointment of more women as special representatives and envoys. Currently, out of 27 peace operations, 2 are headed by women: ONUB and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Three women serve as deputy Special Representatives in the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), UNAMA and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

93. In order to encourage female candidates to apply for peacekeeping operations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has introduced specific language into vacancy announcements, targeting professional women's organizations. The Department has also made efforts to increase the representation of women among uniformed personnel serving under United Nations auspices, including by highlighting the need for greater numbers of women, when corresponding with troop- and police-contributing countries. Efforts should be made by Member States to increase the representation of women in military and police contributions and strive for levels commensurate with respective national representation.

94. Within humanitarian entities in the United Nations system, as of August 2004, none of the 18 humanitarian coordinators was a woman. At UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP), women constitute 40 per cent of professional staff, making up 23 and 26 per cent, respectively, at senior levels. Individual agencies have made commitments to ensure the representation of

women on their staff. At least 50 per cent of the staff recruits and 75 per cent of all local food aid monitor recruits at WFP are to be qualified women. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women has also encouraged the broadening of the recruitment base for peace operations to cover international and national professional and civil society organizations and has regularly supplied lists of suitable women candidates for special representatives and envoy posts and for regular peace operations staff to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the offices of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

95. Within the resident coordinator system, which includes organizations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development in postconflict reconstruction, the representation of women was 21 per cent as of August 2004 (26 of 122).

96. Mechanisms to target women in the recruitment process for senior-level posts in all areas of peace and security need to be strengthened. These include: the use of specialist headhunting agencies; allocation of funds for outreach activities to attract women candidates; and the further development of a database of precertified women candidates.

97. While recruitment of women at senior level is critical, a clear understanding of gender perspectives in peace and security should become a key criteria for recruitment of all senior and middle-level staff. Training on gender issues should be provided to all staff at decision-making levels, men as well as women. Predeployment briefing of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General is critical.

98. I call on Member States, United Nations entities and civil society organizations to:

- (a) Further analyse the obstacles to increasing women's representation in peace operations and humanitarian response and develop and implement recruitment strategies aimed at increasing the number of women, particularly in decision-making positions, including in military and civilian police services;
- (b) Create a pool of precertified female candidates for senior level positions to ensure rapid deployment.

B. Preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel

99. Sexual exploitation and abuse are forms of gender-based violence that can be perpetrated by anyone in a position of power or trust. The involvement of United Nations personnel, whether civilian or uniformed, in sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of local populations is particularly abhorrent and unacceptable and a serious impediment to the achievement of the goals of resolution 1325 (2000) on the protection of women and girls. In May 2004, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) uncovered allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, including of minors, by civilian and military personnel in Bunia. Such abuses must be prevented and the perpetrators must be held accountable.

100. Initiatives have been taken by some Member States to address sexual exploitation and abuse. Finland has developed a code of conduct for peacekeeping missions that includes information on sexual exploitation and forbids the use of prostitutes. The code of conduct is monitored and immediate action taken in the case of any violation.

101. The United Nations, working with NGOs, has instituted a number of measures to address sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee created the Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises, co-chaired by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNICEF, which led to the issuance of a Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. The Task Force developed a number of tools to facilitate the implementation of the bulletin such as implementation guidelines, model information sheets on sexual exploitation and abuse for local communities and model complaints forms. In addition, focal points on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are to be appointed in each United Nations entity and NGO at country level, creating a network to ensure the full implementation of the bulletin in both emergency and development contexts.

102. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made progress in implementing the Secretary-General's bulletin in peacekeeping operations through improved training materials, complaints mechanisms and the production of a compilation of its disciplinary directives for civilian, military and civilian police personnel. In addition, MINUSTAH, MONUC and ONUB now have Personnel Conduct Officer positions to support mission efforts to address misconduct. The Department is currently conducting a review of its procedures for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, including human trafficking, with a view to improving its ability to prevent, identify, respond to and report on this problem, as well as to advocate with Member States on their role in addressing this issue. However, significant challenges remain.

103. I reaffirm my conviction that sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are totally unacceptable forms of behaviour and reiterate my commitment to the full implementation of the special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse as set forth in my bulletin. I further urge Member States, intergovernmental and regional organizations, international and national aid and civil society organizations to apply the same standards to peacekeeping personnel, including military and civilian police.

C. Coordination and partnership

104. Coordination is critical to ensure complementarity among all actors and effective use of resources. Member States, United Nations entities and nongovernmental and civil society actors at all levels have worked together in innovative ways to implement resolution 1325 (2000). Spearheaded by Canada, an informal group of approximately 25 Member States, the "Friends of Women, Peace and Security", acts as an advocate for and supports intergovernmental coordination, allocation of resources and acceleration of implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) by United Nations entities.

105. In recognizing that effective institutional arrangements and improved collaboration can significantly contribute to the full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), a number of Member States have set up working groups and task forces at the national level. In 2001, Canada created the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security, which is a national coalition, comprised of parliamentarians, civil society representatives and government officials that focuses on advocacy, capacity-building and training. In Colombia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration with the Presidential Advisory Office on Gender Equality, set up a working group on women, peace and security, which supports women's participation related to the promotion of peace in Colombia. In 2003, the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and the Interior and Kingdom Affairs of the Netherlands established a task force on women in conflict situations and peacekeeping, which is charged with implementing resolution 1325 (2000). In Norway, a forum comprised of representatives from relevant ministries and members of civil society has been established to follow up the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). In Azerbaijan, a national "Coalition 1325", comprised of women parliamentarians, NGOs and media representatives, has been established to raise awareness of resolution 1325 (2000) and women's role in decision-making processes, including in conflict resolution and peace-building.

106. I have requested my Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to play a lead advocacy role and to promote a wide variety of actions in support of gender mainstreaming, including on peace and security. My Special Adviser has provided regular updates on women, peace and security issues to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and has urged that gender equality issues be incorporated in discussions and recommendations. To support my Special Adviser, the Finnish Government provided funding support for a full-time P-5 position to work on peace and security for one year.

107. My Special Adviser also chairs the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security of the Inter-Agency Network on Women and Gender Equality, which is comprised of 20 United Nations entities, with 5 NGOs as observers. The Task Force has ensured a coordinated approach to gender mainstreaming in peace and security activities within the United Nations, supported and monitored implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and carried out liaison activities with Member States and NGOs. It facilitated the development of gender checklists for needs assessments and a roster of gender experts. It is critical that my Special Adviser and the Inter-Agency Task Force continue to play a catalytic role in promoting full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), in close coordination with all entities working on peace and security.

108. The inter-agency task forces under the umbrella of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on gender and humanitarian response and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse as well as the United Nations Mine Action Service gender working group, are also good examples of United Nations coordination efforts to mainstream gender issues into substantive work areas.

109. In post-conflict countries United Nations theme groups on gender equality, for example in Afghanistan, have achieved some success in providing a platform for joint planning among United Nations entities, governmental and non-governmental actors. However, more efforts are needed to strengthen such theme groups to facilitate systematic and effective inter-agency coordination and attention to gender perspectives at the field level in post-conflict countries.

110. Resolution 1325 (2000) has been an effective advocacy tool, which has galvanized actors at different levels to develop alliances and partnerships and work in a coordinated manner to support its implementation. This momentum needs to be reinforced and sustained. Enhanced coordination with regional and subregional intergovernmental entities and at the local level with women's groups and networks is needed in order to maximize progress in the incorporation of gender perspectives in the promotion of peace and security.

111. I call on Member States, entities of the United Nations, NGOs and civil society to:

- (a) Enhance coordination to facilitate the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) at all levels in developing partnerships with key actors at the regional level and with women's groups and networks at the local level;
- (b) Strengthen gender theme groups in countries emerging from conflict by ensuring clear mandates and authority, staff with sufficient levels of seniority and expertise, adequate resources and access to senior managers.

D. Monitoring and reporting

112. An analysis of gender perspectives in 264 of the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council prepared from January 2000 to September 2003 revealed that only 17.8 per cent of the reports made multiple references to women and gender concerns, while 15.2 per cent made minimal reference and 67 per cent of the reports made no or only one mention of women or gender issues. The majority of reports referring to gender issues described women and girls primarily as victims of armed conflict and not as potential actors in early warning, reconciliation, peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction. A checklist to support improved reporting on gender issues in the reports of the Secretary-General was widely disseminated to peace support operations at headquarters and in the field. The analysis was updated in July 2004. In the first six months of 2004, a trend of improved reporting was noted, with 23.5 per cent of reports having multiple references to gender issues.

113. It is important to continue to ensure that all reports to the Security Council make appropriate reference to gender perspectives and the advancement of women, including by providing data disaggregated by sex and age. The Council is urged to monitor the incorporation of gender perspectives in reports that provide an important basis for resolutions adopted.

114. I intend to routinely incorporate gender perspectives in all thematic and country reports to the Security Council and continue to monitor the progress made.

115. I urge the Security Council to review the issue of women, peace and security on an annual basis.

E. Information dissemination and exchange

116. Resolution 1325 (2000) has been broadly disseminated and utilized and has been translated into approximately 60 languages.³¹ Member States, United Nations entities and NGOs have held numerous conferences to increase awareness of the resolution and have produced a wide range of practical resources to assist policy makers, actors at the field level and the general public on gender issues in peace and security. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, in cooperation with the Committee on International Gender Equality, hosted a conference on “Women, Peace and Security” in Copenhagen in September 2004. A number of Member States, including Canada, the Netherlands, Senegal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, prepared, or are in the process of launching, major reports on women and peace and security which will guide national policy initiatives related to women’s roles in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

117. Within the United Nations system, UNIFEM has created a web portal as a centralized repository of information on women, peace and security. The International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) has developed a special collection of information resources on gender aspects of conflict and peace.³³ An inventory of resources, including operational guidelines, training materials, manuals and reports on the different thematic areas concerning women, peace and security, produced by 20 United Nations entities, was compiled by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security. In the area of awareness raising and advocacy, the Department of Public Information has underscored the issue of women as peacemakers as one of the top 10 unreported stories.

V. Conclusions and the way forward

118. In the four years since the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), there has been a positive shift in international understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls and the importance of women’s participation as equal partners in all areas related to peace and security. Member States, United Nations entities and civil society actors have made significant strides in implementing the resolution, including by incorporating gender perspectives in policies, programmatic tools and capacity-building activities. The real test of the adequacy of these efforts is, however, in their impact on the ground. In no area of peace and security work are gender perspectives systematically incorporated in planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting. The peacekeeping and humanitarian arenas have seen the most dramatic improvement in terms of new policies, gender expertise and training initiatives. An outstanding challenge is increasing the number of women in high-level decision-making positions in peacekeeping operations. In the areas of conflict prevention, peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction, women do not participate fully and more needs to be done to ensure that the promotion of gender equality is an explicit goal in the pursuit of sustainable peace.

119. The protection and promotion of the human rights of women and girls in

armed conflict is a pressing challenge. The reality on the ground is that humanitarian and human rights law are blatantly disregarded by parties to conflicts and that women and girls continue to be subject to sexual and genderbased violence and other human rights violations. Much more sustained commitment and effort, including partnerships with men and boys, is required to stop the violence, end impunity and bring perpetrators to justice.

120. Much of the work on increasing attention to gender perspectives, protecting the human rights of women and promoting women's participation has been done on an ad hoc basis through voluntary contributions. Inadequate specific resource allocations have contributed to slow progress in the implementation of the resolution in practice. We must ensure that regular budgetary resources are specifically allocated for both gender mainstreaming and initiatives targeted at women and girls.

121. Resolution 1325 (2000) holds out a promise to women across the globe that their rights will be protected and that barriers to their equal participation and full involvement in the maintenance and promotion of sustainable peace will be removed. We must uphold this promise. To achieve the goals set out in the resolution, political will, concerted action and accountability on the part of the entire international community are required. I urge the Security Council, Member States, United Nations entities and civil society organizations to reaffirm their commitment and strengthen efforts to fully implement resolution 1325 (2000), and call for regular monitoring of its implementation through the Security Council.

Bibliography and References

- Ackerley, Beverley, A., 2001, 'Women's Human Rights Activists as Cross-Cultural Theorists', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 3(3), pp. 311-346.
- Agamben, Giorgio, 1998, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press [trans. Heller-Roazan].
- Agathangelou, Anna and Ling, Lily, 2004, 'The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the *Poisies* of Worldism', *International Studies Review*, 6(1), pp. 21-49.
- Agathangelou, Anna and Ling, L. H. M., 2003, 'Desire Industries: Sex Trafficking, UN Peacekeeping and the Neo-Liberal World Order', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 10(1), pp. 133-148.
- Aladjem, Terry, 1991, 'The Philosopher's Prism: Foucault, Feminism and Critique', *Political Theory*, 19(2), pp. 277-291.
- Alcoff, Linda, 1988, 'Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 13(3), pp. 405-36.
- Alder, C., 1997, 'Violence, Gender and Social Change', pp.435-442 in O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, (eds.), *Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, London: New York University Press.
- Alger, Chadwick F., 1999, 'The Expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders', pp. 13-44 in Jeong, Ho-Won (ed.), *The New Agenda for Peace Research*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Alker, Hayward, 2005, 'Emancipation in the Critical Security Studies Project', pp. 189-214 in Booth, Ken, (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Allen, Beverly, 1996, *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Allen, Graham, 2000, *Intertextuality*, London: Routledge.

- Amnesty International, 2005, 'About Amnesty International'
<http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-index-eng> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Amnesty International, 2004, 'Sudan: Government Responsible for Human Devastation in Darfur but Still in Denial',
<http://www.amnesty.ie/user/content/view/full/2659> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Andersen, Neils Å., 2003, *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann*, Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Annan, Kofi, 1999, 'Letters to Future Generations: Towards a Culture of Peace',
<http://www.unesco.org/opi2/lettres/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Artz, Lillian, 2001, 'The Weather Watchers: Gender, Violence and Social Control in South Africa',
<http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/sjrp/publicat/weatwat.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Arquilla, John, 2003, 'Thinking About New Security Paradigms', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 24(1), pp. 209-225.
- Ashley, Richard K., 1988, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 17(2), pp. 227-262.
- Ashley, Richard K., 1986, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', pp. 255-300 in Keohane, Robert, (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, 2002, 'Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism' *International Studies Review*, 4(3), pp. 27-48.
- Ayoob, Mohammed, 1983/4, 'Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?', *International Affairs*, 60(1), pp. 41-51.

- Baden, Sally and Goetz, Anne Marie, 1997, 'Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]? Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing', *Feminist Review*, 56(1), pp. 3-25.
- Bahdi, Reem, 2003, 'Security Council Resolution 1325: Practice and Prospects' *Refuge*, 21(2), pp. 41-51.
- Baker, Gideon, 2000, 'Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society' *Political Studies*, 50(5), pp. 928-943.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Enterline, Andrew J., 2000, 'Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992', *International Studies Quarterly*, 44(4), pp. 615-642.
- Baldwin, David, 1997, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies*, 23(1), pp. 5-26.
- Baldwin, David, 1993, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics', pp. 3-25 in Baldwin, David, (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Barkawi, Tarak, 2004, 'Connection and Constitution: Locating War and Culture in Globalization Studies', *Globalizations*, 1(2), pp. 155-170.
- Barkawi, Tarak, and Laffey, Mark, 1999, 'The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalisation', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(4), pp. 403-434.
- Bergeron, Suzanne, 2003, 'The Post-Washington Consensus and Economic Representations of Women in Development at the World Bank', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 5(3), pp. 397-419.
- Bergeron, Suzanne, 2001, 'Political Economy Discourses of Globalization and Feminist Politics', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 26(4), pp. 983-1006.
- Bhatta, Gambhir, 2001, 'Of Geese and Ganders: Mainstreaming Gender in the Context of Sustainable Human Development', *Journal of Gender Studies*, 10(1), pp. 17-32.

- Bilgin, Pinar, 2003, 'Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security', *International Studies Review*, 5(2), pp. 203-222.
- Blanchard, Eric, 2003, 'Gender, International Relations and the Development of Feminist Security Theory', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4), pp. 1289-1312.
- Bograd, Michele, 1988, 'Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse: An Introduction', pp. 11-27 in Yllo, Kersti, and Bograd, Michele, (eds.), *Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse*, London: SAGE.
- Bond, Jennifer and Sherret, Laurel, 2006, 'New Voice, New Perspectives: A Sight for Sore Eyes – Bringing Gender Vision to the Responsibility to Protect Framework', INSTRAW, <http://www.un-instraw.org/en/images/stories/NewVoices/nv-bond.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Bonnin, Debby, 2000, 'Claiming Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women's Protests in KwaZulu-Natal', *Journal of South African Studies*, 26(2), pp. 301-316.
- Booth, Ken, (ed.), 2005, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Booth, Ken, 2005, 'Critical Explorations', pp. 1-18 in Booth, Ken, (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Booth, Ken, 2004, 'Realities of Security: Editor's Introduction', *International Relations*, 18(1), pp. 5-8.
- Booth, Ken, 1995, 'Human Wrongs and International Relations', *International Affairs*, 71(1), pp. 103-126.
- Booth, Ken, 1991, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), pp. 313-326.
- Bracewell, Wendy, 2000, 'Rape in Kosovo: Masculinity and Serbian Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 6 (4), pp. 563-90.

- Broadhead, Lee-Anne, 2000, 'Re-Packaging Notions of Security: A Skeptical Feminist Response to Recent Efforts' pp. 27-44 in Jacobs, Susie, Jacobson, Ruth, and Marchbank, Jennifer, (eds.), *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- Brooks, Ann, 1997, *Postfeminisms: Feminism, Cultural Theory and Cultural Forms*, London: Routledge.
- Brown, Wendy, 2003, 'Women's Studies Unbound: Revolution, Mourning, Politics', *Parallax*, 9(2), pp. 3-16.
- Brown, Wendy, 1995, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bunch, Charlotte and Fried, Susana, 1996, 'Beijing '95: Moving Women's Human Rights from Margin to Center' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 22(1), pp. 200-204.
- Burchill, Scott, 2001, 'Realism and Neo-Realism', pp. 70-102 in Burchill, Scott, et al., *Theories of International Relations*, (2nd edn), Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Burley, Graham and Moreland, Neilo, 1998, *A Practical Guide to Academic Research*, London: Kogan Page.
- Burton, John, 1997, *Violence Explained*, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Butler, Judith, 2004, *Undoing Gender*, London: Routledge.
- Butler, Judith, 1999, *Gender Trouble*, (rev. ed.), London: Routledge.
- Butler, Judith, 1994, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism', pp. 153-170 in Seidman, S., (ed.), *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [orig. 1990, presented at the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium].
- Butler, Judith, 1993, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, London: Routledge.

- Butler, Judith, 1990, 'Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory and Psychoanalytic Discourse', pp. 324-340 in Nicholson, Linda, (ed.), 2001, *Feminism/Postmodernism*, London: Routledge.
- Buzan, Barry and Herring, E, 1998, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Buzan, Barry, 1991, *People, States and Fear*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, Barry, 1984, 'Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(2), pp. 109-125.
- Cammack, Paul, 2004, 'What the World Bank Means by 'Poverty Reduction' and Why It Matters', *New Political Economy*, 9(2), pp. 189-211.
- Cammack, Paul, 2002, 'Attacking the Poor', *New Left Review*, 13, pp.125-134
- Campbell, David, 1998, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (rev. edn), Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Carpenter, R. Charli, 2005, '"Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups': Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue', *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(2), pp. 295-334.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen, 1997, 'The Mirage of Global Collective Security', pp. 13-28 in Carpenter, Ted Galen, (ed.), *Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and Global Intervention*, Washington: Cato Institute.
- Carr, Edward Hallett, 1939, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, London: Macmillan.
- Carver, Terrell, (ed.), 2003, 'The Forum: Gender and International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 5(2), pp. 287-302.
- Carver, Terrell, 1996, *Gender is not a Synonym for Women*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Carver, Terrell, Cochran, Molly and Squires, Judith, 1998, 'Gendering Jones: Feminisms, IRs, Masculinities', *Review of International Studies*, 24(2), pp. 283-297.

- Chan-Tiberghien, Jennifer, 2004, 'Gender Skepticism or Gender-Boom: Poststructural Feminisms, Transnational Feminisms and the World Conference Against Racism', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6(3), pp. 454-484.
- Chandhoke, Neera, 2002, 'The Limits of Global Civil Society', pp. 35-53 in The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002, *The Global Civil Society Yearbook*,
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2002/2002chapter2.pdf> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Childs, Sarah and Krook, Mona Lena, 2006, 'Gender and Politics: The State of the Art', *Politics*, 26(1), pp. 18-28.
- Chinkin, Christine, 2000, 'Gender and International Society: Law and Policy', pp. 242-260 in Thakur, Ramesh and Newman, Edward, (eds.), *New Millennium, New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security and Governance*, New York, NY: UN University Press.
- Claude, Inis L., 1966, 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', *International Organization*, 20(3), pp. 367-379.
- Cockburn, Cynthia, 2004, 'The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace', pp. 24-44 in Giles, Wenona and Hyndman, Jennifer, (eds), *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*, London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cockburn, Cynthia, 2001, 'The Gendered Dynamic of Armed Conflict and Political Violence' pp. 13-29 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona (eds.), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Cockburn, Cynthia, 2000, 'The Anti-Essentialist Choice: Nationalism and Feminist in the Interaction Between Two Women's Projects', *Nations and Nationalism*, 6(4), pp. 611-629.
- Cockburn, Cynthia, 1998, *The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*, London: Zed Books.

- Cohn, Carol, 2004, 'Feminist Peacemaking', *The Women's Review of Books*, 11(5), pp. 8-9.
- Cohn, Carol, Kinsella, Helen and Gibbings, Sheri, 2004, 'Women, Peace and Security: Resolution 1325', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 6(1), pp. 130-140.
- Commission on Global Governance (CoGG), 1995, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Connell, Robert W., 2005, 'Change Among the Gatekeepers: Men, Masculinities and Gender Equality in the Global Arena', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 30(3), pp. 1801-1825.
- Connelly, William, 2004, 'The Complexity of Sovereignty', pp. 23-40 in Edkins, Jenny, Pin-Fat, Véronique and Shapiro, Michael, (eds), *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, London: Routledge.
- Copelon, Rhonda, 1995, 'Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War', pp. 197-214 in Peters, Julie and Wolper, Andrea, (eds), *Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives*, London: Routledge.
- Cox, Robert and Jacobson, Harold, 2005, 'The Framework for Inquiry', pp. 111-126 in Diehl, Paul, (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Crawley, Heaven, 2000, 'Engendering the State in Refugee Women's Claims for Asylum', pp. 87-104 in Jacobs, Susie, Jacobson, Ruth and Marchbank, Jennifer, (eds.), *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- Croft, Stuart and Terriff, Terry, (eds), 2000, *Critical Reflections on Security and Change*, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
- Cusack, Tricia, 2000, 'Janus and Gender: Women and the Nation's Backward Look', *Nations and Nationalism*, 6(4), pp. 541-641.
- Dalby, Simon, 1997, 'Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse', pp. 3-32 in Krause, Keith and

- Williams, Michael C., (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press.
- Daly, Mary, 2005, 'Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and in Practice', *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, 12(3), pp. 433-450.
- Das, Veena and Kleinman, Arthur, 2001, 'Introduction' pp. 1-30 in Das, Veena et al. (eds.), *Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery*, London: University of California Press.
- D'Cruze, Shani and Rao, Anupama, 2004, 'Violence and the Vulnerabilities of Gender', *Gender and History*, 16(3), pp. 495-512.
- Der Derian, James, 1992, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed and War*, London: Pinter.
- Der Derian, James, 1990, 'The (S)Pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance and Speed', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3), pp. 295-310.
- Der Derian, James, 1989, 'The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations', pp. 3-10 in Der Derian, James and Shapiro, Michael, (eds.), *International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Der Derian, James and Shapiro, Michael, (eds.), 1989, *International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Derrida, Jacques, 2000, 'Lyotard and us', *Parallax*, 6(4), pp. 28-48.
- Derrida, Jacques, 1978, *Writing and Difference*, London: Routledge [trans. Alan Bass].
- Derrida, Jacques, 1974, *Of Grammatology*, London: Johns Hopkins University Press [trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak].
- Desch, Michael C., 1998, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', *International Security*, 23(1), pp. 141-170.

- Di Stefano, Christine, 1991, *Configurations of Masculinity: A Feminist Perspective on Modern Political Theory*, New York, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Di Stefano, Christine, 1990, 'Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity and Postmodernity', pp. 63-82 in Nicholson, Linda (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism*, London: Routledge.
- Digeser, Peter, 1992, 'The Fourth Face of Power', *The Journal of Politics*, 54(4), pp. 977-1007.
- Dillon, Michael, 1996, *Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought*, London: Routledge.
- Dobash, R. Emerson, and Dobash, Russel P., 1992, *Women, Violence and Social Change*, London: Routledge.
- Dörmann, Knut, 2003, 'The Legal Situation of 'Unlawful/ Unprivileged Combatants' *International Review of the Red Cross*, 85(849), pp. 45-74, available at [http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5LPHBV/\\$File/irrc_849_Dorman.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5LPHBV/$File/irrc_849_Dorman.pdf) [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn, 1996, *Imperial Encounters*, London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn, 1993, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(3), pp. 297-320.
- Dunleavy, Patrick, 2003, *Authoring a PhD: How to Plan, Draft, Write and Finish a Doctoral Thesis or Dissertation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas, 2004, '"We the Peoples": Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice', *International Relations*, 18(1), pp. 9-23.
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 1999, 'Knowledge is the New Global Asset, the Very Premise of Progress', *ECA Press Release No.90/ 1999*, <http://www.uneca.org/adf99/pressrelease9099.htm> [accessed 10 August 2006].

- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 1968, 'ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV) Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organisations', <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/info/res-1296.htm> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Edkins, Jenny, 2002, 'After the Subject of International Security', pp. 66-80 in Finlayson, Alan and Valentine, Jeremy, (eds), *Politics and Post-Structuralism*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
- El-Bushra, Judy, 2004, 'Fused in Combat: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict', pp. 152-171 in Afshar, Haleh and Eade, Deborah, (eds), *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- El-Bushra, Judy, 2000, 'Transforming Conflict: Some Thoughts on a Gendered Understanding of Conflict Processes', pp. 66-86 in Jacobs, Susie, Jacobson, Ruth and Marchbank, Jennifer, (eds), *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- El Jack, Amani, 2003, 'Gender and Armed Conflict: Overview Report', *BRIDGE Cutting Edge Pack Series*, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Elam, Diane, 1994, *Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. En Abyrne*, London: Routledge.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 1995, *Women and War*, (2nd edn), London and Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Enloe, Cynthia, 2000, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*, (2nd edn), London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Enloe, Cynthia, 1996, 'Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in International Relations' pp. 186-202 in Booth, Ken, Smith, Steve & Zalewski, Marysia, (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Enloe, Cynthia, 1990, 'Womenandchildren: Making Feminist Sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis', *The Village Voice*, 25/09/90
- Enloe, Cynthia, 1983, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives*, London: Pluto Press.

- Eschle, Catherine, 2002, 'Engendering Global Democracy', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4(3), pp. 315-341.
- Evans, Mary, 1982, 'In Praise of Theory: The Case for Women's Studies', pp. 17-22 in Kemp, Sandra and Squires, Judith, (eds), 1997, *Feminisms*, Oxford: Oxford University Press [orig. pp.219-228 in Bowles, G. and Klein, R. D., (eds), 1982, *Theories of Women's Studies*, London: Routledge].
- Fairclough, Norman and Wodak, Ruth, 1997, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', pp. 258-284 in van Dijk, Teun A., (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction*, London: SAGE.
- Fairclough, Norman, 1992, *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Falk, Richard, 1990, 'Evasions of Sovereignty', pp. 61-78 in Walker, R. B. J. and Mendlowitz, Saul H., (eds), *Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Communities*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Fearon, James and Laitin, David, 2003, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), pp. 75-90.
- Ferguson, James and Gupta, Akhil, 2002, 'Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality', *American Ethnologist*, 29(4), pp.981-1002.
- Flax, Jane, 1990, 'Postmodern and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', pp. 3-62 in Nicholson, Linda, (ed.), *Feminism/ Postmodernism*, London: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel, 1984, 'What is an Author?', pp. 101-120 in Rabinow, Paul (ed.), 1984, *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, London: Penguin, [trans. Harari] [orig. pp. 141-160 in Harari, J. (ed.), *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism*, London: Methuen].
- Foucault, Michel, 1978, *The Will to Knowledge: History of Sexuality Volume I*, London: Penguin.

- Foucault, Michel, 1977, 'Truth and Power', pp. 109-133 in Gorden, Colin, (ed.), 1980, *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 by Michel Foucault*, London: Harvester [trans. Fontana and Pasquino].
- Foucault, Michel, 1972, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, London: Tavistock Publications [trans. Sheridan Smith].
- Fox, Ted, 1999, 'Pakistan Senators Ratify Honour Killing', *Human Beams Magazine*, <http://humanity.humanbeams.com/archives/hr99fox-pakistanhnrkillings.html> [accessed 10 August 2006].
- Fox, Vivian, 2002, 'Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women', *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 4(1), pp. 15-34.
- Francis, Becky, 2002, Relativism, Realism and Feminism: An Analysis of Some Theoretical Tensions in Research on Gender Identity, *Journal of Gender Studies*, 11(1), pp. 39-54.
- Fraser, Nancy, 2003, 'From Discipline to Flexibilisation? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization', *Constellations*, 10(2), pp. 160-170.
- Fuss, Diana, 1989, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference*, London: Routledge.
- Gelles, Richard J., 1997, *Intimate Violence in Families* (3rd edn), London: SAGE.
- Gerring, John, 2001, *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gervais, Myriam, 2004, 'Human Security and Reconstruction Efforts in Rwanda: Impact on the Lives of Women', pp. 301-312 in Afshar, Haleh and Eade, Deborah, (eds), *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Giles, Wenona and Hyndman, Jennifer, (eds), 2004, *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*, London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giles, Wenona and Hyndman, Jennifer, 2004, 'Introduction: Gender and Conflict in a Global Context', pp. 3-23 in Giles, Wenona and Hyndman, Jennifer,

- (eds), *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*, London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gill, Stephen, 2003, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gill, Stephen, 1996, 'Globalization, Democratization and the Politics of Indifference' pp. 205-228 in Mittelman, James, (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Gill, Stephen, 1995, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24(3), pp. 399-423.
- Gilpin, Robert, 1984a, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', *International Organization*, 38(2), pp. 287-304.
- Gilpin, Robert, 1984b, 'The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security', *Political Science*, 17(1), pp. 18-23.
- Gleditsch, Nils Peter et al., 2002, 'Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), pp. 615-637.
- Golberg, Elissa and Hubert, Don, 2001, 'The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians', pp. 223-230 in McRae, Robert and Hubert, Don, (eds), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, London: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Gordenker, Leon and Weiss, Thomas, 1996, 'Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions', pp. 17-47 in Weiss, Thomas and Gordenker, Leon, (eds.), *NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Gough, David, 1998, 'Beaten Wives Challenge Custom', *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,323162,00.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Grant, Rebecca, 1991, 'The Sources of Gender Bias in International Relations Theory', pp. 8-26 in Grant, Rebecca & Newland, Kathleen, (eds.), *Gender and International Relations*, Buckingham: Open University Press in assoc. with Millenium: Journal of International Studies.

- Grosz, Elizabeth A., 1987, 'Feminist Theory and the Challenge to Knowledge', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 10(5), pp. 475-480.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie and Pollack, Mark A., 2002, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Global Governance', *European Journal of International Relations*, 8(3), pp. 339-373.
- Haftendorn, Helga, 1991, 'The Security Puzzle: Theory-building and Discipline-building in International Security', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(1), pp. 3-17.
- Hague Appeal for Peace, 2005, 'About Us', <http://www.haguepeace.org/index.php?action=AbtUs> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Hall, Stuart, 1997a, 'Cultural Identity and Diaspora', pp. 51-59 in Woodward, Kathryn, (ed.), 1997, *Identity and Difference*, London: SAGE [orig. 1990 in Rutherford, J., (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, London: Lawrence and Wishart].
- Hall, Stuart, 1997b, 'The Work of Representation' pp. 13-74 in Hall, Stuart, (ed.), 1997, *Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices*, London: SAGE.
- Halliday, Fred, 2000, 'Global Governance: Prospects and Problems', pp. 431-441 in Held, David and McGrew, A., (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader*, Cambridge: Polity [orig. 2000 in *Citizenship Studies* 4(1)].
- Hansen, Lene, 2006, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, London: Routledge.
- Hansen, Lene, 2000, 'Gender, Nation, Rape: Bosnia and the Construction of Security', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 3(1), pp. 55-75.
- Hanssen, Beatrice, 2000, *Critique of Violence: Between Poststructuralism and Critical Theory*, London: Routledge.
- Hassim, Shireen, 1993, 'Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Place of the Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade', *Feminist Review*, 43(1), pp. 1-25.

- Hay, Colin and Marsh, David, 2000, 'Introduction: Demystifying Globalization', pp. 1-20 in Hay, Colin and Marsh, David, (eds), *Demystifying Globalization*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Held, David and McGrew, Anthony, 1998, 'The End of the Old Order: Globalization and the Prospects for World Order' *Review of International Studies*, 24(5), pp. 219-243.
- Held, David, McGrew, Anthony, Goldblatt, David and Perraton, Jonathan, 1999, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Helliwell, Christine, 2000, 'It's Only a Penis: Rape, Feminism and Difference', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 25(3), pp. 789-816.
- Herz, John, 2003, 'The Security Dilemma in International Relations: Background and Present Problems', *International Relations*, 17(4), pp. 411-416.
- Herz, John, 1950, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 2(2), pp. 157-180.
- Hill, Felicity, Aboitiz, Mikele and Poehlman-Doumbouya, Sara, 2003, 'Nongovernmental Organizations' Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4), pp. 1255-1269.
- Hill, Felicity, 2002, 'NGO Perspectives: NGOs and the Security Council', *Disarmament Forum*, 1(1), pp. 27-30, <http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art9.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Hill, Tony, 2004, 'Three Generations of UN-Civil Society Relations: A Quick Sketch', *Global Policy Forum*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/gen/2004/0404generation.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Hoffman, John, 2001, *Gender and Sovereignty: Feminism, the State and International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Hoffman, Stanley, 2002, 'Clash of Globalizations', *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4).
- Hoogensen, Gunhild and Rottem, Svein Vigeland, 2004, 'Gender Identity and the Subject of Security', *Security Dialogue*, 35(2), pp. 155-171.

hooks, bell, 1982, *Ain't I A Woman*, London: Pluto Press.

Hopgood, Stephen, 2000, 'Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal Self', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29(1), pp. 1-25.

Howarth, David 2000, *Discourse*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Howarth, David, and Stavrakakis, Yannis, 2000, 'Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis', pp. 1-23 in Howarth, David, Norval, Aletta and Stavrakakis, Yannis, (eds.), *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Huß, Sabine, 2004, 'Backgrounder: Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', Canada: The Institute for Global Issues, <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/1325backgrounder.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].

Ibáñez, Ana Cristina, 2001, 'El Salvador: War and Untold Stories – Women Guerillas', pp. 117-130 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona, 2001, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.

International Alert (IA), 2005, 'About Us', http://www.international-alert.org/about_alert/index.php [accessed 11 August 2006].

International Criminal Court (ICC), 1999, 'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Part 2 – Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law', available at <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].

International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2006, 'World Telecommunication Development Report 2006: Measuring ICT for Social and Economic Development', available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/wtdr_06/index.html [accessed 11 August 2006].

Jabri, Vivienne, 1996, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Jackson, Richard, 2001, 'The State and Internal Conflict', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 55(1), pp. 65-81.
- Jackson, Robert, 1990, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, Robert and Owens, Patricia, 2005, 'The Evolution of International Society', pp. 45-62 in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (3rd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, Robert and Sørensen, Georg, 2003, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jacobson, Ruth, Jacobs, Susie and Marchbank, Jennifer, 2000, 'Introduction: States of Conflict', pp. 1-23 in Jacobs, Susie, Jacobson, Ruth, and Marchbank, Jennifer, (eds.), *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- Jaquette, Jane, 2003, 'Feminism and the Challenges of the 'Post-Cold War' World', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 5(3), pp. 331-354.
- Jaworski, Adam, and Coupland, Neil, 1999, (eds.), *The Discourse Reader*, London: Routledge.
- Jeffries, Sheila, 1999, 'Queer Theory and Violence Against Women', http://sisyphe.org/article.php3?id_article=1053 [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Joachim, Jutta, 2003, 'Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs and Women's Rights', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(2), pp. 247-274.
- Jones, Adam, 2002, 'Gender and Genocide in Rwanda', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 4(1), pp. 65-94.
- Jones, Adam, 2000, 'Gender and Genocide', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2(2), pp. 185-211.

- Jones, Adam 1996, 'Does Gender Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 22(4), pp. 405-29.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N., 2001, "'New" and "Old" Wars: A Valid Distinction?', *World Politics*, 54(1), pp. 99-118.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz, 2004, 'Post-conflict Reconstruction, "Democratisation" and Women's Rights', *IDS Bulletin*, 35(4), pp. 134-136.
- Kappeler, Susanne, 1995, *The Will To Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kaufman, Michael, 1997, 'The Construction of Masculinity and the Triad of Men's Violence', pp. 30-51 in O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, (eds.), *Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, London and New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Kelly, Liz, 2000, 'Wars Against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics and the Militarised State', pp. 45-65 in Jacobs, Susie, Jacobson, Ruth and Marchbank, Jennifer, (eds.), *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance*, London: Zed Books.
- Kelly, Liz, Burton, Sheila and Regan, Linda, 1996, 'Beyond Victim or Survivor: Sexual Violence, Identity and Feminist Theory and Practice', pp. 77-101 in Adkins, Lisa and Merchant, Vicki, (eds.), *Sexualizing the Social: Power and the Organization of Sexuality*, London: Macmillan.
- Keohane, Robert, 1995, 'Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society' pp. 165-186 in Hohn, Hans Henrik and Sørensen, Georg, (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalisation and the End of the Cold War*, Oxford: Westview.
- Keohane, Robert, 1989, 'International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 18(2) pp. 245-54.
- Keohane, Robert, 1986, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics' pp. 1-26 in Keohane, Robert, (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

- Keohane, Robert and Martin, Lisa, 1995, 'The Promise of Institutional Theory', *International Security*, 20(1), pp. 39-51.
- Kleinman, Arthur, 2000, 'The Violences of Everyday Life: The Multiple Forms and Dynamics of Social Violence' pp. 226-241 in Das, Veena et al. (eds.), *Violence and Subjectivity*, London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kolodziej, Edward A., 1992, 'Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!', *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(4), pp. 421-438.
- Krause, Keith, 1998, 'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of 'Critical Security Studies'', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33(3), pp. 298-333.
- Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C., 1997, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies', pp. 33-60 in Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C., (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press.
- Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C., 1996, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies', *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40(2), pp. 229-254.
- Kupchan, Charles and Kupchan, Clifford, 1995, 'The Promise of Collective Security', *International Security*, 20(1), pp. 52-61.
- Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal, 2001, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (2nd edn), London: Verso.
- Laffey, Mark and Weldes, Jutta, 2005, 'Policing and Global Governance', pp. 59-80 in Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, (eds), *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lake, David, 2003, 'The New Sovereignty in International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 5(3), pp. 303-323.
- League of Nations, 1924, 'The Covenant',
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].

- Lees, Sue, 1997, *Ruling Passions: Sexual Violence, Reputation and the Law*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Leledakis, Kanakis, 'Derrida, Deconstruction and Social Theory', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 3(2), pp. 175-193.
- Lentin, Ronit, 1997, *Gender and Catastrophe*, London: Zed Books.
- Levin, Peter, 2005, *Excellent Dissertations*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Linklater, Andrew, 1996, 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(1), pp. 77-103.
- Littelwood, Roland, 1997, 'Military Rape', *Anthropology Today*, 13(2), pp. 7-16.
- Lipschutz, Ronnie D., 1992, 'Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21(3), pp. 389-420.
- Lovenduski, Joni, 2001, 'Women and Politics: Minority Representation or Critical Mass?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54(4), pp. 743-758.
- Lovenduski, Joni and Norris, Pippa, 2003, 'Westminster Women: The Politics of Presence', *Political Studies*, 51(1), pp. 84-102.
- Mackay, Angela, 2004, 'Training the Uniforms: Gender and Peacekeeping Operations', pp. 100-108 in Afshar, Haleh and Eade, Deborah, (eds), *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Mackay, Fiona, 2004, 'Gender and Political Representation in the UK: The State of the 'Discipline'', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6(1), pp. 99-120.
- Malone, David M., 2000, 'The Security Council in the 1990s: Inconsistent, Improvisational, Indispensable?' pp. 21-45 in Thakur, Ramesh and Newman, Edward, (eds.), *New Millennium, New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security and Governance*, New York: UN University Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane, 2003, 'Rethinking Representation', *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), pp. 515-528.

- Mansbridge, Jane, 1999, 'Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent Yes', *Journal of Politics*, 61(3), pp. 628-657.
- Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce, 1993, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986', *American Political Science Review*, 87(3), pp. 624-638.
- Marchand, Marianne and Runyan, Anne Sisson (eds), 2000, *Gender and Global Restructuring: Sightings, Sites, Resistances*, London: Routledge.
- Marcus, Sharon, 1992, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention' pp. 385-403 in Butler, Judith and Scott, Joan (eds.), *Feminists Theorise the Political*, London: Routledge.
- Mazurana, Dyan, 2005, 'Gender and the Causes and Consequences of Armed Conflict' pp. 29-42 in Mazurana, Dyan, Raven-Roberts, Angela and Parpart, Jane (eds), *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping*, Oxford and Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- McDonald, Matt, 2002, 'Human Security and the Construction of Security', *Global Society*, 16(3), pp. 277-295.
- McGinnis, Lyn, 2001, 'Queer-Bashing: A Sign of Individual and Cultural Illness', <http://www.bluestarweb.on.ca/QueerBash.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- McGrew, Anthony, 2002, 'From Global Governance to Good Governance: Theories and Prospects of Democratizing the Global Polity', pp. 207-226 in Ougaard, Morten, and Higgott, Richard, (eds), *Towards a Global Polity*, London: Routledge.
- McIlwhaine, Cathy, 1999, 'Geography and Violent Crime as Development Issues', *Progress in Human Geography*, 23(3), pp. 453-463.
- McKay, Susan, 2005, 'Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls' Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone', pp. 19-30 in Sweetman, Caroline, (ed.), *Gender, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- McNay, Lois, 1994, *Foucault: A Critical Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

McQuillan, Martin, 2000, 'Introduction: Five Strategies for Deconstruction', pp. 1-43 in McQuillan, Martin, (ed.), *Deconstruction: A Reader*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

McRae, Richard, 2001, 'Human Security in a Globalised World', pp. 14-27 in McRae, Richard and Hubert, Don, (eds), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy*, London: McGill-Queen's University Press.

McSweeney, Bill, 1999, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J., 1995, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19(3), pp. 5-49.

Mearshiemer, John J., 1990, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15(1), pp. 5-56.

Milliken, Jennifer, 1999, 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research Methods', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), pp. 225-254.

Mills, Sara, 1997, *Discourse*, London: Routledge.

Mingst, Karen and Karns, Margaret, 2000, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (2nd ed.), Oxford: Westview.

Mitchell, Timothy, 1991, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics', *American Political Science Review*, 85(1), pp. 77-96.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 2002, '"Under Western Eyes" Revisited: Feminist Solidarity Through Anticapitalist Struggles', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(2), pp. 499-535.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 1991, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses' pp. 51-80 in Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, Russo, Ann and Torres, Lourdes, (eds), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Moi, Toril, 1990, *Feminism and Postmodernism: Recent Feminist Criticism in the United States*, pp. 367-376 in Lovell, Terry, (ed.), *British Feminist*

- Thought: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell [orig. 1988, Feminism, Postmodernism and Style, *Cultural Critique*, 9, pp.3-22].
- Moore, Catherine, 2003, 'Women and Domestic Violence: The Public/ Private Legal Dichotomy', *International Journal of Human Rights*, 7(4), pp. 93-128.
- Moore, Henrietta, 1988, *Feminism and Anthropology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew, 2004, 'Is There a Democratic Deficit in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis', *Government and Opposition*, 39(2), pp. 336-363.
- Morgenthau, Hans, 1973, *Politics Among Nations*, (5th edn), New York, NY: Knopf.
- Morgenthau, Hans, 1952, 'Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States', *American Political Science Review*, 46(4), pp. 961-988.
- Morgenthau, Hans, 1948, 'World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century', *Review of Politics*, 10(2), pp. 154-173.
- Moser, Caroline, 2001, 'The Gendered Continuum of Violence and Conflict: An Operational Framework', pp. 30-52 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona, (eds), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona (eds.), 2001, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona, 2001, 'Introduction', pp. 3-12 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona, (eds), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Moser, Caroline and McIlwhaine, Cathy, 2001, 'Gender and Social Capital in Contexts of Politics Violence: Community Perspectives from Colombia and Guatemala', pp. 178-200 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona (eds), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.

- Moser, Caroline and Moser, Annalise, 2005, 'Gender Mainstreaming Since Beijing: A Review of Success and Limitations in International Institutions', *Gender and Development*, 13(2), pp. 11-22.
- Murphy, Alexander B., 1996, 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations', pp. 81-120 in Biersteker, Thomas and Weber, Cindy, (eds), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Murphy, Craig, 2002, 'Why Pay Attention to Global Governance?', pp. xi-xv11 in Wilkinson, Rorden and Hughes, Steve, (eds), *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*, London: Routledge.
- Murphy, Craig, 2001, 'What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order', pp. 261-276 in Diehl, Paul F., (ed.), *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, (2nd edn), London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Murphy, Craig, 2000, 'Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood', *International Affairs*, 76(4), pp. 789-803.
- Naraghi-Anderlini, Sanam, 2000, 'The A-B-C to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/ABC1325.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Naraghi-Anderlini, Sanam, and El-Bushra, Judy, 2004, 'The Conceptual Framework: Security, Peace, Accountability and Rights', pp. 5-13 in International Alert and Women Waging Peace, *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*, London: Hunt Alternatives.
- Narayan, Uma, 1997, *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminism*, London: Routledge.
- Newman, Edward, 2001, 'Human Security and Constructivism' *International Studies Perspectives*, 2(3), pp. 239-251.

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), 2005, 'NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security',
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/wg.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), 2004, 'Four Years On: An Alternative Report and Progress Check on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325: Findings and Recommendations for United Nations Member States and United Nations Entities from Women's Civil Society Organizations',
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/ngopub/FourYearsOnOct04.pdf>
[accessed 11 August 2006].

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), 2000a, 'Letter to Ambassadors of the Security Council on the United Nations Security Council Open Session on Women, Peace and Security',
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/ngoletters/excellence.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), 2000b, 'Oral Statement: The Role of Women in Achieving Peace and Maintaining International Security', <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/arria/ngost.pdf>
[accessed 11 August 2006].

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG), 2000c, 'NGO Statement to the Press', <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/arria/pngo.pdf>
[accessed 11 August 2006].

Niarchos, Catherine, 1995, 'Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17(4), pp. 649-690.

Nicholson, Linda, 1997, 'Introduction', pp. 1-6 in Nicholson, Linda, (ed.), *The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory*, London: Routledge.

Nicholson, Linda (ed.), 1990, *Feminism/ Postmodernism*, London: Routledge.

Niva, Steve, 1999, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East' pp. 147-172 in Weldes, Jutta, et al., (eds), *Cultures of*

Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger,
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

O'Brien, Robert, Goetz, Anne Marie, Scholte, Jan Aart and Williams, Marc,
2000, *Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions
and Global Social Movements*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI), 2003, 'Sexual Offences Act 2003',
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030042.htm> [accessed 8 January
2007].

O'Hare, Ursula A., 1999, 'Realizing Human Rights for Women', *Human Rights
Quarterly*, 21(2), pp. 364-402.

Oneal, John R., Oneal, Frances H., Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce, 1996, 'The
Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict
1950-85', *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), pp. 11-28.

Oosterveld, Valerie, 2005, 'Prosecution of Gender-Based Crimes in International
Law', pp. 67-82 in Mazurana, Dyan, Raven-Roberts, Angela and Parpart,
Jane (eds), *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping*, Oxford and Lanham MD:
Rowman and Littlefield.

O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, 1997a, 'Preface: Conceptualising Gender
Violence', pp. xi-xiv in O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, (eds.),
1997, *Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, London: New
York University Press.

O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, 1997b, 'Gender Violence in the United
States', pp. 67-73 in O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, (eds.), 1997,
Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, London: New York
University Press.

O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, 1997c, 'Changing Our Minds: Towards
Nonviolence in Gender Relations' pp. 423-426 in O'Toole, Laura and
Schiffman, Jessica, (eds.), 1997, *Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives*, London: New York University Press.

O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica, 1997d, 'The Roots of Male Violence
Against Women', pp. 3-8 in O'Toole, Laura and Schiffman, Jessica,

- (eds.), 1997, *Gender Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, London: New York University Press.
- Otto, Dianne, 2004, 'Securing the 'Gender Legitimacy' of the UN Security Council: Prising Gender From its Historical Moorings', *Legal Studies Research Paper* No. 92,
<http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/juris/Lamarche/Droitsdesfemmes/Documents/ssrn-id585923%5B1%5D-otto.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Otto, Dianne, 1996, 'Nongovernmental Organisations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 18(1), pp. 107-141.
- Ougaard, Morten, and Higgott, Richard, (eds), 2002, *Towards a Global Polity*, London: Routledge.
- Pankhurst, Donna, 2004, 'The 'Sex War' and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peacebuilding', pp. 8-42 in Afshar, Haleh and Eade, Deborah, (eds), *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Paris, Roland, 2001, 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?', *International Security*, 26(2), pp. 87-102.
- Parker, Andrew, (ed.), 1992, *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, London: Routledge.
- Parpart, Jane, 1995, 'Deconstructing the Development Expert', pp. 221-243 in Marchand, Marianne & Parpart, Jane (eds.), *Feminism, Postmodernism, Development*, London: Routledge.
- Paul, Daryl, 1999, 'Sovereignty, Survival, and the Westphalian Blind Alley', *Review of International Studies*, 25(2), pp. 217-231.
- Paul, James, 2004, 'NGOs and the Security Council', *Global Policy Forum*,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/gpfpaper.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Paul, James, 2001, 'A Short History of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council', *Global Policy Forum*,
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/history.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].

- PeaceWomen, 2005, 'A Call for Translations of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', <http://www.peacewomen.org/1325inTranslation/index.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Peck, Jamie and Tickell, Adam, 2002, 'Neoliberalizing Space', *Antipode*, 34(3), pp. 380-404.
- Peterson, V. Spike, 1999, 'Sexing Political Identities/ Nationalism as Heterosexism', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 1(1), pp. 34-65.
- Peterson, V. Spike, 1992, 'Security and Sovereign States: What is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?', pp. 31-64 in Peterson, V. Spike, (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Peterson, V. Spike and Runyan, Anne Sisson, 1999, *Global Gender Issues*, Oxford and Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Peterson, V. Spike and True, Jacqui, 1998, "'New Times" and New Conversations', pp. 14-27 in Zalewski, Marysia and Parpart, Jane, (eds), *The "Man" Question in International Relations*, Oxford and Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Pettman, Jan Jindy, 1999, 'Globalisation and the Gendered Politics of Citizenship', pp.207-220 in Yuval-Davis, Nira and Werbner, Pnina, (eds), *Women, Citizenship and Difference*, London: Zed.
- Phillips, Estelle and Pugh, Derek, 2005, *How to Get a PhD*, (4th edn), Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Pickup, Francine, Williams, Suzanne and Sweetman, Caroline, 2001, *Ending Violence Against Women: A Challenge for Development and Humanitarian Work*, Bournemouth: Oxfam.
- Pietilä, Hilikka, 2002, 'Engendering the Global Agenda: The Story of Women and the United Nations', *Development Dossier Series*, New York, NY: UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service.

- Poehlman-Doumbouya, Sara and Hill, Felicity, 2001, 'Women and Peace in the United Nations', *New Routes*, 6(3), available at http://www.life-peace.org/sajt/filer/pdf/New_Routes/nr200103.pdf [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Puechguirbal, Nadine, 2004, 'Women and Children: Deconstructing a Paradigm', *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, <http://diplomacy.shu.edu/journal/new/pdf/VolVNo1/1%20-%20Puechguirbal.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Puechguirbal, Nadine, 2003, 'Gender Training for Peacekeepers: Lessons from the DRC', *International Peacekeeping*, 10(3), pp. 113-128.
- Radcliffe, Sarah, 1993, 'Women's Place: El Lugar de Las Mujeres: Latin America and the Politics of Gender Identity', pp. 102-116 in Keith, Michael and Pile, Steve, (eds), *Place and the Politics of Identity*, London: Routledge.
- Radcliffe, Sarah and Westwood, Sallie, 1996, *Remaking the Nation: Identity and Politics in Latin America*, London: Routledge.
- Radford, Jill, 1992, 'Introduction', pp. 3-12 in Radford, Jill, and Russell, Diane, (eds.), *Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Radford, Jill, Kelly, Liz and Hester, Marianne, 1996, 'Introduction', pp. 1-16 in Hester, Marianne, Kelly, Liz and Radford, Jill, (eds), *Women, Violence and Male Power: Feminist Activism, Research and Practice*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Ramphela, Mamphela, 2000, 'Teach Me How To Be a Man: An Exploration of the Definition of Masculinity' pp. 102-119 in Das, Veena et al. (eds.), *Violence and Subjectivity*, London and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Reanda, Laura, 1999, 'Engendering the United Nations: The Changing International Agenda', *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 6(1), pp. 49-68.

- Rehn, Elizabeth and Sirleaf, Ellen, 2002, *Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-building*, New York, NY: UNIFEM, http://www.ecoi.net/pub/ds371_02550all.pdf [accessed 8 November 2005].
- Riley, Denise, 1988, *Am I That Name? Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History*, London: Macmillan.
- Rosaldo, Michelle, and Lamphere, Louise (eds), 1974, *Women, Culture and Society*, London and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rosenau, James, 1992, 'Governance, Order and Change in World Politics' pp. 1-29 in Rosenau, James and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, (eds.), *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruddick, Sara, 1989, *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Runyan, Anne Sisson, 2003, 'The Places of Women in Trading Places Revisited: Gendered Global/ Regional Regimes and Internationalized Feminist Resistance', pp. 139-156 in Kofman, Eleonore and Youngs, Gillian (eds) *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, (2nd edn), London: Continuum.
- Rupert, Mark, 2000, *Ideologies of Globalisation*, London: Routledge.
- Russett, Bruce, 1993, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Scholte, Jan Aart, 2002, 'Civil Society and Governance in the Global Polity', pp. 145-166 in Ougaard, Morton and Higgott, Richard, (eds.), *Towards a Global Polity*, London: Routledge.
- Scholte, Jan Aart, 2001, 'Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance', <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2001/wp6501.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. and Mishler, William, 2005, 'An Integrated Model of Women's Representation', *Journal of Politics*, 67(2), pp. 407-428.

- Scott, Joan, 1994, 'Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism', pp. 282-298 in Seidman, S., (ed.), *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [orig. 1988, *Feminist Studies*, 14(1), pp. 33-50].
- Segal, Lynne, 1987, *Is the Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism*, London: Virago.
- Sen, Purna, 1998, 'Development Practice and Violence Against Women', *Gender and Development*, 6(3), pp. 7-16.
- Shapiro, Michael, 2004, '"The Nation-State and Violence": Wim Wenders contra Imperial Sovereignty', pp. 101-124 in Edkins, Jenny, Pin-Fat, Véronique and Shapiro, Michael, (eds), *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics*, London: Routledge.
- Sharoni, Simona, 2001, 'Rethinking Women's Struggles in Israel-Palestine and in the North of Ireland', pp. 85-98 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona, 2001, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Shaw, Martin, 2001, 'The Unfinished Global Revolution: Intellectuals and the New Politics of International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 27(4), pp. 627-647.
- Sheehan, Mike, 2005, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Shepherd, Laura, 2006, 'Loud Voices Behind the Wall: Gender Violence and the Violent Reproduction of the International', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(2), pp. 377-401.
- Shepherd, Laura J. and Weldes, Jutta, *forthcoming* 2006, 'Security: The State (of) Being Free From Danger?', in Brauch, Hans Günter, et al., (eds), *Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century* Mosbach: AFES-PRESS.

- Skjelsbaek, Inger, 2001, 'Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship', *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(2), pp. 211-237.
- Skunk Anansie, 1997, 'Yes It's Fucking Political', *Stoosh*, London: One Little Indian Records.
- Smith, Steve, 2005, 'The Contested Concept of Security', pp. 27-62 in Booth, Ken, (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Sparke, Matthew, 2005, *In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State*, London and Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Squires, Judith, 2005, 'Rethinking Substantive Representation', paper presented at the European Consortium of Political Research 8-10 September 2005, available at <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/budapest/papers/symposia/1/squires.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Squires, Judith, 1999, *Gender in Political Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Stanko, Elizabeth A., 1994, 'Challenging the Problem of Men's Individual Violence' pp. 32-45 in Newburn, Tim and Stanko, Elizabeth A. (eds.), *Just Boys Doing Business?*, London: Routledge.
- Stanko, Elizabeth A., 1985, *Intimate Intrusions: Women's Experience of Male Violence*, London: Routledge.
- Stanley, Liz, 1997, Recovering Women in History From Feminist Deconstructionism, pp. 274-278 in Kemp, Sandra and Squires, Judith, (eds.), *Feminisms*, Oxford: Oxford University Press [orig. 1990, *Women's International Studies Forum* 13(1-2)].
- Starr, Harvey, 1992, 'Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities', *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(2), pp. 207-213.
- Staudt, Kathleen, 2003, 'Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Links to Institutional Machineries', pp. 40-66 in Rai, Shirin, *Mainstreaming Gender, Democratizing the State? Institutional Mechanisms for the*

Advancement of Women, Manchester: Manchester University Press on behalf of the United Nations.

Steans, Jill, 2003a, 'Engaging From the Margins: Feminist Encounters With the 'Mainstream' of International Relations', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5(3), pp. 428-454.

Steans, Jill, 2003b, 'Gender Inequalities and Feminist Politics in a Global Perspective', pp. 123-138 in Kofman, Eleonore and Youngs, Gillian (eds.), *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, (2nd edn), London: Continuum.

Steans, Jill and Pettiford, Lloyd, 2005, *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, (2nd edn), Harlow: Pearson Longman.

Steinbruner, John D., 2000, *Principles of Global Security*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, (ed.), 2006, *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Stone, Alison, 2005, 'Towards a Genealogical Feminism: A Reading of Judith Butler's Political Thought', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 4(1), pp. 4-24.

Sunderland, Jane, 2004, *Gendered Discourses*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Sutterlin, James, 2003, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met*, (2nd edn), London: Praeger.

Sweetman, Caroline, 2005, 'Editorial', pp. 2-7 in Sweetman, Caroline, (ed.), *Gender, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.

Swingewood, Alan, 2000, *A Short History of Sociological Thought*, (3rd edn), Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Sylvester, Christine, 2002, *Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sylvester, Christine, 1996, 'The Contributions of Feminist Theory to International Relations', pp. 254-278 in Smith, Steve, Booth, Ken and

- Zalewski, Marysia, (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sylvester, Christine, 1994, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tatchell, Peter, 2002, 'Some People Are More Equal Than Others', <http://www.petertatchell.net/hate%20crimes/moreequal.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Tehrani, Majin, (ed.), 1999, *World Apart: Human Security and Global Governance*, London: I. B. Tauris.
- Tétreault, Mary Ann and Lipschutz, Ronnie D., 2005, *Global Politics as if People Mattered*, Oxford and Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Thapar, Suruchi, 1993, 'Women as Activists, Women as Symbols: A Study of the Indian Nationalist Movement', *Feminist Review*, 44(1), pp. 81-96.
- Thomas, Caroline, 2001, 'Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the Links', *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2), pp. 159-175.
- Thomas, Caroline, 2000, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security*, London: Pluto.
- Thomas, Nicholas and Tow, William, 2002, 'The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention', *Security Dialogue*, 33(2), pp. 177-192.
- Tickner, J. Ann, 1997, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists', *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(4), pp. 611-632.
- Tickner, J. Ann, 1992, *Gender in International Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tomlinson, John, 1991, *Cultural Imperialism*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Torring, Jacob, 1999, *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*, Oxford: Blackwell.

- True, Jacqui, 2003, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy'
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 5(3), pp. 368-396.
- True, Jacqui and Mintrom, Michael, 2001, 'Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(1), pp. 27-57.
- Turshen, Meredith, 2001, 'The Political Economy of Rape' pp. 55-68 in Moser, Caroline and Clark, Fiona (eds.), *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, London: Zed Books.
- Ullman, Richard, 1983, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, 8(1), pp. 129-153.
- United Nations, 2005a, 'List of Member States',
<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- United Nations, 2005b, 'UN Security Council: Background',
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html [accessed 11 August 2006].
- United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, 2002, 'Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview', New York, NY: United Nations,
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/e65237.pdf> [accessed 17 August 2006]
- United Nations, 2000, 'Secretary-General Calls for Council Action to Ensure Women are Involved in Peace and Security Decisions', SG/SM/7598,
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001024.sgsm7598.doc.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- United Nations, 1993, 'Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women', <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- United Nations, 1983, 'Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council', S/96/Rev.7, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules.htm> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- United Nations, 1945, 'Charter of the United Nations',
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 2005, 'Security Council Resolution 1325 Annotated and Explained', http://www.womenwarpeace.org/toolbox/Annotated_1325.pdf [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 2004, 'Women, Peace and Security: UNIFEM Supporting Implementation of SC Resolution 1325', <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/supporting1325.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW), 2005, 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women', <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW), 2000, 'Gender Mainstreaming', <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/GMS.PDF> [accessed 16 August 2006].

United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women (UNFWCW), 1995, 'Beijing Platform for Action', available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/index.html> [accessed 16 August 2006].

United Nations General Assembly, 2000, 'Windhoek Declaration on the Tenth Anniversary of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group', A/55/138-S/2000/693, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55138.pdf> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2005, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security', S/2005/636, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/534/82/PDF/N0553482.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2004a, 'Women, Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General', S/2004/814,

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/534/14/PDF/N0453414.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2004b, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2004/40,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/578/09/PDF/N0457809.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2002a, 'Report of the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security', S/2002/1154,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/634/68/PDF/N0263468.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2002b, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2002/32,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/671/80/PDF/N0267180.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2001, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', S/PRST/2001/31,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/612/25/PDF/N0161225.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000a, 'Resolution 1325', S/RES/1325, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000a, 'Resolution 1325', S/RES/1325,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000b, 'Resolution 1296', S/RES/1296,
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/399/03/PDF/N0039903.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 8 November 2005].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000c, 'Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality Between Women and Men Says Security Council, in International Women's Day Statement', Press Release SC/6816,
<http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000d, 'Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General', A/55/163-S/2000/712, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/529/46/PDF/N0052946.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000e, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Report of the Secretary-General' S/2000/101, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/291/43/PDF/N0029143.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000f, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council' S/PRST/2000/7, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/340/73/PDF/N0034073.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2000g, 'Peace Inextricably Linked With Equality Between Women and Men Says Security Council, in International Women's Day Statement', SC/6816, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000308.sc6816.doc.html> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 1999, 'Resolution 1261', S/RES/1261, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/248/59/PDF/N9924859.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 1998, 'Resolution 1208', S/RES/1208, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/362/90/PDF/N9836290.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 11 August 2006].

Uvin, Peter, 1998, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Van Dijk, Teun A., 1997a, 'The Study of Discourse', pp. 1-34 in van Dijk, Teun A., (ed.), 1997, *Discourse as Structure and Process*, London: SAGE.

Van Dijk, Teun A., 1997b, 'Discourse as Interaction in Society', pp. 1-37 in van Dijk, Teun A., (ed.), 1997, *Discourse as Social Interaction*, London: SAGE.

- Varadarajan, Latha, 2004, 'Identity and Neoliberal (In)Security', *Review of International Studies*, 30(3), pp. 319-342.
- Väyrynen, Tarja, 2004, 'Gender and UN Peace Operations: The Confines of Modernity', *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), pp. 125-142.
- Viotti, Paul and Kauppi, Mark, 1999, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, (3rd edn), London and Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Waeber, Ole, 1995, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', pp. 46-86 in Lipschutz, Ronnie D., (ed.), *On Security*, Chichester: Columbia University Press.
- Walby, Sylvia, 2005, 'Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and in Practice', *Social Politics*, 12(3), pp. 321-343.
- Walby, Sylvia, 1992, Post-Post-Modernism? Theorising Social Complexity, pp. 31-52 in Barrett, Michelle and Phillips, Anne, (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Walker, R. B. J., 2002, 'International/Inequality', *International Studies Review*, 4(2), pp. 1-24.
- Walker, R. B. J., 1997, 'The Subject of Security', pp. 61-82 in Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C., (eds), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press.
- Walker, R. B. J., 1993, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walker, R. B. J., 1991, 'State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 20(3), pp. 445-461.
- Walker, R. B. J., 1990, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice' pp. 159-186 in Walker, R. B. J. and Mendlowitz, Saul H., (eds), *Contending Sovereignities: Redefining Political Communities*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Walt, Stephen, 2000, 'Fads, Fevers and Firestorms', *Foreign Policy*, 121, pp. 34-42.

- Walt, Stephen, 1991, 'Renaissance in Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), pp. 211-239.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 2000, 'Structural Realism After the Cold War', *International Security*, 25(1), pp. 5-41.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 1993, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, 18(2), pp. 44-79.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 1979, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 1967, 'The Politics of Peace', *International Studies Quarterly*, 11(3), pp. 199-211.
- Waltz, Kenneth, 1959, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Weber, Cynthia, 1995, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, Cynthia, 1994 'Good Girls, Little Girls and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Keohane's Critique of Feminist International Relations' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 23(2), pp. 337-349.
- Weber, Cynthia, 1992, 'Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary', *Review of International Studies*, 18(3), pp. 199-216.
- Weeks, Jeffrey, 1981, *Sex, Politics and Society*, London: Longman Books.
- Weiss, Thomas G., 2000, 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges', *Third World Quarterly*, 21(5), pp. 795-814.
- Weldes, Jutta, (ed.), 2003, *To Seek Out New Worlds: Exploring Links Between Science Fiction and World Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Weldes, Jutta, Laffey, Mark, Gusterson, Hugh and Duvall, Raymond, 1999, 'Introduction: Constructing Insecurity', pp. 1-33 in Weldes, Jutta, et al., (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

- Weldes, Jutta, 1996, 'Constructing National Interest', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3), pp. 275-318.
- Wendt, Alexander, 1992, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It', *International Organization*, 46(2), pp. 391-425.
- Whitbread, Jasmine, 2005, 'Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Reduction: From Challenge to Opportunity', pp. 41-49 in Sweetman, Caroline, (ed.), *Gender, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Whitehead, A. et al., 1993, 'Editorial', *Feminist Review*, 44(1), pp. 1-4.
- Williams, John, 2003, 'Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good Fences Still Make Good Neighbours?', *Geopolitics*, 8(2), pp. 25-46.
- Williams, Suzanne, 2004, 'Mission Impossible: Gender, Conflict and Oxfam GB', pp. 315-336 in Afshar, Haleh and Eade, Deborah, (eds), *Development, Women and War: Feminist Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Wilkinson, Rorden, 2002, 'The Contours of Courtship: The WTO and Civil Society', pp. 193-211 in Wilkinson, Rorden and Hughes, Steve, (eds), *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives*, London: Routledge.
- Wilson, J. Zoë, 2005, 'State Making, Peacemaking and the Inscription of Gendered Politics into Peace: Lessons From Angola', pp. 242-264 in Mazurana, Dyan, Raven-Roberts, Angela and Parpart, Jane (eds), *Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping*, Oxford and Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Winter, Bronwyn, Thompson, Denise and Jeffreys, Sheila, 2002, 'The UN Approach to Harmful Traditional Practices', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 4(1), pp. 72-94.
- Wolfers, Arnold, 1952, '"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), pp. 481-502.
- Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2005, 'Mission Statement', <http://www.womenscommission.org/about/mission.shtml> [accessed 11 August 2006].

- Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 2005, 'Welcome to the Website of the WILPF International', <http://www.wilpf.int.ch/> [accessed 11 August 2006].
- Woodward, Kathryn, 'Concepts of Identity and Difference' pp. 7-62 in Woodward, Kathryn, (ed.), *Identity and Difference*, London: SAGE.
- Wyn Jones, Richard, 2005, 'On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity and Concrete Utopias', pp. 215-236 in Booth, Ken, (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Yanow, Dvora, 1996, *How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion, 2003, 'The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 29(1), pp. 1-25.
- Youngs, Gillian, 2003, 'Private Pain/ Public Peace: Women's Rights as Human Rights and Amnesty International's Report on Violence Against Women', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4), pp. 1209-1229.
- Youngs, Gillian, 1999, *International Relations in a Global Age: A Conceptual Challenge*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira, 1997, *Gender and Nation*, London: SAGE
- Zalewski, Marysia, 2000, *Feminism After Postmodernism: Theorising Through Practice*, London: Routledge.
- Zalewski, Marysia, 1996, 'All These Theories yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up': Theories, Theorists, Theorising', pp. 340-353 in Smith, Steve, Booth, Ken and Zalewski, Marysia, (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zalewski, Marysia, 1995, 'Well, What is the Feminist Perspective on Bosnia?', *International Affairs*, 71(2), pp. 339-356.
- Zuckerman, Elaine and Greenberg, Marcia, 2005, 'The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for

Laura Shepherd
University of Bristol

Policymakers', pp. 70-82 in Sweetman, Caroline, (ed.), *Gender, Peacebuilding and Reconstruction*, Oxford: Oxfam GB.